create that entire revolution in the plans of the Emperor. He abandoned the idea of restoring the Grand Dukes, and thus acquiring a dominant influence in Italy by retaining them as his puppets; he postponed the annexation of the Rhenish-Prussian provinces until a more convenient season; flung his engagements to the luckless Austrian Emperor to the winds; nearly kicked the papal stool from beneath its pontifical occupant; patted Sardinia on the back, and reminded her of a little arrangement to take place at a future period with reference to Savoy; apologised to the whole of Italy; and embraced the British nation generally, and Cobden in particular. We might do a little quiet annexation during this lull, and the French Press would applaud us. The Suez Canal is put away, not to be reproduced for some months; the Spaniards are left to finish the Morocco war as they please; but we are to be gratified as Protestants by seeing the Pope illused, and as free-traders by seeing the French people adopt enlightened commercial principles, to their intense disgust and our serious detriment. The only practical result of our interference in Italian politics up to this point, has been to furnish the Emperor with a plausible pretext for the annexation of Savoy and Nice, the precursor of a pleasant little arrangement which the altered aspect of affairs renders necessary with refer ence to Central Italy, and which it would be impertinent in us now to pry into. We may, however, be permitted to express our admiration of the ingenuous simplicity which led our Government to propose to the Emperor a settlement of the question, containing as one of the conditions the withdrawal of all French troops from the Peninsula. Mr Bright and his friends say that the Emperor has always behaved very honestly to us, and that, therefore, we have no reason to distrust him. In the first place, we do not distrust him more than we should Mr Bright himself in the same position, and with the same vast resources at his command. Mr Bright's ambition, probably, equals that of the Emperor. His animosities are even stronger; hatred and ambition, combined with immense power, do not make a man a pleasant neighbour. In the second place, we have every reason to distrust him. His refusal to allow the Turkish army to leave the Crimea to go to the relief of Kars lost that fortress, and was the only episode in the war which affected British interests in the East. His conclusion of a peace at a time when both in the Baltic and Black Seas we were best able to bring the war to a successful issue, damaged our prestige throughout Europe as seriously as if we had sustained a defeat from French arms. The institution of the St Helena medal was not calculated to create a warm feeling in his army towards us, or the Colonels' letters to increase that feeling. We can judge by the present tone of the French Press how skilfully he plays through its keys upon the wires which vibrate through France.* Austria and the Pope are qualified to speak as to his sincerity, and we are fairly enabled to judge of a man's probable conduct towards ourselves by his behaviour to our neighbour. By those pamphlets with which he feels the pulse of Europe, and which he repudiates or homologates at pleasure; by that press which may be considered a Department of the Government; by those ministers who are themselves misled in order that they may mislead others, and then kicked out of office with large retiring pensions; by the complicated machinery of his police department, and by means of a Chamber of Deputies practically chosen by himself, he is enabled to di See Times Paris Correspondent, February 13th. "Orders were given yesterday morning to the Paris papers not to allude any more to the annexation of Savoy to France; and in the afternoon counter orders were given, and the papers instructed to write it up as before. rect with peculiar nicety the intricate details of his foreign policy, and at the same time to conceive and carry into effect those measures best calculated to insure the stability of his throne. This leads us to another class of considerations highly important when taken in connection with his foreign policy-namely, the internal condition of France, the sentiments of her population towards their Emperor, and the effects of the present system of administration upon the country generally. It is not easy to realise the extraordinary difficulties of a man in the position occupied by the present ruler of the French nation, the opposing interests which have to be consulted, the impossibility of retaining friends, conciliating enemies, and making head against the tremendous under-current of opposition which is threatening soon to show itself in whirling eddies upon the surface of society, and is now only gathering force with which to sweep away the barriers that have hitherto stemmed the torrent. It is worth while glancing at the present state of popular feeling in France, for without the insight which this affords us into the domestic troubles of the Emperor, we can scarcely appreciate the necessities which