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evidence, from which he never deviates, and insists on its being applicable to all cases. The philosopher varies his rule to suit every particular case, considering each by itself. The lawyer declines to act in any case unless he deems the evidence ample. In order for legal evidence to be ample it is not required to be certain or absolute, but the lawyer rests satisfied with, and acts upon, such evidence as appears probable, and likely to be true according to the particular principles laid down by him. The philosopher acts upon such evidence as he obtains, whatever it may be, regulating his proceedings upon the matter by the nature of the evidence. Nevertheless, but a small portion of the evidence which is received, either legal or philosophical, is absolute and conclusive. In each case we act upon it when we deem it satisfactory; in the case of legal, where it comes up to the rule laid down; in the case of philosophical, where, under the circumstances, it appears to be ample, and the balance of probabilities seems in its favour.

Certain legal evidence is however rejected, not because it is bad in itself, but because its admission might lead to inconvenient results. The philosopher receives all the evidence which he deems trustworthy, uninfluenced by any such considerations as to the consequences. The lawyer requires the best evidence that can be had, under the circumstances, and is satisfied with, and acts upon, no other. The philosopher is satisfied with the best evidence that he can get, and acts upon it.

Allusion was made in the preceding chapter to the inability of animals to receive ideas, or, as a necessary consequence, to convey them by language. As a further consequence, they are also incapable of reasoning, which is but the power of comparing ideas. Nevertheless, the instinctive endowments which they possess supply, to an extent sufficient for all their wants,

7"If it may be doubted whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas to any degree, this, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in them, and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes by no means attain to. For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of making words or any other general signs."-Locke on the Understanding, b. ii. c. 2, s. 10.

Mr. Wake is of opinion that "there is in reality no such process in animal reasoning as that intended by comparison,' such reasoning being simply a judgment of relation instinctively formed on the presentation to the mind of certain objects of thought, an increase in the number of which renders the operation more complex, but does not alter its character."-Chapters on Man, pt. i. c. ii. p. 16.

Mr. Darwin, however, remarks th it "few persons any longer dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning."-Descent of Man, &c. vol. i. p. 46.

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an acquaintance with objects around them, and with the mode of dealing with them, although without imparting any intellectual information, or evincing or implying any reasoning power whatever.

But, although animals may be deemed utterly incapable of reasoning, or of drawing rational inferences, even of the simplest nature, they appear nevertheless able to perceive conclusions of certain kinds which have been arrived at. Thus, they observe the sum total as regards the difference in qualities and size between various bodies, although they cannot analyze the constituent elements which contribute to make them up. So also, although they are unable to calculate numbers, they can perceive the difference between one object and several, or between a few and a great many objects.'

2. The Capacity of Sense.

The capacity of sense, or what we ordinarily term common sense, is that capacity of the faculty of reason by which it is enabled with facility, celerity, and clearness to compare one

Lord Brougham held that the instincts of animals are unquestionably mental faculties; which we discover by observation and consciousness, but which are themselves wholly unconnected with any exercise of reason."-Discourse of Natural Theology, sect. iii.

To this passage the following interesting and valuable note nas been supplied by Mr. Wake:

There is no doubt that according to your definition of reason, * animals are 'utterly incapable of reasoning.' That they are not, however, incapable of drawing rational inferences' is, I think, evident from a consideration of animal actions. Take the case of the fox, which-it was chained up in a farm-yard-spread its food just within the radius covered by its chain, and when the fowls trespassed within the circle it commanded pounced upon them. The fox certainly inferred that if the fowls ate of the food it would be able to catch them. There was, indeed, a clear process of reasoning; and here, as it could not, I think, be brought within your definition of that mental process, this definition must be imperfect. If you refer to p. 16 of Chapters on Man, you will see that I put comparison between inverted commas in the passage, there is in reality no such process in animal reasoning as that intended by comparison.' Here it is affirmed that animals have the reasoning power, but not in the sense intended when the mental faculties of man are spoken of. The mere logical process is, however, the same (see p. 20). Animal reasoning appears to have relation merely to the applicability of a certain means to attain a desired end, and the higher animals undoubtedly can make choice of means. Here, however, we see no reference to ideas, as distinguished from action, the former being the distinctive mark of human reasoning, which, nevertheless, differs from animal reasoning only in the objects of thought, and not in the mental process. The difference seems

* Vide ante, s. 1, p. 268.

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with another so as to draw general conclusions therefrom, the ideas relating to any subject.'

As I observed when treating of the capacity of apprehension, that nearly all the ideas that the mind receives pass through this capacity, by which means the understanding obtains a clear and accurate knowledge of them before it proceeds by its other capacities either to observe them minutely, or to survey them comprehensively; so, in a corresponding manner, the capacity of sense institutes a general scrutiny into the ideas of each subject before they are closely analyzed, or are compared by the judgment. Indeed here, as in the case of apprehension, the essential difference in the ideas consists, not in themselves, but in the mode in which they are dealt with by different capacities.

