CHAPTER I.

MORAL DISPOSITION AND CHARACTER.

1. Constitution and Essence of Moral Endowment.

Of the three several departments into which the consideration of the nature and constitution of man is divided in the present work, that which relates to his moral being is necessarily on many accounts the most complex, and the most perplexing. The subjects requiring to be embraced in connexion with it, are not only very diversified as regards their extent, but very abstruse in their quality; and the mutual bearing and dependence of each branch of the constitution of man upon the other, demand to be ascertained, and very precisely adjusted, ere any correct decision upon the matter can be arrived at. Hence arises the extraordinary abstruseness and obscurity in which most topics of an ethical nature appear to be frequently so inextricably involved. It is, moreover, with disquisitions upon them, as it is with arithmetical calculations, that the most trivial error in any one of the items renders the whole sum wrong throughout; although, on the other hand, arithmetical exercises are, happily, wholly exempt from all those perversions. arising from the bias of the feelings, to which ethical controversies are so peculiarly subject; and which, as I shall endeavour to illustrate when I come to treat on the process of reasoning,' is what mainly occasions topics of this nature so liable to be erroneously determined. Law and ethics, whose object and province it is to reduce all other subjects to order and certainty; as respects the conclusions attempted to be effected regarding themselves, but too often prove uncertain and unsatisfactory. Hence, those appliances which we regard as, and which ever ought to be, the surest safeguards against confusion and error, are, on the contrary, frequently found to be among their main promoters.

That which constitutes what is ordinarily termed the moral nature of man, does not consist in any actual independent quality or power possessed by him of a moral kind; but simply

Vide post, b. iii. c. 3. s. 7, 8.

in the various medial and mental endowments with which he is gifted, simultaneously and reciprocally acting together upon each other, some aiding, others retarding the operation of the entire system, and producing as the result of their united concurrent operations, a certain determinate principle as regards the action they occasion, which forms the real essence of the moral endowment, characteristic, or disposition of the individual.' Hence, the moral endowments of man are none of them simple or separate of themselves, but are all of them formed by the complex and reciprocal operation and influence of the medial endowments, and the mental powers. Moral endowments are, indeed, in this respect somewhat analogous to certain chemical productions which are originated and constituted by the conjunction together of two or more simple substances of an opposite kind, that at once by amalgamation form a new element, in its nature totally different from either of its compounds. In this respect too, moral endowment somewhat resembles man himself, who is, as it were, placed on the confines between mind and matter. So moral endowment springs out of the conjoint operations of the mental and medial parts of our nature.

In the consideration and determination of the moral endowment, and disposition, and character, of any person, we have therefore, to ascertain, and to keep in view, what are the several medial and mental properties, and qualities, and powers of such an individual; the relative proportionate extent, strength, and activity of each of these agents; and their respective influence, both to incite and to retard action in any particular case. The ultimate course of general habitual conduct, directed and produced by these mutual reciprocal and counteracting powers and influences, is that which constitutes the moral character of the man.

If we examine minutely the conduct of any person, we shall find that the emotions, appetites, passions, and other endowments already alluded to, are ceaselessly in operation, according as various circumstances or causes may contribute to excite them, some impelling him in one direction, others in another; so that the influence of one counteracts or balances that of the other, and thus allows the operations of the reason to exercise their legitimate sway in the regulation of the actions. Thus, to put the case of an ordinary criminal, appetite

2 According to Mr. Darwin, "a moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of approving or disapproving of them."-Descent of Man, &c., vol. i. p. 88.

Professor Mill defines morality to be "an obedience to the law and constitution of man's nature, assigned him by the Deity in conformity to His own essential and unchangeable attributes, the effect of which is the general happiness of His creatures."-Theory of Moral Obligation.

COUNTERACTING EFFECT OF CONTENDING INFLUENCES.

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and passion urge him on to the commission of crime; while the emotion of fear from the chances of discovery, and the dictates of reason pointing out to him the iniquity and danger of his course, urge him in an opposite direction. If his reason predominates in influencing his conduct, it will in such a case prevail, and will determine him to resist the temptation before him. If, on the other hand, his reason be subjected to the lower impulses, appetite and passion will prevail, and he will rush into crime. This final result, produced by the reciprocal opposite and counteracting influence of these various medial and mental endowments and powers, is that which constitutes the moral character and disposition and endowment of the individual.

The emotions, and even the passions, will nevertheless in certain cases be found serviceable, and directly conducive to the amelioration and exaltation of the moral constitution of man's nature. Thus, a person who is but little susceptible of emotion, or of excitement by passion, although more entirely under the guidance of reason than those who are extensively liable to be thus moved, is apt to be wanting in those warm and genial feelings towards others, and in those actions of vigorous effort for their good, which so mark and adorn the character of the latter. Those who are not easily excited by their own internal operations, are not readily moved by the circumstances of others. Hence, indifference about self, is very apt to be accompanied by apathy respecting those near to

us.