force upon him a foreign policy that harmonises perfectly with his natural ambition and the traditions of his dynasty. The visitor in Paris, gazing at the imposing edifices and magnificent streets which have risen into being under the magic touch of Louis Napoleon-who mixes with the gay crowds that throng those splendid thoroughfares -who dines in cafés, attends theatres, and rides in the Bois de Bologne, little dreams of the volcano, pent up under the thin crust of all this gaiety and splendour. As a spendthrift when he is keeping up appearances upon a visionary income is reduced to the most desperate straits to maintain the requisite display, and who, as his fortunes become more desperate, grows himself more reckless, so Louis Napoleon, bankrupt in the affections of his subjects, binds with difficulty the hollow mask of content and satisfaction upon the public countenance. It is chiefly by diverting the attention of the most volatile people in the world from a consideration of their own wrongs that he succeeds in postponing the evil day, when that mask will be violently flung aside. Sometimes the complications of the situation are increased by the danger from without being greater than that from within; and a foreign policy becomes necessary, which is unpopular with large sections of society at home. This can only be counterbalanced by some happy stroke of audacity, which appeals to a great national sentiment, such as the extension of the French frontiers, or a popular war. To prove that we are not making random assertions, with reference to the general state of feeling throughout France, we shall specify some of the causes which have operated to estrange from him various sections of society in the country. The classes which are most decidedly and violently opposed to the Emperor are the clergy, the bar, the liberals (or constitutionalists), the obscurantists, and ultra-royalists, the educated and actively intelligent, and nearly the whole of what is called La Société. The influence and importance of the first of these classes in a Roman Catholic country is well understood; it may not, however, be so well known by whom that influence was fostered and cherished, or under what conditions, and under whose auspices, the ecclesiastical party in France acquired its present character and position. In 1848-49, the French clergy went with the Liberal movement, and was popular. The Church of France, properly so called, was in a flourishing condition, and likely to be reconciled to the école des philosophes. There were Liberal priests and pious Liberals, or Liberals really desiring to live on good terms with religion. This was the moment when Rossi, Louis Philippe's great thinking friend, could contemplate saving the popedom as a grand component part of Italian freedom and power; and when the Gallican Archbishop of Paris died in the Barricades, and was looked up to by the people as a martyr. When Louis Napoleon per petrated his coup-d'état, there was not a Jesuit in the whole of France. He was himself without friends; but he looked forward to reigning ultimately in some other way than by having every citizen watched over by a sentinel. In this emergency, the Jesuits seemed to him the most available instruments. He recalled them to France at this present moment there is not a village in which, from cradle to deathbed, the Jesuits have not gradually crushed out the enlightened Gallican priest. They are everywhere; in the Salles d'Asile (where go the babies from two to seven); in the communal schools, where they are educated from seven to fourteen; in the seminaries, where young men are brought up-not only for the Church-in the "direction," as it is called, of convents, as confessors for both sexes; and in the councils of the episcopacy, where, though they cannot attain to any high rank themselves, they exercise an important influence as spies and tale-bearers to Rome. In return for furthering Jesuit interests in France, the Emperor has received good service at their hands; without them he could not have made his journey into Brittany; while even so recently as two months since, on the occasion of an election to the Legislative Chamber in Anjou, he could not have secured his candidate without the clergy: through them the curés received the large sums as bribes which ultimately carried the election. Thus has the Emperor, and he alone, made these men powerful for his own ends. They will now undermine him for theirs. Still the Jesuits have more to hope from the present ruler of France than from any other form of government in the country. The Comte de Chambord, following the old Bourbon tradition, would bow them out; the Orleanists would turn them out; and the Republicans would kick them out of France. But they have no choice; if the Empire be anti-papal, the Jesuits must undermine it; and it will be a serious matter for Louis Napoleon to ward off the blow now impending from the sword which he has himself so carefully sharpened. We can best judge of the desperate nature of his situa tion by the consideration that the danger of making