The capacity of sense, analogous to the capacity of apprehension, is the most commonly of all the capacities in this faculty possessed in an extensive degree. It enables a person to inform himself correctly and satisfactorily concerning the probable truth or general merits of any topic on a superficial or cursory examination of it, to discern the obvious, ordinary, and principal relations between different subjects or objects, and to ascertain with clearness and accuracy their most prominent and characteristic differences. It is brought into use. in every kind of reasoning, inasmuch, as already observed, before we exercise analysis or judgment, we usually exert this capacity to a certain extent, so as to effect a general examination of the arguments involved, prior to descending to a minute and particular examination of the different points of the ques

tion.

to depend in fact on the use by man of generalizations which are unknown to animals (see Chapters on Man, p. 21). Man's use of generalizations again depends on his special faculty of higher perception, which enables him to distinguish the qualities of objects as separate from the objects themselves as individuals (see p. 24). The incapacity of animals to do more than recognize individuals, as possessing features distinct from other objects, is the source of all this mental inferiority. Here, probably, we agree; but I affirm, nevertheless, that animals can reason so far as the objects of thought they possess will allow them. Here we seem to differ, because I give a wider definition to reasoning than you do. Substitute in your definition.' objects of thought' for 'ideas,' and I think we shall then completely agree.'

According to Condillac, "good sense and understanding are no more than to conceive or to imagine, and differ only by the nature of the object with which we are occupied.”—Origin of Human Knowledge, pt. i. s. 2, § 98.

Helvetius lays it down that "the difference between wit and good sense proceeds from the different causes by which they are produced. The one is the effect of strong passions, and the other of the absence of those very passions."-Essays on the Mind, Essay iv. chap. 12.

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According to Dr. Reid, in his Essay on the Mind, the office of common sense, or the first degree of reason, is to judge of things self-evident, as

The being largely endowed with the capacity of sense, constitutes the man of good common sense and correct decision with regard to ordinary matters of life, who, on the first examination, perceives the general bearing of the question in agitation.

Deficiency in this capacity occasions erroneous decision with regard to common affairs, about which we are called upon to give an immediate and unhesitating opinion. It constitutes the silly man, who, in ordinary matters, constantly displays what is vulgarly termed a want of common sense.

This capacity corresponds with that of apprehension in the faculty of understanding, although quite independent of, and by no means co-existent with it in any mind; and it is principally exercised in comparing the ideas which that capacity receives, although those obtained by the other capacities may be also made use of by it.

One great advantage resulting from the extensive possession of this capacity, is that it enables the individual so gifted to profit by turning to account the efforts of other men of more comprehension and acuteness than himself, and to avail himself of the operations which their superior wisdom and power have been carrying on. Thus a monarch of sound sense, surrounded by sincere and able statesmen, may, from their various reasonings and researches and contentions, draw accurate conclusions as to the course of conduct which, on the whole, it is most desirable for him to adopt.3

Sense is probably created at once the most perfect, is the earliest developed, and is the least dependent upon artificial education, of all the capacities of reason.

contrasted with the office of the second degree of reason, which is to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are.

Dr. Carpenter defines common sense to be "an attribute,* which judges of things whose self-evidence is not equally apparent to every individual, but presents itself to different individuals in very different degrees, according in part to the original constitution of each, and in part to the range of his experience, and the degree in which he has profited by it."-Mental Physiology, c. xi. p. 472.

Mr. Sergeant Cor's definition of common sense is that it is "that confidence common to all mankind in certain conditions of things, as true, which, because it is common, may be presumed to have its foundation in some universal truth, or something which the human intelligence is constructed to recognize as truth, and the belief in which is not a mere intellectual acceptance, but that firm conviction upon which we act without hesitation or doubt."-What am I? vol. i. c. xxvi. p. 246.

3 Vide, Civilization considered as a Science.-Moral Jurisprudence. (Bohn's Library edition), pp. 243, 244.

How does Dr. Carpenter distinguish an "attribute" from a "faculty," the existence of which he denies P-Vide ante, c. i. s. 3, pp. 181, 182.

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3. The Capacity of Analysis.

The capacity of analysis is that capacity of the faculty of reason by which it is enabled, with the utmost precision, clearness, acuteness, and distinctness, to compare one with another, so as to draw the most accurate and exact conclusions therefrom, the particular and minute ideas of any subject, especially one of a subtle and precise nature.

This capacity is principally of use in controversy, to detect inaccuracy or inconclusiveness in the reasoning of an opponent, by discovering the minute points of difference between the facts as they really are, and as he contends them to be. It is the mode of many disputants to mix a certain portion of truth with what is unsound, whereby the whole is gulped down together as true. Analysis is exercised in unravelling and exposing in controversy fallacies of this nature, by proving these minute and unobserved distinctions.

It is with the treasures of the soul as it is with those of the soil, that things of the utmost value, and those which are mere dross, are frequently discovered united and blended together so as to form but one substance. Thus virtue and vice, truth and falsehood, philosophy and sophistry, are often so commingled in the arguments of a particular writer, or the principles of a particular party, that we unhesitatingly and unwittingly either accept or reject their system and tenets as a whole, without attempting to separate the good from the bad, so as to choose the one and reject the other. It is the peculiar province of the capacity of analysis in these cases to act the part of the refiner's fire, to divide the gold from the dross, and to point out moreover what is gold and what is dross.

I think it can hardly be doubted that this process is performed by the particular capacity of analysis and not by the whole faculty of reason, as might otherwise be inferred from the manner in which efforts of this nature are sometimes spoken of. That the mind possesses such a capacity, endowed with a peculiar power of this nature, is, I conceive, alike essential and evident. Sense and judgment, which are also capacities of this faculty, are wholly inapplicable for the performance of this operation.

The capacity of analysis also assists any one engaged in the pursuit of natural philosophy or experimental science, to analyze and discover the essential properties of beings, or their original elementary principles.

The extensive possession of this capacity confers a great degree of sharpness and penetration on the mind, and enables an individual to argue with acuteness and from first principles;