among the Christians afterwards. It is aftonishing to confider how fond the Chriftians were, in the firft ages of this church, to believe, and to make others believe, that all the myfteries of their religion had been revealed by the writings of pagan philofophers, many centuries before they were fo by the preaching of Christ and his apoítles: as if the latter could want, or the former give any additional authority. It was to promote this opinion, that fo many books were forged under the names of Mercurius Trismegiftus of Hyftafpes, of the Sybils, and perhaps of others. Thefe forgeries, indeed, were fo grofs, that they might be well fufpected even at the time they were publifhed. Their credit, however, was maintained, till they had had in fome degree the effect they were defigned to have. When they could have this effect in any degree no longer, they were rejected, and even condemned. There was the lefs need of them for the abfurd purposes to which they were applied, because the writings of Plato, writings indifputably his, were public; and because his works alone, wherein was mingled much of the pythagorean and other antient theology, formed an ample and fufficient repertory of theological fables and fymbols, and of metaphyfical myfteries. They who have employed themfelves from thofe days to ours in raifing fyftems of divinity on the gofpel, and impofing their own inventions by pretending the authority of it, have contented themfelves accordingly with the affiftance of Plato and Ariftotle; of the mafter for fublimity of matter; of the scholar for fubtilty of form.

If the abfurdity of thofe, who have gone about to explain, to confirm, and even to improve christianity by the doctrines and authority of paganifim, be, as it is furely, very aftonishing; we must confefs, that it is ftill more aftonishing to obferve the ftrange conformi

"Res enim et verba fcholam Platenis fapiunt, iis ex"ceptis, quæ mifcet è libris divinis." Cafaub. fpeaking of one of these books, in his exercit.

ty

ty between platonism and genuine chriftianity itself, fuch as it is taught in the original gofpel. We need not ftand to compare them here. Particular inftances of conformity will occur often enough. In general, the platonic and christian systems have a very near refemblance, " qualis decet effe fororum:" and feveral of the fathers, as well as modern, divines, have endeavoured with all their might, by forced conftructions, and sometimes by no very faithful extracts, to make this resemblance appear ftill greater. Ridiculous endeavours, no doubt, fince they give unbelievers occafion to fay, that if the doctrines are the fame, they must have been deduced from the fame principle, and to afk what that principle was, whether reafon or revelation? If we fay it was reafon; they will reply, that reafon could not discover what reason cannot comprehend when it is difcovered. A mystery may be an object of faith to him, to whom it is communicated in an intelligible propofition. But it muft be an object of knowledge in him who communicates it, and requires an affent to it, on his own authority, that is, on a confidence that he knows it to be true, and that it is no mystery to him. If we fay it was revelation; they will reply, that Plato then must have been illuminated by the holy ghoft; that he must have been the precursor of the faviour, as fome platonic bigots have ventured, with a very little foftening to the term, to call him; and that he must have been a precurfor too of more importance than St. John. St. John inftituted a baptifin of repentance; and much has been faid by antient and modern doctors in theology to ftate the difference between this baptifm and that of Chrift, baptifm with water, and baptifm with the holy ghoft and with fire t. Thefe terms, as dark as they are, fhew however a manifeft difference; and there can be no doubt that the baptifm of Jesus was much more effectual than the baptifm of John,

In aquâ in pœnitentiam.

+ In fpiritu fancto, et igni. Mat. cap. iii.

as

"

as that of John was effectual to higher purposes than that of the Jews. But Plato, instead of calling on men in general to repent, and of inftituting one inyftical ceremony, anticipated the gospel on fo many principal articles of belief and practice, that, as fome divines fay the gospel was a republication of the law of nature, the unbelievers will fay it was a republication of the theology of Plato. They will argue « à "fortiori," that fince the republication of these myfteries was made by divine revelation, the publication of them must have been of neceffity made by the fame means, and they will conclude, perhaps by afking with a fneer, whether a man, whofe paffion for courtefans, and handfome boys, infpired him to write fo many lewd verfes, was likely to be infpired by the holy ghoft?

