susceptibilities of democratic temper in the several States would permit, by making the President supreme over all appointments, and able to select and to retain his ministers in defiance of hostile majorities in Congress.

In Washington's hands the new political organization worked well, and the Executive seemed almost strong enough. Such difficulties as arose even at that early stage of the experiment were easily surmounted by his promptitude, resolution, and prestige. But Washington was a man in a million. He achieved success in the two most arduous enterprises which can try the faculties of statesmen: he conducted a revolutionary war to a triumphant issue, with the smallest conceivable means and against the most powerful nation in the world; and he inaugurated and administered for eight years a Constitution peculiar, unprecedented, and in some points unavoidably and incurably defective from its origin. His embarrassments and the scantiness of his resources as a revolutionary chief have seldom been done justice to. Wellington's difficulties in the early days of his Peninsular campaigns, though analogous in some respects and formidable enough, were trivial in comparison.

The American Revolution presented many features which distinguished it from most other movements of a similar nature, and added enormously to the obstacles and complications with which its leaders had to contend. In the first place, during all its earlier stages, it was not a revolution at all, or even a rebellion. It was merely a resistance in the name of law and constitutional right to an illegal exercise of power. For many years the colonists had no idea of assailing, much less of overthrowing, the king's authority: they merely aimed at confining it within legitimate bounds. There was in consequence every degree of difference of opinion as to the extent to which resistance should be pushed, and the means by which it was to be carried on. The great majority of the colonists were sincerely attached to the mother country, were even ardent in their loyalty, and were shocked at the bare notion of rebellion or separation; and these sentiments continued to animate them up to a very late period of the contest. Thus the chiefs of the movement had to guide and to act for a people

who were anything but united in their sentiments and purposes, and whose views, moreover, were in a constant state of fluctuation and of progressive development.

Then, again, when resistance had become general and resolute, when all word of compromise or submission was over, and when ulterior plans and hopes began to present themselves to a few of the more advanced and excited spirits, the very simplicity and purity of the motives which led to the rebellion placed serious barriers in the way of its success. It was resistance in the name of a sacred principle, not revolt against cruel and unendurable oppression. It was carried on to assert a constitutional right, not to escape from or resent a hideous wrong. The tax to which the colonists refused to submit was a mere trifle: no one would have felt its pressure; no one would have refused or grudged its payment, had it but been legitimately levied. The colonists had no atrocious tyranny to escape from; justice was purely administered; their property was secure; their personal liberty was never menaced; their religion and their claims of conscience never came in question. They had everything they could wish for, as far as practical freedom and the daily enjoyments of life were concerned; but they would not be taxed without their own consent, even to the extent of a few shillings per head; and for this they went to war. Now, it is evident that a motive of this sort, honorable and defensible as it may be, is very inferior in stimulating and sustaining power to those barbarous and unjust tyrannies, and that burning passion for emancipation and revenge, which have usually caused nations to rise in armed rebellion against their rulers. It may suffice to make men vote, harangue, combine, go to prison for a while perhaps; seldom to make them-seldomer still to make them cheerfully-endure severe privations, or encounter with unflinching spirit the sacrifices and hardships inseparable from a prolonged and dubious strife. The origin of the rebellion thus goes far to explain the general backwardness and lukewarmness of which Washington had so frequently occasion to complain. Had the colonists suffered more, and had more reason for resistance, their emancipation would have been incomparably easier.

But, besides all this, Washington, properly speaking, had no army, no authority, no means, no government. He had literally to make bricks without straw. The Colonies hitherto had been entirely distinct and unconnected with each other; they were unaccustomed to combined action; and the assembly of delegates improvised for the occasion was without constituted authority, and therefore without power. They could appoint Washington their commander-in-chief, but that was about all. They could not compel his officers to obey him; they could not compel soldiers to flock to his standard; they could not compel citizens to administer to the necessities of his army. They could authorize him to make requisitions, but they could not empower him to enforce them, nor oblige the several States to recognize them. They could not legally contract loans nor levy taxes. They could only decide what contributions should be called for, and recommend and urge the people of each State to give their quota cheerfully. Persuasion, both at the seat of government and at the headquarters of the army, had to do the work of authority. Washington himself, as well as the civil leaders, had to raise the sinews of war by argument, by entreaty, by remonstrance, by personal influence, in short. Merchants, planters, magistrates, officers, sent in loans and contributions as they could or as they felt moved to do. The contest was, in fact, very much carried on by subscription, and this had to be done for years.

