These two fundamental propositions are so intimately connected, and the latter is so essentially dependent on the former, that they must stand or fall together. And, consequently, we find, that the man who obstinately rejects the doctrine of a future state, either avows himself a down. right atheist, or acts precisely in the same way as a person would do, who believes that a Supreme Moral Governor has no existence. But even the principles of atheism itself, though frequently embraced by vicious characters to allay their fears, are not sufficient to remove all apprehensions in regard to a future existence. For, if the universe be the production merely of an eternal succession of causes and effects, produced by blind necessity impelling the atoms of matter through the voids of immensity-what should hinder, that amidst the infinite combinations arising from perpetual motion, men should be created, destroyed, and again ushered into existence, with the same faculties, reminiscences, perceptions and relations as in their former state of existence? And, although thousands or millions of years should intervene between such transformations, yet such periods might appear as short and imperceptible as the duration which passes while our faculties are absorbed in a sound repose. The idea of infinity, immensity, and an endless succession of changes, renders such a supposition not altogether impossible. But what a dreadful futurity might not the mind be left to picture to itself in such a case? If the movements of the universe were the production of chance, directed by no intelligent agency, we should incessantly be haunted with the most dreadful anticipations. We should see the images of death, annihilation, and reproduction advancing before us in the most terrific forms, and should find it impossible to determine on what foundation the hopes and the destiny of intelligences reposed. We should be uncertain whether mankind were doomed to perish irrecoverably, or, by the operation of some unknown cause, or accident, to be reproduced, at some future period in duration, and devoted to endless torments. The comparative order and tranquillity which now subsist, or have subsisted for ages past, could af ford us no ground of hope that such consequences : would not take place for all the revolutions of time to which we can look back, are but as a moment in the midst of infinite duration, and the whole earth but a point in the immensity of space. So that, during the lapse of infinite ages, changes, revolutions and transformations might be effected, which might overwhelm all the intelli gent beings that ever existed, in eternal misery. Hence it appears, that even atheism itself, with all its mass of contradictions and absurdities, cannot entirely shelter its abettors from the terrors of an unknown futurity. I shall only remark farther, on this part of my subject, -that, although the arguments now adduced in support of the immortality of man were less powerful than they really are, they ought to make a deep impression on the mind of every reflecting person, and determine the line of conduct which he ought to pursue. If they were only probableif they possessed no greater degree of weight than simply to overbalance the opposite arguments, still, it would be every man's interest to act on the supposition, that a future world has a real existence. For, in the ordinary affairs of human life, and even in the sciences, our opinions and conduct are generally determined by a series of probabilities, and a concurrence of reasons, which supply the want of more conclusive evidence on subjects which are not susceptible of strict demonstration. A merchant, when he purchases a certain commodity, has no demonstrative evidence that the sale of it shall ultimately turn to his ad vantage; but, from a consideration of its price and quality, of the circumstances of trade, and of his immediate prospects, he determines on the purchase; and, by acting on the ground of similar probabilities, he conducts his affairs, so as to issue in his prosperity and success. A philosopher has no demonstrative arguments to support the one half of the opinions he has formed, in relation to the phenomena of human society, and of the material world. His deductions respecting the causes of the winds, of thunder and lightning, of volcanic eruptions, of the nature of light, sound, electricity, galvanism, and other operations in the system of nature, are grounded on that species of reasoning which is termed analogical, and which, at best, amounts to nothing more than a high degree of probability. Not withstanding, he feels no hesitation in prosecuting his experiments and researches, under the guidance of such reasoning, confident that it will ultimately lead him to the innermost recesses of the temple of truth; for we know, that the most splendid discoveries of modern times, have originated from inquiries and observations, conducted on the ground of analogical reasoning. In like manner, in the important subject under consideration, we ought to be determined in our views and conduct, even by probabilities, although the arguments adduced should leave the question at issue in some measure undetermined. For, if an eternal world has a real existence, we not only embrace an error in rejecting this idea, but, by acting in conformity with our erroneous conceptions, run the risk of exposing ourselves to the most dreadful and appalling consequences. Whereas, if there be no future state, the belief of it, accompanied with a corresponding conduct, can produce no bad effect either upon our own minds or those of others. On the contrary, it would prove a pleasing illusion during our passage, through a world of physical and moral evil, and would