CONSCIENCE NOT AN INFALLIBLE MONITOR.

123

in the mere exercise of reason, or rather originating from this, instead of being an unerring irresistible impulse, such as has been supposed, that this is too unimportant, and too trivial a mode to account for the existence of so exalted a faculty, and one which is of immense importance to us in the discharge of our duties; and that we should never on such momentous occasions be left to the mere guidance of our reason, which is constantly liable to be deceived. Here, however, we may reply that it is an important part of our duty to exercise fairly and discriminatingly our reasoning faculty; and that the obligation to do so is in the strongest manner evinced by the judgments recorded in Holy Writ against those who refused to receive Divine testimony, when their reason told them it was supported by conclusive evidence.

The reasoning faculty, moreover, all will admit, is liable to be perverted by abuse. But so is the endowment which is termed conscience. A deadened conscience is justly regarded as a punishment for perverting it. Precisely so is it with regard to the reason, which is also liable to be warped by abuse. Among children, in whom this faculty is least likely to be affected by prejudice, we find that in such matters as are within the sphere of their reason, especially on moral points, their judgment is ordinarily and singularly correct. Children, we also observe, are peculiarly subject to the dictates of conscience.

But it will be contended that the mind by conscience is impelled at once, and the conviction of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any action instantaneously, and without the slow and complicated process of reasoning, is forced upon it; and that therefore the reason here is not the director of the mind. On the other hand, if we examine narrowly into the operations of our minds, we shall be convinced that it is no proof that reason is not exerted in any case, that we do not feel its efforts within us, or that we are impelled too quickly for this operation to be performed; inasmuch as, in many of the various and sudden motions which our bodies make, they are instantaneously directed in the same manner by the reason.

The exercise of our reasoning power, as I shall endeavour to demonstrate in a subsequent chapter, is all-sufficient for our guidance both in our moral and religious duties, and in the multifarious actions and pursuits which we may be called upon through life to fulfil. But what is denominated the conscience has been shown not to be infallible; consequently, the reason is equal to it as a monitor, even supposing the former to exist

2 Vide post, b. iii. c. vi. s. 9.

3 Ibid. c. iii. ss. 6, 9.

as an independent principle, which appears however to be contrary to all probability. Nor does it seem likely, or would it be for the good of man, or apparently more consonant with the wisdom and justice of God, that any director beyond this of the reason, should exist to guide us in our moral course; but it appears to me more consistent with our present situation in a probationary state, to suppose that an intelligent monitor like the reason only, whose advice could be obtained alone by a fair inquiry of it, than that one like what the conscience is supposed to be, which would be ever intruding its dictates upon us, should be provided by our All-wise and Allbeneficent Creator, to regulate our conduct; especially when such an independent moral monitor would in some cases lead us entirely into error, and be liable in all cases to be verted or deadened by abuse.

per

One particular cause why conscience is so efficient and so powerful in directing us aright, arises from the thorough sifting and reiterated examination of each doubtful question of conduct which it ensures, by keeping the subject so long before us, through the anxiety that it occasions, and by which every point of it becomes debated; so that if any matter of moment escapes our examination on the first view of it, or fails to be correctly apprehended, it is almost certain to be set right on a subsequent survey. A series of appeals from one decision to another is thus afforded, and the evidence is carefully scrutinized on each argument, whereby at last the real truth is discovered.

Reason and experience are indeed the surest and safest, if not the sole guides to man, not only in moral, but in general conduct. Yet even in dealing with experience, reference to reason is ever required; and indeed, without the employment of reason, experience could be but of little avail.

Reason in its operations however, always refers to the existence of some definite rule of conduct by which it is guided. But this reference by reason to a rule of conduct, implies also necessarily a giver of that rule, and by consequence also, a superior ruler to whom we owe allegiance; as without such ruler, there can be no authority either to prescribe, or to enforce obedience to a rule. That ruler, in the case of man, is the Supreme Being, to the existence and authority of whom conscience therefore appears tacitly ever to bear testimony.

As conscience is so largely constituted of the faculty of reason, it may also be inferred, and indeed observation renders it obvious, that according to the peculiar characteristic of this faculty in each particular individual, will be also the particular character of his conscience. Thus, corresponding with the various endowments and developments of reason in the

MORAL STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

125

manner hereafter pointed out, the conscience of some persons is peculiarly susceptible of excitement on ordinary matters of practical import; of others on subtle questions of morality; of others on grand and important subjects only.

Immediately connected with the reference to the reason of each question in which moral conduct is concerned; is the consideration of the precise standard of moral right and wrong which every individual establishes in his own mind, and in which respect different individuals widely differ one from another. The efficient causes of variety in the adjustment of this standard, originate not only in the reason, or in mental endowment, but equally so in the medial endowments and inclinations; and perhaps more than all in the education which the individual has received, and the circumstances in which he is placed. Thus, considerations of duty which would weightily affect one man, by another are completely disregarded; although this same person might be much moved by other considerations, which the former would deem as but trivial. According however to the nature and precision of this standard of right and wrong, the determination by the reason of any person upon each question of moral duty, must be very largely dependent.

The man of high rectitude and honourable dealing, is he who, in addition to his being very perfectly endowed as regards his reasoning faculty, which guides him steadily and unerringly in the right course when dealing with any matter where duty is involved, is also largely endowed with those particular, medial emotions and qualities which urge on the Will to confirm, and strenuously to act upon, whatever the reason may determine to be right. But the man of high conscientious feeling also owes this character entirely to his possession of endowments of this nature. The two may therefore be considered as very nearly, if not entirely identical.

