of the soul. The one excites it to action; the other exhausts and debilitates it, and rather retards than aids it in any important enterprises. as Perhaps, if we compare together these two moral desires as regards the results which they have respectively effected, whether for good or evil; our conclusion will be that although avarice has produced but few, if any, virtues, it has led to but few of the crimes with which the pursuit of ambition has ever been charged. On the other hand, if the pursuit of ambition has often led to great crimes, it has nevertheless frequently been productive of great and magnanimous exploits, if not of heroical virtues also. In many respects it has a direct tendency to promote virtue, and never fails to exact due homage to it; inasmuch as those actions only which are virtuous and honourable, and deserving of our esteem and commendation, can obtain such applause and honour as it is the object of ambition to secure.* Indeed, ambition constitutes it were the mainspring, and the very life of ability. It is the source of activity and energy in the greatest minds, the real germ of the noblest actions, and the immediate cause of the grandest undertakings which have exalted human nature. Without ambition our mightiest capacities might lie torpid. And were this desire to be banished from the human soul, the constitution of man would be left like a planetary system without a sun, which rouses into vitality and vigour each latent power and endowment. Extinguish ambition, and with it the love of glory would also fade. No efforts would be made to excel by painful labour, in arts, in arms, in eloquence, poetry, philosophy, or knowledge. All stimulant to exertion, and to overcome indolence, or to brave danger, would be gone for ever. Competition, both between individuals and nations, would thenceforth cease. The enjoyment of present pleasure, instead of the desire of doing good and of gaining approbation, would alone predominate over the mind. Ambition, although it may occasionally impel us too vigorously, or too rapidly, when we submit entirely to its influence, and by which we abuse it, is 5 "The noble Brutus Hath told you Cæsar was ambitious; If it were so, it was a grievous fault, Julius Cæsar. Hence, Aristotle observes of emulation, or ambition, that "it always implies a certain sense of worthiness: men actuated by it must deem their power commensurate to the honours and advantages which they are emulous to acquire. The young and the high-minded are easily roused to emulation."-Rhetoric, b. ii. c. 11. Lord Bacon observes that "to take a soldier without ambition is to pull off his spurs."-Essays, xxxvi. Of Ambition. Ambition, the soldier's virtue."-Antony and Cleopatra. AVARICE AND AMBITION MODERATE EACH OTHER. 109 not on that account never to be indulged in; which would indeed imply that, because we are in danger of sometimes proceeding too fast, we should resolve to remain for ever immoveable. As reasonably might we object to the sun because it occasionally scorches, and forget its general fructifying and genial influence; as denounce, as we have seen that many do, the very existence of this noble desire, implanted in man by God himself, which of all his endowments raises him the nearest to his Maker, and proves baneful only because of its perversion. The richer too in natural gifts, either mental or moral, any person is, the greater is his consciousness of his own powers; and although, on the one hand, he will be more influenced by ambition, yet, on the other, he will be proportionably less liable to envy others. Indeed, as ambition is the characteristic of noble, so envy is the mark of ignoble minds; and arises from a perception of weakness in their own capacities, and of inability to emulate those whom they would fain excel. They are consequently fully conscious that their only chance of appearing great in the eyes of mankind, is not by any efforts to raise themselves, which are quite beyond their power, but by lowering others down to their own base level. The pursuit of a grand object of ambition, has already been compared to climbing a steep mountain. Rocks and crags present themselves on all sides to the enterprising traveller, and perils threaten at each step. And when at last he has fairly gained the summit which few are destined to reach, it but too often happens that either the prospect which was to reward his pains, is obscured by the hazes of the damp valleys below; or another and higher mountain is found to intervene, which shuts out from his sight the enchanting view on which he had vainly hoped to gaze. 8. Power over, and Discipline of these Desires. If however it is our imperative duty to direct our desires aright, it must be correspondingly important to ascertain exactly and clearly, the precise extent of the control over them which we possess, so as duly to regulate and discipline them, and to promote their proper use, and prevent their per version. • Aristotle, indeed, contrasts emulation with envy, of which he says that it "is bad in itself, and proceeds from a bad source: emulation animates our exertions to merit the same advantages which others have obtained; envy inspires no such ardour, but makes the envious brood in sullen sorrow over the hated joys of their neighbours."-Rhetoric, 8. ii. c. 11. The moral desires, which owe so much to the aid and operation of the emotions, and appetites, and passions, as regards their vigour and energy, and also to the action of the mental powers; are nevertheless, in a corresponding measure, restrained and controlled in their exercise, by these opposite and counteracting impulses, and by the efforts of the reason. To a certain extent indeed, avarice and ambition contribute essentially to control and moderate each other. Thus ambition, which urges a man on to attempt great exploits, leads him also to sacrifice his love of money in order to gratify this desire; as many a man has spent his fortune in the pursuit of power or of fame. On the other hand, avarice, which causes a man to delight in the possession of riches, checks him strongly in the pursuit of ambitious desires, by restraining and hindering that expenditure of wealth which is in many cases essential to secure them. Although a great man may be largely influenced by these desires, yet he is in reality great, not because he is ruled by, but because he has the power to rule them. Although few men. attain eminence without ambition, yet how many to this desire fall a prey? The moral desires are, indeed (as has already been remarked with regard to the appetites and passions), like the elements of fire and water: when allowed to overwhelm us, they spread havoc and ruin on all sides; but when duly subjected to our use, they are beneficial and serviceable. The principles already laid