neighboring kingdom, countenanced the pretensions of Dom Miguel to the Portuguese crown, and supported the efforts of his partisans to overthrow the regency and the charter. Hostile inroads into

change entirely the character of the proposed step. The amendment was upon the theory that Yucatan might be treated by us as a part of the republic of Mexico, and occupied by us as part of our war against that power. This was supported by Mr. Jefferson Davis; but the administration party generally, led by Mr. Cass and Mr. Hannegan, favored the original bill, and supported it on the ground of preventing by anticipation a new European dependency. The opposition resisted both schemes throughout. While the discussion was going on, news arrived of a treaty between the Indians and whites in Yucatan; and the project of taking possession was abandoned. During this debate, Mr. Calhoun made a speech upon the Monroe Doctrine, significant from the fact that he was a leading member of Mr. Monroe's Cabinet at the time of the message, and at this time the only survivor. He gave the history of the declaration respecting foreign interposition in American affairs, now well known, and referred to hereafter; its origin in the attempt to extend the arm of the Holy Alliance over Spanish America; and states that the subject was gravely considered by the Cabinet, on receiving from Mr. Rush Mr. Canning's proposal, and that the language in which the declaration was couched was carefully weighed and agreed upon by the entire Cabinet. These are the passages at the close of the message, in connection with the affairs of Spanish America, relating to attempts of the European powers to extend their system over this hemisphere, and interpositions to oppress or control the destiny of any American State. As to the paragraph relating to colonization, introduced into the early part of the message, in connection with the British and Russian boundaries, Mr. Calhoun says that was not submitted to the Cabinet, and formed no part of the principle they intended to announce; but was a disconnected position taken by Mr. Adams, in the negotiations under his sole charge with Russia and England, which the President introduced into his message, by Mr. Adams's advice, in that connection. Mr. Calhoun treated it as limited to acquisitions of sovereignty over unoccupied regions of country by virtue of prior colonization, and as having no relation to such transfers of acknowledged sovereign territory as may be made by coercion or voluntary agreement between civilized nations. He says: "The word 'colonization' has a specific meaning. It means the establishment of a settlement, by emigrants from the parent country, in a territory either uninhabited, or from which the inhabitants have been partially or wholly expelled." No doubt, the same objections existed against new foreign dominions, however they might be derived; but the paragraph only declared against deriving dominion from colonization, as not admissible in the condition which the continent had reached. As to the other and more general doctrine of opposition to European intervention, Mr. Calhoun took the ground which had been taken in the Panama discussion, and which the opposition was then holding in the case before the Senate, that the United States was under no pledge to intervene against intervention, but was to act in each case as policy and justice required; and that, in this case, there was no proof of a danger of actual transfer to a European power, or if there were, that the object was important enough to us to warrant our intervention.

At the time Mr. Calhoun made this speech, as has been said, neither Mr. Adams nor Mr. Monroe was living; but Mr. Calhoun referred back to his speech on the Oregon question, where he says he made the statement that the clause respecting colonization was not submitted to the Cabinet. "I stated it in order that Mr. Adams might have an opportunity of denying it, or asserting the real state of the facts. He remained silent; and I presume that my statement is correct." Calhoun's Works,

the territory of Portugal were concerted in Spain, and executed with the connivance of the Spanish authorities, by Portuguese troops, belonging to the party of the Pretender, who had deserted

iv. 454. Mr. Calhoun's statement derives confirmation also from the fact that this subject of colonization is not noticed in the correspondence, hereafter cited, between Mr. Monroe and Mr. Jefferson, to whom the subject of a declaration had been referred by Mr. Monroe.

In explanation of this movement respecting Yucatan, and the attempt to invoke, in its aid, the popularity of the Monroe Doctrine, it should be remembered that the slave-power had obtained an ascendency in the counsels of the nation; that Mr. Polk's administration was devoted to its interests; and that its purpose was to add slave States to the Union by extending our territory southward, and, eventually, by the acquisition of Cuba. It was not politic, with reference to its Northern adherents, to avow the motive; and its movements were made under the color of preventing foreign intervention or the acquisition of foreign dominion, and under the sanction of a popular tradition. Mr. Calhoun not only saw that the Monroe Doctrine was perverted, but believed that the cause of slavery extension would be perilled by involving the country in foreign complications in its behalf, on novel and doubtful principles.

