250 would seem, secured the adhesion of its chiefs. Mr Cobden at Paris has been overwhelmed by Imperial civilities; and Mr Bright at Manchester is vociferous in praise of the great man who has " propounded, in a document which deserves to be written in letters of gold, a new commercial policy for France, and if for France, for the world." Mr Bright, it appears to us, is afflicted with a confusion of ideas, for he confounds reciprocity, which is one thing, with unconditional free-trade, which is another. His notions, however, on such matters were never very distinct, his department being that of delivering harangues, whilst others furnished the arguments; but when he passes from laudation into elaborate defence of the whole policy of Napoleon, we must take leave to refresh his memory. "I hesitate not," says this eulogist of despotic power, "to make an assertion which nobody can disprove-namely, that from the hour when Louis Napoleon was elected to the Presidency of the French Republic until this hour, there has not been a single act of his own or of his Government which can fairly be charged against him as an unfriendly act towards the Government or the people of England." Indeed! Let us examine a little more closely into this. Our readers will doubtless remember that, immediately after the termination of the Crimean war, the relations between Russia and France became suspiciously intimate. Russia had taken serious, and, we admit, not unnatural umbrage at the part which Austria thought proper to assume, and was also very much incensed at Britain, having calculated erroneously on the indifference, if not the acquiescence, of an old ally. Influenced by these feelings, and finding himself isolated from the rest of Europe, the young Czar made overtures to the Emperor of the French, which were more than joyfully responded to. After the Congress of Paris, Count de Morny was sent on a special mission to St Petersburg, and we were given to understand, on the authority of the Times, that a private treaty had been entered into between the two powers, not for [Feb. commercial purposes, but for laying down a distinct plan of policy as to future political operations. It has been questioned whether an actual formal treaty to that effect had existence-that is, whether a document binding Russia and France to mutual and ratified. To us it appears quite co-operation, was prepared, signed, immaterial whether the usual forms observed or dispensed with. That of diplomacy were on that occasion there was a complete understanding Napoleon, was admitted by Prince between the Czar and the Emperor Gortschakoff; and the object of that understanding was the policy to be pursued in regard to Italy. What that policy was is sufficiently explained by subsequent events. France was to pick a quarrel with Austria, minions. Russia was not to interfere, and wrest from her her Italian doexcept by holding Germany in check, and England was to be excluded from all participation in the affair, and her ed. Our readers may recollect that remonstrances were to be disregardbefore hostilities actually commenced there was a gleam of hope that the differences might be adjusted by the friendly mediation of Britain-that to be quite ready to submit to that the Emperor of the French professed mediation-but that it was put an proposition from Russia, who proend to by a so-called unlucky counterposed that the matter should be submitted to the arbitration of a Congress. That was no accident, but rescue France from a dilemma, and a deliberate diplomatic move to to free her from the imputation of being obstinately bent on disturbing the peace of Europe. Also they may remember that when Germany, alarmed by the energetic movements and immense warlike preparations of France, was about to arm on behalf of Austria, the Russian that if a diversion were attempted minister intimated in plain terms be sent across the Vistula. Here is on the Rhine, a Russian army would said, of co-operation, and a secret direct proof, which cannot be gainalliance between France and Russia, Europe, and especially hostile to the most ominous for the liberties of interests of Britain. Not being in the secrets of foreign cabinets, we cannot tell what first disturbed this intimate alliance-for disturbed it was, and is now, to all appearance, entirely broken. It may be that the Czar took alarm at the spread of the revolutionary movement, and that he began to perceive that when ducal coronets are falling, there may be risk even for imperial diadems. We strongly suspect that the employment of Kossuth by Louis Napoleon, for the purpose of raising an insurrection in Hungary, first startled the Czar. The flame, once kindled there, might rapidly extend to Poland; and Russia knows too well the difficulty of suppressing such conflagrations, to encourage them from mere motives of spite or of resentment for former ingratitude. Certain it is that the Czar began to cool; and we doubt not that certain symptoms of that altered disposition led to the sudden patching up of peace after the French victory of Solferino. It would appear now that the Czar has seen his error, and has returned to his older and more natural alliance with Austria and Prussia. It is even rumoured that he has expressed his disapproval of the attempt to coerce the Pope into the surrender of his territory; and this at least is certain, that Prince Gortschakoff, who was notoriously the promoter of the French alliance, has ceased to be minister. Coupled with the dismissal of Count Walewski, this is very significant, and serves to explain the unusual degree of cordiality which the Emperor of the French has recently assumed towards Great Britain. Will Mr Bright maintain that the conduct and policy which we have just described was friendly towards Great Britain, or such as we were entitled to expect from a trusty and intimate ally? It is quite true that there has been no overt act of hostility, for in the present temper of the nation such would not have been endured for a moment; but there has been caballing, finessing, deceit, concealment, and meditated treachery throughout. We shall not go the length, though the circumstances are suspicious, of charging the Emperor of the French with having instigated Spain to go to war