In the army itself nearly the same state of affairs prevailed. The soldiers were in a manner volunteers. They enlisted only for a time; desertion seemed almost legal, since it was only desertion from a rebel force; they felt themselves in a manner at liberty to disband when they were weary, or had fought through one campaign, or when domestic or agricultural concerns wanted their presence at home; and thus they sometimes dispersed just when a victory had to be turned to account, or a defeat to be repaired, or a promising enterprise to be undertaken. Then the soldiers often chose their own officers, and would obey no others. All orders and plans were freely discussed; the commander-in-chief had to persuade his regimental colonels rather than to direct them; his army was more of a voluntary association than an organized body of

troops. Power there was almost none; authority could do little; personal influence, moral and intellectual qualities, had to do the work of both. And all this time-while Washington had to control his men, to exhort his officers, to beg sometimes almost piteously for supplies-he had to fight more numerous and powerful antagonists, whom nothing but the imbecility of their commanders could have enabled him to overcome; and to contend against the mean jealousies, the ill-timed parsimony, and the ungenerous exigencies and suspicions of his fellow-citizens. Nay, more; he had to keep together, and to inspire with zeal and submission to needful discipline, an army often without food, usually without pay, always unsupported by magazines and stores, yet sternly forbidden to supply their wants by plunder or exactions.

Truly here was a field, such as few men have, for the exercise of that hopeful and untiring patience which is perhaps the sublimest and most difficult of virtues; and never was there a more magnificent example of this attribute than Washington. His military genius was no doubt great; but it was as nothing compared with the moral qualities which were required to bear up against those difficulties which deprived military genius of its fairest opportunities. His reputation was founded, not on splendid days, but on painful years; not on a series of those brilliant and startling achievements in which, if there is much of inspiration, there is often yet more of accident; but on a whole life of toil, sacrifice, selfcontrol, and self-abnegation, such as no man can lead whose principles and whose virtues are not rooted in the very deepest recesses of his nature.

His sagacity in governing the State was as eminent as his ability in creating it. For eight years he ruled the young commonwealth with rare prudence and firmness, showing the same resolute front to domestic insubordination as to foreign encroachment; and when he retired in 1797 to the private happiness he had so long sighed for, he left behind him that Farewell Address which is perhaps the most touching legacy of wisdom and affection ever bequeathed by a ruler to his native land. The exhortation shows with how true a foresight he laid his finger on each one of the dangers and weak

nesses of the Republic. He warns his countrymen against "geographical divisions,"—against the bad habit, even as a phrase, of speaking of the North and the South. He tells them that to be a NATION, they must have a central government, which should be the chief object of their loyalty, and which no local or democratic jealousies should be allowed to weaken; but he does this in language which proves how doubtful he felt in his heart whether the Union could permanently be preserved. "Let experience solve the question, he says; "to listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal." He exhorts them earnestly to uphold public credit and the strictest national integrity at any cost, by careful economy and cheerful acquiescence in necessary taxes. Finally, he recommends a policy of rigid neutrality towards foreign countries, peace, forbearance, but above all the most magnanimous and scrupulous justice and good faith; and, knowing his countrymen, he assures them that in the longrun this policy, and this alone, will pay.

By the universal consent of mankind, Washington stands out among statesmen as the wisest, best, and purest ruler who ever governed a free nation. He was pre-eminent, no doubt, among his colleagues and countrymen both in wisdom and in virtue, but he had many wise and virtuous men to assist him in his work. Jefferson, Hamilton, Randolph, Jay, Madison, and Adams, though holding very different opinions, were all earnest and high-minded patriots. The first among them did ultimately much harm by the uncompromising democracy of his principles; but they were all worthy coadjutors of their noble chief. There were giants in those days; there are only dwarfs now. What are the advantages, and what should be

the future of a nation which started on its career with such a man as Washington for its representative and guide! -W. R. GREG.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WASHINGTON.

How infinitely superior must appear the spirit and principles of General Washington, in his late address to Congress, compared with the policy of modern European courts! Illustrious man!—deriving honor less from the splendor of his