A careful examination of this history, from the first letters of Mr. Adams to Mr. Rush and Mr. Middleton, in 1823, to the close of the Yucatan debate, will show that the general object of Mr. Adams was to prevent the establishment on this continent of new colonial dependencies of European powers. These were objectionable by reason of the restrictions and exclusions on commerce and navigation which, to that time, formed part of the European colonial systems, especially when such colonies lay at the mouth of a river occupied above by American colonies, or the converse; and by reason of the totally different political systems of which they would become a part, as distant from our own in principle as in geographic space. It was not necessary to declare that one State shall not appropriate by colonization part of the recognized territory of another State. That would be an act of war, the world over. It was not necessary to take the new and peculiar position, that, if any parts of this continent were lying fera natura and beyond the recognized limits of a civilized State, they still should be closed to the colonization of any but the independent States of this continent: excluding not only European States unconnected with the continent, but those that now had possessions here. Mr. Adams thought the end could be attained by declaring that no part of the continent was in that condition; that it was all, in his own words, "occupied by civilized nations," and "accessible to Europeans and each other on that footing alone." It will be seen that this declaration has ceased to be of much consequence, as no doubt can now be made that such is the present condition of the continent. By treaties and long possession, the boundaries of the continent have been adjusted, among the American States and the previously existing foreign colonies, upon the theory of including all parts of the continent within the domain of a recognized State, from the Polar Seas to the Straits of Magellan. If any portion of an American State should hereafter become a foreign dependency, it must be as a result of coercion or of voluntary compact, and not by virtue of title founded on appropriation by recent primary occupation.

In the debates in the Senate of the United States in 1855-56, on the construction to be given to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, there was some discussion as to the effect of the phrase "occupy and colonize." That treaty, which was intended to secure an inter-oceanic transit across the Isthmus, and, for that purpose, to maintain the neutrality of the region in use, contained this clause: "The governments of the

into Spain, and were received and succored by the Spanish authorities on the frontiers. Under these circumstances, the British government received an application from the regency of Portugal, United States and Great Britain hereby declare, that neither one nor the other will ever occupy or fortify or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America; nor will either make use of any protection which either affords or may afford, or any alliance which either has or may have to or with any State or people, for the purpose of erecting or maintaining any such fortifications, or of occupying, fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion over the same." The British Government took the position that this clause related only to future acts, and did not embrace places in their possession at the time the treaty was made. This construction was rejected by the United States. The words "fortify or colonize, or assume . . . dominion over," doubtless look solely to the future. The word "occupy " may be ambiguous. It has, in the Law of Nations, a technical sense, derived from the Roman law, signifying the taking original possession of any thing not at the time in possession, and therefore open to appropriation, as of animals feræ naturæ, or of things derelict, &c.; and, when applied to territory, signifying the acquisition of sovereign title by original occupation of a place not at the time within the occupation and jurisdiction of a recognized sovereignty. But, in its general and popular sense, it signifies merely the act or condition of possessing: as successive tenants are said to occupy a house, or a military force a town. In the former sense, the word would be limited to future acts; while, in the latter sense, it would not. But the American argument did not rest on the character of one word, but on the sense of the entire clause, especially as colored by the words "exercise dominion."

We now proceed to examine that distinct branch of the Monroe Doctrine which relates to European intervention in American affairs.

The result of the congresses at Laybach and Verona was an alliance of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France; the ostensible object of which was to preserve the peace of Europe, and to put down conspiracies against established power, consecrated rights, and social order: but, as the allies acknowledged no legitimate basis of right and order except the existing hereditary sovereign houses of Europe, the practical result was a combination of forces against all changes in the direction of liberal institutions not voluntarily made by the sovereigns. In accordance with the spirit of this alliance, the movements for free constitutions in 1821 in Spain, Naples, and Piedmont, were put down by armed intervention, and absolutism re-instated. At this time, the Spanish colonies in America, after years of warfare, had substantially secured their independence, which had been recognized by the United States; but Spain still asserted her claim; and the independence of the provinces had not been acknowledged by Great Britain diplomatically, though she had sent consuls to their principal ports. In 1823, to carry out the purposes of the Holy Alliance, France invaded Spain, to suppress the constitutional government of the Cortes established there, and restore absolutism in the person of Ferdinand VII. As the success of the French invasion became certain, there were signs that the parties to the Holy Alliance intended to go further, and lend their aid to Ferdinand VII. to restore his dominion over the Spanish-American provinces. The fears of this course were justified by the previous language of the Holy Alliance. In the Laybach circular of May 12, 1821, they distinctly declared that they regarded "as equally null, and disallowed by the public law of Europe, any pretended reform effected by revolt and open force;" and in their circular of Dec. 5, 1822, respecting the constitutional government in

claiming, in virtue of the ancient treaties of alliance and friendship subsisting between the two crowns, the military aid of Great Britain against the hostile aggression of Spain. In acceding to Spain, they declared their resolution "to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place or under whatever form it might show itself;' "thus repeating their claim made at Troppau, "that the European powers have an undoubted right to take a hostile attitude in regard to those States in which the overthrow of the government might operate as an example." England professed, also, to see indications that France intended to be compensated for her effective intervention, by a cession of some American province, and Cuba was the suspected reward.