with Morocco, for the view of future operations against Gibraltar-nor shall we insist on the very curious project of the Suez Canal, advocated by France, the main feature of which consisted in the cession to a French company of a large tract of land on either side, which clearly might have been used to bar the overland passage to India. We happen to know something about the project of M. Lesseps, and are assured that, as a commercial speculation, nothing could have been more hopeless. As a paying scheme, upon which men would risk their capital, it was utterly ludicrous-the proposal of a railway through Lapland would hardly have been more preposterous. And yet this scheme was backed by the entire political influence of France-a country, be it remarked, whose commercial interest in the construction of such a work was infinitesimally small. Curiously enough, we are now informed that M. Thouvenel, who was charged with the duty of pressing the Porte to grant the desired cession, has been recalled from Constantinople-so we may regard the canal scheme as a trap long set, but now useless owing to altered circumstances; and we shall be surprised if, for some little time to come, we hear anything more of M. Lesseps and his proposals for irrigating the desert, and renovating the Land of Goshen. But there is another point to which we fain would draw the attention of Mr Bright and his brethren of the Peace Society. How do they reconcile their reiterated and strenuous assertions of the pacific tendency of the French Government, with the fact that, down to the present hour, the energies of France have been directed, not towards internal improvement, but to the augmentation of her navy, coupled with such an amount of military preparation as would be utterly unjustifiable except on the hypothesis that some gigantic attempt is in contemplation? We are very glad to observe that, at the opening of Parliament, that most important fact was not passed over without special notice. The Marquess of Normanby, a distinguished why these navies ?-why that expenditure of the wealth of the country on preparations which a peacefully disposed State, with almost no colonies to protect, must find intolerably destructive to industry, if not absolutely ruinous to its finance? Plausible as may be the protestations of Louis Napoleonwilling as he may be to enter into commercial treaty-we cannot, and we dare not, overlook the fact that France is arming to the teeth, ready by sea or land for some new aggressive design. We are most sincerely anxious for a firm and enduring alliance with France. The countries are too near each other, and too equally balanced, to admit of differences. There is no reason, apart from ambitious, and therefore illegitimate objects, why there should be any difference. Our real interests do not clash. We are not rivals in any legitimate sense of the word; and there are no two nations in the world that are so ready to reciprocate, if we could only get rid of that feeling of distrust which seems mutually to beset us. But Britain has one advantage which France has not. She is above suspicion; and -0 that we could force upon the conviction of France the grandeur of such a position! France has armed, and is arming-and what is the impression throughout Europe? Neither more nor less than that she contem plates territorial aggrandisement, either by force or diplomatic movements in Italy and elsewhere, and that she is a dangerous neighbour. Britain has armed, and is arming, and the flower of its population has spontaneously adopted what in other countries is done by coercion--but she has armed simply for defence, resolute that her free soil shall not be sullied by the tread of an invader. member of the Whig party, and a man of large diplomatic experience, stated that he had received, "from one on whose authority he implicitly relied, a letter which by no means foreshadowed the halcyon age of peace and commerce now spoken of. Armaments of all kinds, his informant said, were now being pressed on in France with the utmost vigour. Naval armaments were continued as though war was expected next week. Munitions of war were being prepared-steel-plating for ships was ordered all over the country-vessels were being built-guns proved-and the French dockyards rang with work day and night. Such preparations formed rather a curious concomitant of universal peace." Assuming these things to be true-which we cannot doubt they are, for statements to the same effect crowd upon us from every quarter-we would ask Mr Bright how he can reconcile them with the eminently pacific intentions of the despot whom he admires so greatly? To us they appear ominous symptoms, requiring us to stand upon our guard. We are sorry to be compelled to write thus about a potentate who, had he not given way to personal or dynastical ambition, and attempted to revive in France an aggressive spirit, which for long was the curse of Europe, might have become our most trusted ally. He is evidently desirous that we should receive and acknowledge him in that character now, for that unquestionably is his best policy. He is deserted by the rest of Europe; and he is now trying to do what he might easily have done long ago, had he not betrayed his restless spirit of ambition-viz. drawn close the cords of amity between Britain and France, renounced all projects of aggrandisement, shown an anxious wish to maintain the peace of Europe, Until the Italian difficulty is solved, and refrained from unusual arma- and the future government of that ments, which proved that he either country arranged and established, we intended to disturb that peace, or had cannot expect the restoration of abno confidence that tranquillity could solute tranquillity. But how is it to be preserved. It rests with France be solved? That is the grand enigma itself-or, we may rather say, accord- of the present day. If not arranged ing to its present constitution, with by a Congress, the Italian States the Emperor of the French-to be- must be left free to make their own come a greater, happier, and even selection; and in that case our immore powerful nation than she is. pression is that they will prefer being Why these extensive armaments?