innate in the mind; but from the consciousness of transgressing a moral rule, whenever we discharge them so as to offend the feelings of others. When they are performed without this violation, no sense of shame arises. Savages, indeed, who are not supposed to be destitute of conscience, although in their case it is uncultivated, exhibit the same deficiency in regard to decency that animals do; and it might therefore fairly be urged that if it is no proof of want of conscience in their case, it ought not to be admitted to be so in the case of animals. These people are, however, in a condition but little above that of animals, either mental or moral, of which, indeed, their deficiency as regards the operations of conscience in many respects, is one of the most striking proofs. Nor Although instinct may be said to guide animals in their various proceedings, in a manner analogous to that in which reason guides man; yet it does not appear that any emotion accompanies their actions of any kind, corresponding with that which contributes to the constitution of the conscience in man. is it to be inferred from any circumstances connected with their conduct, that such emotion is ever excited; if, indeed, we except those cases where fear of punishment from breach of an act of discipline affects them, but which, as has already been pointed out, is totally different, both in man and animals, from a qualm of conscience. But although animals are wholly destitute of any such endowment as conscience, to guide them in their career; through their instinctive endowments, and the subtilty and susceptibility of their material organs, they are probably more extensively influenced, and more immediately impelled by certain emotions, as also by their appetites and passions, than is the case with man. From this arrangement in the economy of their nature, they are in many respects arbitrarily restrained and directed, which in a great measure serves them for their mere animal duties and requirements, almost as efficiently as, and in a manner corresponding with that in which, the conscience does man. CHAPTER I. THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES. 1. Distinction between, and peculiar proper Province of, the Mind, the Intellectual Faculties, and the Will. THE consideration of the faculties of the mind, which is proposed as the subject of the present book, is at once one of the noblest, and at the same time one of the most difficult topics upon which that mind can be engaged. Knowing all things but imperfectly, itself it appears to know least intimately of all; just as the eye which sees every object about it, is to itself alone always invisible. In order however to acquire a clear and distinct idea of the subject before us-which must be a principle of the first importance in every process of philosophical investigationwe ought to regard the soul as not merely made up of certain active powers, which the intellectual faculties constitute; but as a being which, like every other being of whatever nature, possesses properties and qualities, distinctive, characteristic of, and essential to it, as well as its more prominent features and endowments. The moral qualities and attributes of the soul, have been considered more particularly in the preceding book of this treatise; and in the first book an inquiry was instituted into the various excitements and affections to which the soul is liable. By the term mind,' I mean the whole active intelligent power of the soul-as distinguished from its feelings, or passive power or liability to be excited or moved, on the one hand, and its moral and other qualities, on the other. By the intellectual faculties, I mean the active powers or capabilities of the soul." By the will, I mean the resolute determination of the mind, after due deliberation, as to the course which it eventually resolves to adopt. Of the nature and prerogative of the 1 Vide ante, Prel. Diss. s. iv. a. 2. "This perceiving active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself."-Bishop Berkley. Principles of Human Knowledge, s. 2. "I find in myself divers faculties of thinking, that have each their special mode; for example, I find I possess the faculties of imagining and perceiving."-Des Cartes. Medit. vi. will generally, I have already treated in a previous chapter, where its constitution was defined, and its office was pointed out; while the nature and extent of its freedom, were also attempted to be demonstrated. Soul and spirit are in reality the same, and constitute the being or substratum in which the mind, and all its faculties, exist or reside." 8 An idea is the picture, image, or notion, of any subject, or object, which exists in the mind; and which is what, and the whole of what, the mind perceives of such subject or object : analogous to a sensation, which is a visual or oral perception, or impression, of a sight or sound, for instance, which is excited in the corporeal organ of seeing or hearing. The soul is to the mind, what the body is to the man; the vehicle or principle of existence or reality. The faculties and capacities of the soul, are the powers by which it acts. They are to the soul, what the limbs and sinews are to the body; and the operation of the soul by these faculties, is what motion by means of the limbs is to the body. Hence action is only the motion, and not, as some have erroneously supposed and contended, the essence of the soul." It is not impossible, nor indeed improbable, that the main and real distinction between human and animal nature, may be simply this that man has a soul with intellectual faculties annexed to it; while an animal has a soul, but without any intellectual faculties." The mind, the intellect, and the intellectual faculties, mean therefore in reality the same thing; although one term may sometimes comprehend rather more, or rather less, than another just as a person may talk of his house, his residence, and his abode, meaning thereby the same identical dwelling-place. Thus, the house might be contended to include the kitchen and the cellar, which are not necessarily comprehended under the : 3 Vide ante, b. ii. c. 1, ss. 2, 3. 4 Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. 4., a. 1, 3. "By the word spirit, we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term." -Bishop Berkley. Principles of Human Knowledge, s. 138. 6 Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. 6, a. 2. 7 Buffon considers that all the actions of animals may be explained without allowing them either thought or reflection, the internal sense being sufficient to produce all their movements.-Natural History. Nature of Animals. Le Roy, on the contrary, holds that "the commonest actions of animals, their daily proceedings, suppose memory, reflection upon the past, comparison between a present object which excites their desire, and the indications of danger which repel them, a power of distinguishing between circumstances which are alike in some points, while differing in others; finally, a power of appreciating their relations, and deciding among them."-On the Intelligence and Perfectibility of Animals, letter vii. 1 |