these men his enemies was a less one than that which threatened from other quarters. Of the evils presented to him, he chose the least, and was forced into a step which arrayed against him the whole power of the clergy. But if he has thus made himself unpopular with the Church, he certainly can count as little on the affections of the Bar. From the very origin, nature, and modus operandi of his administration, the present Emperor of France has never had the lawyers with him. They have now rallied in obstinate opposition under the two cries, "Right of Petition," "Freedom of Defence." With reference to the first of these rights, it is scarcely necessary to allude to the proceedings in the case of Mons. d'Haussonville, or to his Consultation des Bâtonnières." The case has now been judged, and it is the decision of the tribunals which invests it with significance. It is now settled that a document that is warned by the minister in a newspaper may be published separately in a pamphlet. The government may seize that pamphlet, if they are prepared to incur the vexations of a trial, and the crucifying speeches of men like Berryer, Jules Favre, Hébert, and others. As the case upon which "the freedom of defence" is founded has not yet been decided, and involves a principle of importance, we may be permitted to state it more fully. About two months ago, Emile Olivier, the republican deputy, and a very rising barrister, defended the cause of Mons. Vacherot, author of a pamphlet entitled "La Democratie," before the 6me Chamber, when he had occasion very justly to say that the Bench "was not impartial, and that it appealed to the worst partyspirit and passions." The consequence of this reflection upon it was that the Bench, in virtue of its "discretionary power," suspended Mons. Olivier on the spot from the exercise of his functions as a barrister for three months. The next day the Council of the Order of Barristers met and decided to appeal from the sentence, after much discussion; for, in spite of the "beautiful simplicity" of the Code Napoleon, their course of action was not very clear. Under the circumstances, it was ultimately resolved to have the appeal, if it were feasible, brought before the court called Toutes Chambres Réunies because this reverend assembly might abolish the sentence, which the mere Court of Appeal they knew would not, being composed of men picked from the Imperialist party. It was therefore determined to plead upon certain technical grounds the incompetency of the Court of Appeal before the Toutes Chambres Réunies, the disadvantage attending this latter court being that it is a "uniclos," whereas the former implies publicity. The Court of Appeal, however, asserts its competency, and now the affair lies before the Cour de Cassation. If this court decides in favour of the competency of the Court of Appeal, there will be a public trial, and Olivier will come into court attended by all the bâtonnières past and present, and two or three hundred barristers, all members of the Council of the Order. Such a demonstration made by a body of men comprising some of the most influential and talented men in France, can scarcely be an agreeable prospect for our Imperial friend. It will, of course, be sympathised in by the third class to which we have alluded - viz. the whole Liberal party in France. It is scarcely necessary to say that this is the bitterest section of politicians, so far as hostility to the present ruler is concerned; and we have succeeded in utterly estranging them from their natural sympathy towards this country, by assisting a despot, whom they hate, to place his heel more firmly on their necks. The complaint of these e-who,though they are Liberals in the French sense, are not free-traders - us is, that we, a constitu#zation, are enabling an absolute Terzi ve force a measure upon the popular, that without ude could not have vend only dares to make jects. If ever there was an act of tyranny perpetrated in an oppressed country, it is the Treaty of Commerce, of which Mr Cobden is the author. The sentiments of the Liberal party in France, with reference to Italy, may be gathered from the pamphlets of Mons. de Villemain and others, and from the writings of Messrs Forcade de Falloux, Albert de Broglie, and scores of independent spirited men, who are writhing under the lash of despotism, and look across the Channel in vain for sympathy. These men, who are scarcely ever good Catholics, seldom Catholics at all, are driven into espousing the cause of the Pope, not by their love of him, but by their hatred to the Emperor. Another very different class from the above, but one no less important, are the Ultra-royalists. This party, like the Jesuits, would prefer Louis Napoleon to any other of the probable alternatives of government in France, if circumstances would allow him to stand by them; but whilst he finds himself, on the one hand, forced, for the safety of his throne, to offend the Constitutionalists by despotic practices, he is, on the other, compelled, for the safety of his life, to disgust the Absolutists by