-xed to Sardinia. But we can not speak confidently as to that. Italy has never been a nation, and has no ancient reminiscences of common union upon which it can fall back. It has been a discordancy of principalities and republics. of local aggressions and intrigues, of feudal institutions on an extremely limited scale; and when we add to that, the difference of the taxation, which appears, in the case of the duchies, to have been less than that which is exacted by Sardinia, we foresee that there are elements of discord which can only be removed by a very liberal concession on the part of the power which shall assume the right of supremacy. If the Pope should refuse to give up any part of his dominions, there may be a trial of strength between him and his revolted subjects; and in that case we trust that the British Ministry will not implicate themselves in the quarrel, beyond employing every means of moral suasion to prevent other powers from appearing in the field. That seems to us the real point of danger. If Naples should take part with the Pope, Sardinia will probably deem it her duty to support the people of the Legations. We shall have a civil war in Italy, more French interference; and the difficulty will be practically solved by the erection of a French kingdom of Central Italy. All depends upon Louis Napoleon. If he is sincere in his expressed wish for peace, for a lasting alliance with Britain, and for the internal improvement of France, let him prove his sincerity by reducing his armament, discontinuing his warlike preparations, withdrawing his troops from Rome and from Lombardy, where they are still unnecessarily, according to the general idea of Europe, located, and refraining from any active interference in the affairs of Italy. If he will do this, he will give to us and to the world a much better pledge of his sincerity than a mere commercial treaty. That would be his wisest policy-indeed, upon the adoption of that, his chances of establishing a dynasty, and securing for his son the succession to the imperial throne, must mainly rest. He has no reason to complain of the treatment he has met with from any foreign power. No one dreams of attacking France, or undermining its prosperity. The curse of France is, and has been, the wretched dreams of ambition which, under the delusive semblance of military glory, haunt the sleep of her soldiery, and pervert the understanding of her statesmen. Surely the example of the uncle might serve as a sufficient warning to the nephew. After all his aggressions, alliances, victories, and conquests, the power of the first Napoleon was prostrated on the field of Leipsic by the vengeance of united and outraged Europe; and the like catastrophe will befall his successor, if, unhappily, he should be led to imitate that wicked and detestable career. Austria, it is quite plain, will not again interfere in Central Italian affairs. She may have quite enough to do to retain possession of Venetia. Russia will not interfere, either as regards the Duchies or the Legations, unless France appears in the field. Germany has no interest in the matter; and Britain, up to this time, has been a passive though not uninterested spectator. Let the Emperor of the French leave Italy to settle its own affairs, and he will relieve Europe of much of that apprehension and distrust which late events have engendered. One word in conclusion with regard to the volunteer movement at home. A sublimer spectacle was never witnessed than that of a people spontaneously arming themselves to be ready for any emergency; and most sincerely do we trust that the movement so auspiciously_begun, and already so successfully advanced, will be carried on until we have raised such a disciplined force in the land as will render invasion impossible. We shall not take notice of any criticisms which have been made upon the raising of such a body: they are absolutely contemptible. In broad military operations and the open field organisation is of course of the utmost importance; but is that to supersede loyalty, patriotism, and courage? Were the three hundred of Leonidas-as some of our martinets seem to suppose-trained to the goose-step-or did they fight less valiantly, and become immortal, because they were enthusiastic young men-indeed the volunteers of Sparta? The volunteer force consists of the very flower of the British youth, strong, hardy, and intelligent; physically much superior to the ordinary run of recruits, and capable of being trained to arms with much more ease. It is an institution which the country has long wanted, and which ought in every way to be fostered and encouraged. Independently of the feeling of security and self-reliance which it gives to the nation, it cannot but produce a good effect upon society, by bringing together men of all ranks, and uniting them in a common object. Mr Bright is hostile to the movement because he thinks, "that of every ten men who are induced to try, needlessly as most of us believe, to connect themselves with those organisations, at least nine will come out much less of real reformers than they thought they were." If Mr Bright had said "much less of democrats," he would have secured our acquiescence. It is a loyal and devoted spirit that actuates the volunteers; not a grumbling, carping, and abusive spirit, which seems to have taken possession of the Quaker. Free intercourse among men of all ranks, such as this movement is calculated to promote, is the best antidote to democracy. The artisan learns to appreciate the character of the gentleman, whom he finds anything but haughty or supercilious, as represented by the demagogues of the pothouse-the gentleman is led to recognise and respect the good qualities, intelligence, and patient resolution of the artisan. Long may the force continue to augment and flourish, and be inspired by such sentiments as are expressed in the following lines, composed by one of our young brethren of the rifle, and worthy of a place in Maga :— THE VOLUNTEERS' SONG. UP and arm you, one and all! Hearken not to them that say, Hearken not, but grasp your arms; Tempting France to do us wrong. Up to guard your country!-arm you ; If they say, "We will not harm you," Make it, "Neither will nor can." Printed by William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh. |