Not only, moreover, is every endowment and propensity of our nature, however humble and even base in its order, capable of being exercised in its due course, and in fulfilment of its appropriate end, without incurring the violation of any moral rule; but he who neglects, legitimately and to the full, to avail himself of their proper use when required, is liable to fall into errors as gross and as grievous as he who, by his excessive indulgence of them, and from being too extensively swayed by their influence, recklessly abuses the possession of the good gifts.

There is, indeed, this essential distinction between an emotion, an appetite, a passion, an affection, and a moral endowment; in that while the four first of these all spring entirely and solely from the medial part of our nature, however compounded they may be of different emotions and feelings of that class, or one with another, and are in certain cases also aided or consummated by an operation of the mind: each of the moral endowments are compounded of certain operations and properties belonging both to the medial and to the mental part of our nature; and spring and originate from, or are the result of, this compound, instead of arising in any particular

department of our constitution. In addition to this, each endowment or operation of this class immediately relates or has reference to some question of active conduct, in which duty is more or less directly concerned. Where only an appetite or affection is excited, the feeling or desire of the individual is merely called forth towards a particular object, without any action in regard to it being considered, or any mental operation exerted, although both these results may doubtless in such a case be produced. They are not, however, essentially necessary to, but are entirely independent of the constitution of the appetite or affection; and when they are excited, they generally, if not always, extend the appetite or affection to some moral exertion; which is, in fact, always the case when any result in regard to conduct or active duty is occasioned. This is especially seen when passion is called forth, as, for instance, that of anger. Thus, though the passion itself is merely a medial excitement of the mind, the action which it immediately produces, bears relation to the moral constitution of our nature.

As the middle course is generally that which in all moral transactions is the most correct, and the most safe to pursue; so the medial condition appears to be ever that to which nature spontaneously inclines. And to this condition we are reduced by the number of counteracting influences by which we are beset, as emotions of different and opposite kinds balance and resist each other, and reduce our general medial constitution to one of a moderate state, midway between pleasure and pain. So also as regards the moral disposition of each person, a middle or moderate condition is produced by the co-existence and co-operation in him of opposite qualities. Thus, a consciousness of rectitude often tends to pride; while, on the other hand, it is counteracted by pride, and pride by a consciousness of rectitude. Humility may produce baseness, and baseness humility. Benevolence may be the occasion of estentation, and admiration of piety may stimulate to hypocrisy.

Occasionally indeed, dispositions which are directly opposite in their nature, and apparently even inconsistent one with another as regards their tendency and influence, will nevertheless be observed to be co-existent in the character of the same person. But this is because they spring from, or are produced by, qualities which, however different one from the other, are nevertheless not absolutely hostile to, or inconsistent with, the contemporaneous presence of each other. Thus, for instance, the same person may be a man of great benevolence, and yet of great avarice. In this case, his benevolence will often prompt him to be generous, while his avarice will ordinarily prompt him to be penurious. On urgent occasions the benevolence may predominate, but the avarice will ordinarily exercise sway over his conduct.

OPPOSING INCLINATIONS, MENTAL AND MEDIAL.

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As I have remarked with regard to the emotions, that those of different kinds are frequently excited together, so that the effect of one to a great extent counteracts that of the other; in a corresponding manner, in the composition of moral character, qualities of an opposite and counteracting nature will be found commingled together, one contradicting and counterbalancing the effect and influence of the other.

If, however, it be objected to this complex constitution of the moral nature of man, that it is contrary to anything which we see in nature to find various constituent portions of the same composition or subject, dissimilar in their quality and tendency, thus blended together into one and the same compound; I would reply that, so far from being contrary to, this is exactly in accordance with what we may observe in nature throughout, and even in material substances. Nay, even the very constitution of our corporeal frames, is exactly analogous to it in many respects. Thus we find one part of these frames constituted of bone, another of flesh, another consisting of blood, while other parts are made up of two or more of these elements compounded together. There is, indeed, in reality, greater apparent variety in this respect in our material, than in our mental constitution; although probably, if accurately examined, there would be discovered a strict and close analogy between them in this, as in many other respects; and it would be perceived that here as elsewhere, the design and constitution of the one would but serve to elucidate that of the other. Man himself is, moreover, essentially a complex being, compounded of the very different and opposite elements of body and soul. In his case, too, sometimes the soul acts alone; sometimes the body alone; and occasionally both conjoined.

The soul moreover affects the body, quite as much as the body does the soul; and the body the soul, as much as the soul does the body. In nearly every motive that influences us, each counteracts the other; and in nearly every action that we perform, the tendency to effect it is opposed by an inclination to do some other. Any affection of the one part of our being is, forthwith, communicated to the other; and injury to the one, at once occasions pain to the other. The constant mutual contentions between the inclinations of the mind and those of the body, each striving to attain the pre-eminence, and to influence and direct the conduct, may indeed be traced in the career of every person alike; on particular occasions the medial endowments becoming invigorated and excited, and those which belong to the intellectual part of our nature being correspondingly weakened and depressed. Hence, it may happen that men of very different moral character, will both be endowed with

3 Vide ante, b. i. c. 2. s. 8.