revive the downcast spirit, when overwhelmed with the disappointments and sorrows which are unavoidable in our present condition. So that, even in this case, we might adopt the sentiment of an ancient philosopher,* and say"If I am wrong in believing that the souls of men are immortal, I please myself in my mistake; nor while I live will I ever choose that this opinion, with which I am so much delighted, should be wrested from me. But if, at death, I am to be annihilated, as some minute philosophers suppose, I am not afraid lest those wise men, when extinct too, should laugh at my error." But, if the arguments we have brought forward, amount, not only to bare probability, but to moral certainty, or, at least, to something nearly approximating to moral demonstration-if the opposite opinion involves a train of absurdities, if it throws a dismal gloom over the destiny of man, and over the scenes of the universe, and if it robs the Almighty of the most glorious and distinguishing attributes of * Cicero. his nature-no words are sufficient to express the folly and inconsistency of the man, by whatever title he may be distinguished, who is determined to resist conviction, and who resolutely acts, as if the idea of a future world were a mere chimera. To pass through life with indifference and unconcern, to overlook the solemn scenes of the invisible world, and to brave the terrors of the Almighty, which may be displayed in that state-in the face of such powerful arguments as even reason can produce-is not only contrary to every prudential principle of conduct, but the height of infatuation and madness. Such persons must be left to be aroused to consideration, by the awful conviction which will flash upon their minds, when they are transported to that eternal state which they now disregard, and find themselves placed at the bar of an Almighty and impartial Judge. Among the considerations which have been adduced to prove the immortality of man, I have taken no notice of an argument, which is almost exclusively dwelt upon by some writers, namely, that which is founded on the immateriality of the human soul. I have declined entering upon any illustration of this topic,-1. Because the proof of the soul's immateriality involves a variety of abstract metaphysical discussions, and requires replies to various objections which have been raised against it, which would tend only to perplex readers endowed with plain common şense. 2. Because the doctrine of the immateriality of the thinking principle, however clearly it may be proved, can add nothing to the weight of the considerations already brought forward; nor, when considered by itself, can it afford any conclusive argument in favour of the soul's immortality. It simply leads us to this conclusion,-that, since the soul is an uncompounded substance, it cannot perish by a decomposition of its parts; and conse. quently, may exist, in a separate state, in the full exercise of its powers, after its corporeal tenement is dissolved. But its immortality cannot necessarily be inferred from its natural capacity of existing in a state of separation from the body; for that Being who created it may, if he pleases, reduce it to annihilation, since all the works of God, whether material or immaterial, depend wholly on that power by which they were originally brought into existence. Its immortality depends solely on the will of its Creator, without whose sustaining energy the whole creation would sink into its original nothing. If it could be proved that God will employ his power to annihilate the soul, in vain should we attempt to demonstrate that it is naturally immortal. But whether God wills that the soul should be destroyed at death, is a very different question from that which relates to its nature as an immaterial substance. The whole train of argument illustrated in the preceding pages, affords, I presume, satisfactory evidence that the Creator will never annihilate the human soul, but has destined it to remain in the vigorous exercise of its noble faculties to all eternity. Hence it follows, that it is a matter of trivial importance, when considering the arguments which prove our immortal destiny, whether we view the soul as a material, or as an immaterial substance. Suppose I were to yield to the sceptic, for a moment, the position, "that the soul is a matèrial substance, and cannot exist but in connexion with a material frame," what would he gain by the concession? It would not sub.. tract a single atom from the weight of evidence which has already been brought forward to prove the immortality of man. For, if we can prove that God has willed the im. mortality of the soul, and, consequently, has determined to interpose his almighty power, in order to support its faculties throughout an eternal existence, in vain shall he have proved that it is not immortal in its nature. He who created the human soul and endued it with so many noble faculties, can continue its existence, through an unlimited extent of duration, in a thousand modes incomprehensible to us. If a material system of organical powers be necessary for the exercise of its energies, he can either clothe it with a fine ethereal vehicle, at the moment its present tenement is dissolved, or connect it, in another region of the universe, with a corporeal frame of more exquisite workmanship, analogous to that which it now animates. For any thing we know to the contrary, there may be some fine material system, with which it is essentially connected, and which goes off with it at death, and serves as a medium through which it may hold a direct communication with the visible universe. Even although its consciousness of existence were to be suspended for thousands of years, its |