Great Britain, who had never been party to this alliance, and protested against the intervention of 1821, took special umbrage at the French invasion of Spain, her late ally, from whose borders she had, only ten years before, expelled the French armies. There was a strong popular inclination in England to make this invasion a cause of war; but this was not seconded by the ministry, who betook themselves to diplomatic efforts to defeat the schemes of the continental powers. The French Government, on its part, had its suggestion that the British Cabinet was determined to send a squadron, and take possession of Cuba. The people of Cuba, already divided between the parties of the king and the Cortes, and terrified by symptoms of slave insurrections, had among them large numbers who, dissatisfied with Spanish rule, looked to other powers for protection, some to Great Britain, but far the larger part to the United States. About September, 1822, the latter party sent a secret agent to confer with President Monroe. They declared, that, if the United States Government would promise them protection, and ultimate admission into the Union, a revolution would be made to throw off the Spanish authority, of the success of which they had no doubt. While this proposition was before Mr. Monroe's Cabinet, he received an unofficial and circuitous communication from the French Minister, asserting that his government had positive information of the design of Great Britain to take possession of Cuba. The American Government replied to the Cuban deputation, that the friendly relations of the United States with Spain did not permit us to promise countenance or protection to insurrectional movements, and advised the people of Cuba to adhere to their Spanish allegiance; at the same time informing them that an attempt upon Cuba, by either Great Britain or France, would place the relations of Cuba with the United States in a very different position. Mr. Rush was instructed to inform Mr. Canning that the United States could not see with indifference the possession of Cuba by any European power other than Spain, and to inform him of the rumors that had reached the Cabinet. Mr. Canning disavowed emphatically all intention on the part of Great Britain to take possession of Cuba, but avowed her determination not to see with indifference its occupation by either France or the United States; and proposed an understanding between the British, French, and American governments, without any formal convention, that Cuba should be left in the quiet possession of Spain. This was assented to by Mr. Monroe; but he had no communication with France on the subject, leaving that to the management of Great Britain.

As respects the Spanish colonies which had been at war with Spain for their independence, the United States were naturally anxious about the movements of the allies; and Mr. Adams had communicated to Mr. Rush at London, in general terms, the strong feeling of the government, and the earnest popular opinion on that subject. The British Government was also very solicitous to prevent all intervention against those provinces by the continental powers, and to leave them free to

that application, and sending a corps of British troops for the defence of Portugal, it was stated by the British minister that the Portuguese Constitution was admitted to have proceeded from a complete their independence. This would not only, with the arrangement respecting Cuba, defeat the Transatlantic schemes of France, if she had any, and, in the famous words of Mr. Canning, "call the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old," but would repress generally the absolutist powers on the continent, avenge the affront to Great Britain by the invasion of Spain, and procure for England the benefit of an unrestricted commerce with Spanish America. Mr. Canning feared that a formal recognition of the independence of those colonies might involve England in a war with the continental powers; but was confident that their independence would be secured, if all intervention or hope of intervention in aid of Spain, could be effectually precluded. With this view, Mr. Canning, in August and September, 1823, urged upon Mr. Rush a combined declaration by Great Britain and the United States to the effect, that, while they aimed at the possession of no portion of the Spanish colonies for themselves, and would not obstruct any amicable negotiations between the colonies and the mother country, they could not see with indifference the intervention of any foreign power, or the transfer to such power of any of the colonies. In support of his request, Mr. Canning stated that a proposal would be made for a European Congress, to settle the affairs of Spanish America; and said that Great Britain would take no part in it, except upon the terms that the United States should be represented. Mr. Rush replied, as to the Congress, that it was the traditional policy of the United States to take no part in European politics; and, having no instructions from his government, said he would still take the responsibility of joining in the declaration, if Great Britain would first acknowledge the independence of the colonies. Mr. Canning not being ready to take this decisive step, the proposed joint declaration was never made; but Mr. Rush communicated the proposal to his government; the result of which was the celebrated declaration against European intervention in Mr. Monroe's annual message of Dec. 2, 1823.

In Mr. Monroe's Cabinet at that time, John Quincy Adams was Secretary of State, and Mr. Calhoun Secretary of War; and, beside the advice derived from them, Mr. Monroe laid the subject of Mr. Canning's proposal before Mr. Jefferson, then in retirement, -and asked his opinion. Mr. Jefferson replied by an elaborate letter, of 24 October, 1823. (Jefferson's Life, iii. 491.) He says: "Our first maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with Cisatlantic affairs." Referring to the great power Great Britain could wield for good or evil in these controversies, and expressing his gratification at the stand she was then taking, and recognizing the fact that we could not join in the declaration if we had any designs upon Cuba or any American State ourselves, he advised Mr. Monroe to join in the declaration, which Mr. Jefferson worded thus: "That we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions; that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between the colonies and their mother country; that we will oppose with all our means the forcible interposition of any other power as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way."

It will be seen that the administration did not accept Mr. Canning's proposal for a joint declaration, but spoke for the United States alone; and, in doing so, did not adopt the declaration proposed by Mr. Canning and recommended by Mr. Jefferson, but a very different one. After treating of various other matters, foreign and domestic, as