his revolutionary principles. When a Carbonaro becomes a despot, he must have some inconvenient acquaintances, and find himself occasionally on the horns of a very disagreeable dilemma. because we give to his sub We now come to the actively intelligent classes of France. These hate the Emperor because his government is an obstacle to all healthy action-to all public life. Freedom of speech and pen cannot coexist with Imperialism, and the youth of the schools, for instance, aspire to freedom of tongue and pen. These young men know that any one who is not too conspicuous to make such a proceeding safe, can be made away with secretly, and got rid of. It would not be difficult to adduce numerous instances to prove the truth of this. Three years ago at the Odéon a young student, seeing the Empress enter her box alone, sang in a loud tone a verse of the popular song, “Le Sire de Framboisie," applying it to her. He was seized, and is in prison still. Two months ago, a man of the middle classes named Herbin, "talked" of the details of a scandalous affair that had taken place at Orleans, and in which young Magne, the financeminister's son, had thrashed his newmarried wife, who deserted him in consequence. M. Herbin was quietly seized and spirited off to La Prison Mazas, where he still is, and will probably remain. Nor is there anything the least illegal in this mode of proceeding. There is a whole arsenal full of laws expressly framed to cover these arbitrary acts. The Deputies, a collection of weak instruments in his hands, chiefly employ themselves passing laws, in virtue of which it would be perfectly competent to the Emperor to transport them all to Cayenne. There are, for instance, certain laws defining publicity, under which any interchange of ideas with a friend becomes criminal, if so it please the police. Others legislate for "the protection of the public conscience against false reports," and you may find yourself imprisoned for having listened to the unfounded gossip of your washerwoman. A hostile court would have no difficulty in making anything out to be a "false report. Every Frenchman is living under a Damocles' sword, and is conscious of it. How can he feel friendly towards the man who suspends it above him? The only remaining class to which we have adverted, is society of the higher stamp. Those who have resided in Paris know how completely isolated the Court stands with reference to society at large. Whatever may be the fact with reference to the moral tone which pervades it, it is studiously and ostentatiously shunned by the more respectable part of society. Hitherto our attention has been more especially turned to those classes of whose sentiments the visitor to Paris is able more especially to judge; but if we look into the provinces, we find the same widespread feeling of disaffection existing towards the present régime. The tendency to centralisation and arbitrary enactments which characterises the Imperial administration, has at last stirred the VOL. LXXXVII.-NO. DXXXIII. sluggish blood of the provincials; and in the south of France especially a considerable agitation has been the consequence. The alteration which took place in 1855 in the laws regulating municipal elections, has been one prime cause of this dissatisfaction. Formerly the préfêt and souspréfêt represented the central and executive authority. The conseils généraux and the mayors and municipal councils represented the local element, and were invested with a fair share of importance, having it in their power to make themselves, when occasion required, tolerably disagreeable to the Home Office delegate. In May 1853 this last vestige of local liberty was extinguished by a law by which the mayor and president of the council-general, the only checks on the préfêt, were to be named by the Government, and the central and local authorities henceforth emanated from one and the same source. After a violent but futile struggle to regain their rights, the municipalities succumbed to the central pressure, and have only now been once more roused into action by the abuses which have taken place in the administration of the local revenues. The central authority has persisted in converting the departmental or municipal funds to its own purposes, until the departmental or municipal mind has become thoroughly exasperated, and the souls of mayors and councillors-general have become fired with a flame of zeal, that neither insulted personal dignity nor outraged political rights have ever been able to light up; and so just now, notwithstanding "the advance of the age," with its railroads and electric wires, the provincial spirit is awakened, and the unhappy Mons. Billault is kept in a perpetual state of hot water by the turbulent citizens of Bordeaux, Marseilles, Pau, and other important towns, whom he vainly endeavours to appease by alternate threats and promises. Nor in this emergency can the Government depend for any effective support upon that pillar of despotism, the standing army. The army does not like to feel that it exists only to keep down the intelli 2 A |