it may be influenced by different, and even opposite causes, it still remains at liberty to pursue the course that it prefers; and indeed the very opposition to one another of these various counteracting influences, contributes materially to preserve and to insure its freedom.

The will, nevertheless, although it is ever free to determine exactly as it chooses, invariably and inevitably preponderates, with unerring certainty, towards that which appears to the mind to be the greatest good, or the most desirable object under all circumstances, on the present occasion, to pursue; just as surely as, and in a manner corresponding with, that in which the heaviest of two weights or ponderous bodies, is that which, notwithstanding its uncertain previous vibrations, ultimately decides the declivity of the scale in which it is placed. Consequently, the particular influence that determines the will, is what we commonly term the motive for action; by which we mean that one special inducement out of several, which is the preponderating one, as appearing to be the most desirable object, or the preferable course to pursue. When, on the other hand, we say that there is an absence of motive for action, we simply mean that there is no particular inducement which is of importance beyond others, so as to determine

the will.

But if it be contended that this opinion of the will being absolutely determined by the motives that influence it, destroys all notion of moral responsibility for action, and renders men merely the agents of external impulses; it may be replied that, although all men alike are swayed by the motives which influence the will, yet the quality of these motives depends upon, and is entirely decided by, the moral disposition and character of the individual himself; and so, ultimately, the decision of the will is regulated by, and, as it were, reflects, the disposition and character of the individual. Consequently, by the decision of his will, ought his conduct to be judged. Thus, the man of high moral principle is swayed by the love of virtue, and the desire of acting rightly; considerations which would have but small influence over one of a depraved disposition. And this rule prevails through all orders of men in a corresponding manner. Indeed, there is hardly anything in which people differ so much one from another, as they do in regard to the motives by which their wills are influenced; a point on which they vary quite as widely as they do in the choice of their food. On the other hand, nothing so truly, so unerringly, and so exactly exhibits the disposition of the individual, as does the nature of the motives that actuate his will. Thus, the

"It is that motive which as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will."-Edwards on Free Will, pt. i. s. 2.

WHAT FINALLY DETERMINES THE WILL.

19

intellectual man is swayed by motives which have reference to his exalted pursuits; the sensual man by those which bear relation to the gratification of his appetites; the religious man by considerations concerning God and Heaven; the covetous man by thoughts of gain; and the voluptuary by those of pleasure.

From all this, it follows that although the determinations of the reason, on which the will mainly depends, are themselves dependent upon external circumstances and events over which we have no control, and upon the preponderance of particular motives which constitute the hinges as it were, on which they turn; and so it may be contended that we have no actual liberty of action here, or that that liberty is very limited and imperfect: yet, on the other hand, we have a further source of liberty, in the choice allowed to us as to the relative weight or importance which we attach to certain of these circumstances and motives by which the will is determined. According to the constitution or condition of the mind, does it give greater or less weight to some of them; while in doing this, it is at perfect liberty. And as it is by the relative weight of these several influences thus decided, that the will is guided; so as regards its guidance also, it is consequently, ultimately, as well as originally, free.

Thus one man may voluntarily attach more importance to a particular act of duty than another man does; another to a question of self-interest; another to considerations of affection: and one man may be more influenced than another by a dread of poverty, or of physical pain. Over our estimate of these events, we therefore possess a control; and hence even the very determinations of our will are not wholly beyond our choice." Thus, as already observed, a man surrounded by robbers with loaded fire-arms, is free to act as he chooses, inasmuch as he is not under actual physical restraint. But the consideration that if he attempts to move, he will at once be shot dead, is one of such weight that it amounts to a necessity, and imperatively influences, in other words, compels him to remain passive. He is, nevertheless, actually free to prefer attempting to escape, at the risk of being shot.

The essence of free-will may be determined, therefore, to consist in the power of the mind to decide absolutely as to the ultimate course that it shall adopt, with regard to its conduct in any particular matter, notwithstanding the influences of different kinds which may be in operation, and by which it may

According to Kant, practical liberty is the independence of the will from necessity, or the impulses of sensibility.-Critic. of Pure Reason. 5 When it is said the will decides or determines, the meaning must be that the person in the exercise of a power of willing and choosing, or the soul acting voluntarily, determines."-Edwards on Free Will, part ii. s. 1.

be affected. In the majority of cases the preponderance between opposing influences will be decided by the relative force or weight which the mind, after due deliberation, gives to each of them. When, however, the weight of one particular influence outbalances every other, it may be deemed to amount to a necessity; and the will is then no longer able to contend against it, or to preserve its freedom, but at once determines to be guided by that alone.

It must consequently be held that, in all ordinary cases, although a man is quite free to act according to the determination of his will, yet he is not free, nay, has no choice in selecting the motives that produce that determination." Here he is dependent on external agents, his own powers and innate. endowments being wholly insufficient to aid him. The cause of this is, that although he wills pursuant to the dictates of his reason, which is also free; yet these dictates are guided by circumstances about him over which he has no control. He is therefore free as regards the determinations of his will, and as regards the acts which he performs in pursuance of these determinations; but he is a slave as regards the events which govern those determinations. So long, therefore, and so far as the reason is free to act, man himself, in respect to his will, is also free. And the impulse of the different emotions and appetites, and passions, many of which influence us in opposite directions, so far from being a restraint on our determinations, greatly conduces to set us at liberty, to enlarge the sphere of our choice, and to aid the freedom of the will.