Such confiderations as thefe are more than fufficient to explode the impertinent and profane notion, that Plato was infpired immediately, or that he had, in any lower degree metaphyficians can imagine, fuch a fhare of divine illumination as enabled him to difcover, in part at least, thofe myfterious truths that were not to be fully revealed till the Meffiah came. But the queftion returns, how came he to discover them, even .in part, near four centuries before the Meffiah did come? or how came they to make a part of that pagan theology from which he took them? A plain anfwer may be made to thefe queftions: and I think there is no other that can be reconciled to common fense. I have hinted at it already: but it requires to be more explained. All we can know of the divine nature, of the attributes, providence, and will of God, must be communicated to us by his word, or collected by us from his works. The heathen philofophers had not his word, and they corrupted all the knowledge they acquired from his works by their manner of philofophifing. They not only haftened too rafhly from particular to general knowledge, and from a few imperfect obfervations of the phænomena, to the most extenfive hypothefes, but they raised hypothefes

pothefes independently of the observations they made, or might have made, and then reafoned on these hypothefes as from certain principles of knowledge: fo that the little real knowledge they acquired" à pofte"riori" was controuled by that which they fancied that they acquired "à priori," and thus the whole mafs of the first philofophy was corrupted. They difcovered, in his works, a firft intelligent cause of all things, a Being of infinite power and wifdom, whofe providence is over all his creatures, and whose will, relatively to man, is manifested in the whole human fyftem. Here was abundant matter of real knowledge. Thus far the Supreme Being lets himself down, if I may use fuch an expreffion, within the verge of human comprehenfion, and of human alone, as far as we can judge of the animal world about us. Beyond this fixed point we can have no real ideas, and therefore no real knowledge. All that we may imagine we have, is, and mut be, fantaftical. We are no more able to acquire knowledge beyond, than other animals up to this point: and the divine nature, the manner of being, the moral attributes of God, the general fyftem of his providence, are as infcrutable to man as to them. His will too, according to which they are determined by natural instinct, is as infcrutable to us, as to them, beyond the bounds of natural revelation, unless a fupernatural revelation communicate farther knowledge, which it did not to thefe philofophers.

What now was their proceeding? Did they ftop where the means of knowledge ftop? Not at all. Where the fyftem ended, the hypothefis began; and with this difference between thefe and all other hypothefes, that thofe which are made in phyfics are made on fubjects on which we have much knowledge, and means in our power of acquiring more; whereas bypothefes in theology are made on a fubject we know little of, and have not the means of knowing more. Error in the former may be corrected by improvement of knowledge: error in the latter cannot, because there can be no improvement beyond the point where fuch hypothefes

hypothefes begin. It has been obferved in these effays, and more than once, perhaps, that there are philofophers who boast much of the power which the human mind has of ranging far and wide in the regions of poffibility, and of perceiving what may be, as well as what is, from whence they draw very foolish conclufions in favor of human understanding. Now that the mind of man has fuch a power, we know most consciously. But we know, or may know too as consciously, that the exercife of this power is dangerous, and that he who does not use it under a ftrict controul of judgment on imagination, will be fure to render his conduct and his science both fantaftical. Plato, like all the divines of paganifm, was far from preferving fuch a controul. No man had more imagination; no man controuled it lefs.

It would be eafy to conceive, if we had not his works before us, that fuch extravagant methods of philofophifing must have produced the most extravagant opinions and he who reads thefe works, like a man in his fenfes, will be tempted to think, on many occafions, that the author was not fo. I fay on many occafions; for on fome it is certain, that he writes like a very pious and rational theift and moralift. But on the whole, his writings are pieces of patch-work, and there are few of them that do not abound in falfe fublime and low images, in things above comprehenfion, in things below notice in the brightest truths, and the fouleft errors: and, to come to the prefent purpose, fome of them abound in notions that are agreeable to the chriftian fyftem, and in others that are repugnant to it; or that bearing an appearance of likenefs, nay of fameness, are much more proper to promote fuperftition and enthufiafm, as in fact they did, than true religion. Thefe confiderations, every one of which may be juftified by the most famous of his dialogues, gave occafion, perhaps, to fome difference that arofe in the reception of platonifm by the chriftian fathers. St. Chryfoftom, it is faid, declaimed against it: and I

remember