down with regard to the discipline of, and giving a proper bias or direction to the dispositions, are to a large extent, if not generally, applicable to the discipline of the moral desires also; the same causes and influences conducing in each case, to a corresponding result. And these desires, like the appetites and passions, become also checked and softened, and as it were tamed, by restraint and training; like wild and unruly animals prone to wander uncontrolled, which are brought into subjection by being held captive. Avarice and ambition, although in their constitution so nearly allied, are nevertheless developed in individuals of very different orders. As was observed in the last section, the extensive endowment with ambition, ordinarily denotes a mind of considerable capacity. Avarice is however, a plant which is produced by a much baser soil, and is mostly found in persons of ordinary ability; who are, moreover, conscious of not possessing great intellectual power, and who are therefore led to look mainly to wealth instead of to glory as the attainable object of their efforts. Where these two moral desires are COexistent in the same person, they may be, to a certain extent, useful, not only, as recently remarked, in counteracting, but DUE DIRECTION PREFERABLE TO ERADICATION. 111 also in correcting each other; and may aid his power over them, and enable him to discipline them more efficiently. Thus, ambition may contribute to raise the covetous man from low desires and thoughts, and to cause his avarice to direct him to higher purposes than those to which he would be otherwise wont to aspire. Avarice, on the other hand, may conduce to render cautious and prudent, the man actuated by ambition. Indeed, when avarice is seen to influence men of powerful minds, it is ordinarily made subservient to ambition; and when ambition is developed in men of weak minds, and of but feeble powers, it is wont to be made subservient to avarice. As the turn which both avarice and ambition take in any particular person in regard to their moral course, depends greatly on the general character, mental and moral, of the individual; so on this will mainly depend his power over these desires, and his success in disciplining them. A virtuous person of great abilities, will be disposed to achieve the noblest ends by the purest means. In one of narrow abilities, and who is less scrupulous or virtuous, ambition may impel him to the attainment of trivial or unworthy ends, by base and discreditable means. According also to the peculiar capacities and circumstances of the individual, will be the peculiar object of his ambition; one being impelled to obtain eminence in arts, another in science, another in politics. This fact, which has already been alluded to in the preceding section, opens a wide field for the direction and discipline of the moral desires, and affords numerous opportunities for obtaining power over them. By this means also, the influence of the reason is brought to bear, both as regards their discipline and their direction. In all these cases indeed, it will be discovered that the strength of our reason is that by which we rule our desires; and that by the weakness of our reason it is that the desires obtain the dominion over our minds. The power that man possesses over his moral desires, is far more extensive to direct, than to eradicate them. Ambition especially is peculiarly open both to direction and to discipline. Like a tree, some of whose branches are lopped off, this desire, if checked in one way, will shoot out in another with equal vigour, and will set before itself some new purpose of accomplishment. But here, also, a fresh opportunity is afforded for disciplining the desire, by supplying it with a proper object for its pursuit. The moral desires also, like a tree, go on growing; and the further they advance, the more vigorous are the shoots which they from time to time put forth. Thus the young aspirant aims only at transient distinction among his fellows. But as soon as this is attained, he is eager for fame in the world at large. And when he has gained this, so far from being satisfied, he considers what he has done only as the means of effect ing higher and far greater achievements. Hence it is indeed alike both with avarice and ambition. The richer we get, the more covetous we become. The higher we rise, the more lofty are our aspirations. More especially as we advance in age, the moral desires are apt to take deeper root, and acquire more vigorous frames. Youth therefore is the time when they should be both restrained and disciplined. The branches are then tender and docile, and without difficulty may be made to grow in almost any form to which they are directed. As we get older, this docility ceases; and towards the close of life, when old age has come upon us, we are rather directed by, than able to direct our moral desires. At the prospect of death, as the objects of them, both immediate and ultimate, fade away, and are discovered to be beyond our grasp; the desires themselves, having as it were lost the support by which they were sustained, fall powerless and lifeless, like the body itself when deprived of the spirit by which it was quickened and animated. 9. How far common to Animals as well as to Man. An interesting and instructive topic of inquiry, calculated to elucidate many points already discussed, is afforded by the question whether animals are endowed with the moral desires in common with man, and if so, to what extent? Animals may appear, at first sight, in certain respects, and on some occasions, to be as vigorously excited by moral desires as is the case with man. In each of these instances however, it will be found on a close investigation, that it is not an actual moral desire which directs them, but, as in the corresponding case of animal propensities, that they are impelled merely by an emotion, or appetite, or passion, which forms a constituent part of a moral desire; and which medial excitement acts with more vigour, possesses more influence over their conduct, and assumes more the features of a moral desire, from the very circumstance which occasions the defect in the constitution of an endowment of this kind in their case, and prevents its complete formation-the absence of reason that might restrain these medial impulses, which are consequently allowed to exert themselves uncontrolled, and to follow unchecked their wonted career. Among animals, who are principally under the dominion of their emotions and appetites, fear and hunger, next in succession to pain and pleasure, and irritation, appear to be the most influential, and, indeed, the ruling motives; and after these, concupiscence has most power. Among mankind, the moral desires have greater influence than either the emotions or |