In one sense, therefore, every man is in every case wholly and absolutely free to act, so far as he possesses the real power to do so, independently of, and without regard to the consequences of his act. In another sense, no man is free as respects even the commonest operation of his life, so far as he is absolutely constrained to follow that particular course alone which his reason dictates to be the most eligible. It is between these two extreme points, that the real course of freedom runs.

The ultimate result as regards the freedom of the will, and the conclusion to be drawn from the whole of the argument, appear, consequently, to be as follows. The will is on all occasions absolutely and entirely free to act; and every one is able

On the question of liberty, necessity, and free will, which is discussed by Locke with characteristic acuteness and perspicuity, he holds that liberty is a power to act or not, according as the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest, is what we call the will. That which determines the will is some present uneasiness, accompanied by a desire, which is guided by the judgment.-Essay on the Understanding, b. ii. c. xxi. s. 71.

7 "If the mind in its volition can go beyond motive, then it can go without motive."-Edwards on Free Will, part ii. s. 10.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

21 to follow, precisely as he pleases, the bent of his own inclination : but the determinations of that inclination are, in each case, influenced, and indeed absolutely swayed, by the resolution of the mind to pursue that end which appears, under all circumstances, the most desirable. As to what particular objects are most desirable, and consequently form the preponderating motive which invariably determines the will; this depends on the particular disposition of the individual, some preferring motives which are virtuous, others those which are vicious; some those which are intellectual, others those which are sensual. On this account, and from the diversity of choice which lies before us, the freedom of the inclination, as well as of the will, frequently appears more absolute than it really is. Hence, at all events, the mind is free, by the decision of the reason, to determine on the preponderating motive. But when the motive has been determined upon, the will is not free whether to choose it or not, but is irresistibly impelled to do so." All are alike determined by their inclination, though free as to their actual will; and the inclination of each is determined by the relative value which he attaches to the motives by which he is influenced. The apparent and immediate motive which determines the will may be uncertain, and variable, and capricious; but it is nevertheless the attainment of the ultimate end, being the security of that which is, or rather which appears to be, the most beneficial to the individual under all circumstances, and which at that

8 Mr. C. S. Wake, Vice-President of the London Anthropological Society, and author of "Chapters on Man," and of some valuable papers read before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Anthropological Institute, and the Anthropological Society, to whom I have submitted the proof-sheets of the present chapter of this work, has been so obliging as to favour me with the following note on the above paragraph:

"I. It should here be noted that the freedom thus claimed is intellectual merely, and not moral (i. e. the intellect decides which is the stronger motive or set of motives, and the will acts accordingly), except so far as a motive may gain or lose in strength by the action of the mind in relation to it, in which case, as the resulting action is to a certain extent decided by the intellect, there may perhaps be predicated moral freedom.

"2. The desire of the highest good is too general to operate as a motive to action in many cases. The will has relation to particular, and not general aims, and its action is governed by what appears desirable at the present time, although to another person, or at another time, it may be evil.

"3. The desirableness of any particular line of conduct depends chiefly on disposition, which has great influence on the mental determination known as will. On the other hand, disposition is affected largely by the bodily organism, which becomes, therefore, an important factor in relation to the freedom of will, constituting often, especially in adult life, the most powerful motive to a special line of conduct.

"4. Where the bodily organism is in such a condition that the intellect is affected, and thus the power of weighing motives is lost, there is no longer freedom of will in any sense.'

particular time commands the will, and compels it to act in that direction. Consequently that, and that alone, which the will is entirely free to determine, is not its own inclination to do any particular act, but its choice as to which motive out of many shall be the preponderating one by which it is to be guided: in other words, that course which, out of several that are offered to it, is the most beneficial or desirable, under all circumstances, to be adopted. The attainment of the highest good is in all cases the ultimate object of the will; good and evil, or rather the desire and the dread of them, being the two grand magnetic influences of attraction and repulsion which never cease to actuate us, and to the attainment or avoidance of which our will ever points, like the magnet to the pole. The will may frequently appear to fluctuate or vibrate in making this decision, inasmuch as what appears to be the greatest good to one, may not seem so to another, and the opinions of different persons must vary much in this respect. In all cases, however, the aim is essentially the same."

In those instances where the will seems to be for a time undetermined how to act, and the mind appears perplexed in making its choice as to which course it shall pursue; the real fact is, not that the will has lost its freedom, or is under any constraint, but that the mind is doubtful which object is that which is most desirable, from being the greatest good out of several; inasmuch as that is the one which the will, directly that it has discovered it, is certain to prefer.' Indeed, this very power of suspending the decision of the will upon any point, has itself been appealed to as a proof of the freedom of the will. But even here, the determination of the will is sure to be decided by the preponderance of the motive, which may either lead us to suspend or to complete our decision.

Nevertheless, when apparently under constraint, the will itself is, in many cases, free; inasmuch as by the former condition nothing more is in reality implied than the presence and influence of such a motive as will operate so strongly as at once of itself, independent of all other considerations, to determine the inclination of the will. Possibly, indeed, the most apt term by which to express what we mean by real liberty, is not freedom of the will, but freedom of the inclination. By the latter is understood, not only the liberty to determine as we please, but

9 Mr. Wake's theory on this subject is, as he informs me, that "all direct freedom of will is purely intellectual, and that this is combined with moral necessity, i. e. the intellect to a certain extent governs motives, but ultimately these must necessarily govern conduct."

According to Professor Bain, when suspense arises, it is through some nerve influence that checks the regular and ordinary course of the voluntary faculty. The deliberative veto is one mode of giving a check, but this withdrawn, action ceases.-The Emotions and the Will, Second edition, p. 429.