3. Medial Excitement attendant on its Exercise.

But, although the reason appears to be the chief and leading element in the constitution and direction of the conscience, experience may be appealed to to prove that it is

4 Vide post, b. iii. c. iii. ss. 5, 7, 9.

5 Dr. Abercrombie, however, considers that conscience conveys conviction to the mind of what is morally right or wrong in regard to conduct "without reference to any other standard of duty."-On the Moral Feelings, pt. iii.

On the other hand, Dr. Carpenter holds that owing to a difference in race, education, and habits, "the moral standards of no two men shall be precisely alike; while the moral standards of men brought up entirely under different circumstances, shall be of the most opposite nature."Principles of Mental Physiology, p. 243.

• Vide ante, b. ii. c. i. s. 8. Post, b. iii. c. iii. s. 9.

not the only element or agent here; and that in each case, where a question of moral duty has to be determined upon, the decision is accompanied by a feeling or emotion of the soul, too vivid and too powerful either to pass unheeded or to be neglected.' The excitement of this emotion attendant on the decision of the reason appertaining to matters of conscience, forms, as it were, the touchstone of its operations, the test that an action of conscience has really been achieved. This emotion so accompanying the exercise of the reason concerning a moral action, consists in a feeling of pain, or pleasure, remorse or satisfaction, according as it condemns or approves of such action. That which causes the emotion attendant on a decision of the reason to arise, is the circumstance of a decided determination of this faculty respecting some active duty having been made, and the conclusion immediately drawn therefrom, that we are morally obliged to exert ourselves to carry out the decision which the reason has effected, and that we shall be involved in some measure of guilt in case we reglect to do so; the fear of which constitutes the emotion, or qualm of conscience, alluded to.

Conscience appears indeed ever to have a bias towards fear or pain, being always excited in that direction where danger is expected to arise; like a careful pilot, who keeps a sharp and constant watch towards the shoals and billows, while he is comparatively inert in the deep still waters where he may sail in safety. On the other hand, the conviction of having taken every requisite precaution against danger, creates in its turn, a firm consciousnes of security. Hence these emotions when thus excited, have been mistaken for supernatural or divine. impulses. Nevertheless, every effort of the reason, and every excitement of an emotion, is not conscience; although all conscience consists, in part, in an effort of the reason, and, in part, in the excitement of an emotion. Conscience however, is exercised through the operation of the reason merely about some moral action, which we are impelled to perform, the consideration of which serves to excite in us an emotion of the nature described.

The emotion so excited, rather immediately succeeds than accompanies the decision of the reason, referred to in the last section but this it does so closely as to become completely incorporated or blended with it; and the two actions, although different in their kind, and proceeding from a different part

7 While some writers have considered conscience to be a faculty of the mind, others have thought that it is only an emotion. Thus, Dr. Henry More defines conscience to be "a fear and confusion of mind arising from the presage of some mischief that may befall a man beside the ordinary course of nature, or the usual occurrences of affairs, because he has done thus or thus."-Works, b. i. c. x.

COUNTERACTING EMOTIONS ACCOMPANYING CONSCIENCE. 127

of our constitution, are ordinarily mistaken for one single operation. And as this emotion is stimulated by the action of the reason, so by this emotion in its turn, is the reason also stimulated. By the joint operation of the two, is generated that intense moral irritation, if we may so term it, as distinct from the sudden and transient impulse excited, in which consists what is ordinarily called the sting, or qualm, of conscience."

These two operations of the mental and medial part of our nature, above described, consisting in the concurrence of the dictates of reason with the emotions of the soul, and which together constitute the operation of conscience, might be well compared to the lightning and the thunder in the natural world; both of which, although they appear to take place at different moments, are in reality but each parts of one single act. Thus, the reason, with all the vividity and force of lightning, instantaneously flashes forth its decision, and is followed by the deep-felt murmur of emotion, which is the voice of conscience; and which, although less swift in its progress, is sure ere long to follow, to make itself heard, and to strike terror into the soul by the deep and solemn notes in which it utters its denunciations.

As in the physical frame we find that any, even the least possible disarrangement, or disorder of, or injury to the system is, in each case, accompanied by corresponding physical uneasiness, or pain, which serves to afford sure and infallible warning of the evil that is in progress, and which feeling is never, in any case experienced, except where there exists to some extent at least, the disorganization alluded to; so in our moral constitution do we also find in a corresponding manner, that each false step or wrong action in our conduct, is ever accompanied by remorse, which affords us immediate notice of our error: so finely, and so perfectly, and upon so nice a balance, are both our material and our mental and moral systems, ordered and adjusted.

Although various different emotions are excited during the operation of conscience, yet those only of pain and pleasure are wont to take the lead, and are what mainly impel us in the determination of the course to be pursued. Nevertheless, among the most common attendants upon the exercise of conscience, are the complex emotions of aversion, apprehension, contempt, shame, and hope. The simple emotions which accompany, or are blended with, and form part of the operation of conscience, act in a double manner, corresponding

"Conscience is the regulating power, which, acting upon the desires and affections, as reason does upon a series of facts, preserves among them harmony and order."-Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings, pt. iii. p. 107.