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therefrom, which may be termed its single exercise or power. 2. In deciding between two or more subjects or matters, which may be termed its double exercise or power, and in performing which it embraces the arguments adduced respecting each subject in dispute, and relating to both sides of the controversy. In this case it compares the two arguments, or collections of ideas, and weighs them, and decides on their relative value in the aggregate; in the same manner as in conducting a single argument, it compares together two or more ideas, and draws conclusions therefrom. In the one case, the capacity resorted to may be considered, as already remarked, to act the part of an advocate; in the other that of a judge.'

As when in travelling in a ship or a carriage, the objects which we see at a distance appear to be moving, and as though we ourselves were alone stationary, while, in reality, the reverse is the case; so, in conducting an argument, we seem to be effecting an actual change in the very facts of the case, while, in reality we are only moving onward to a more close perception and knowledge of the truth at which we are aiming.

Indeed, our condition as regards our knowledge, seems to be the exact counterpart of that contended for by Bishop Berkley with respect to the existence of external objects; for while he argued that things exist only when we see them, and in our perceptions:-so, as regards knowledge, it is evident that all facts, and all knowledge with which we may become acquainted, do actually ever exist the same whether we become acquainted with them or not. It is we only that change as we approach nearer to, or become better informed of, the truth of any matter. Thus, the result both of reasoning and of invention, is not actually to alter the nature of any subject, but only our position with regard to it. It is however mainly by this process of reasoning-of comparing different facts and ideas one with another-that we are enabled to make real progress in the attainment of knowledge of different kinds. Again, as when walking through a country, we see all that is before us, and are entertained with the prospect, but take no heed of that which is behind our backs; so, in our course of reasoning, we are too apt to decide from the argument immediately submitted to us, or directly within our view, without taking into account the evidence offered by those who are on the adverse side of the question.

There are nevertheless, but few popular arguments on behalf of error, which have not more or less of truth mixed up with them. Those are alike in the wrong who deny the truth, or the falsehood of the argument, as a whole. The correct course

Vide ante, s. 4, p. 280.

is to separate truth from error, and to distinguish between the two. The line set to catch us is, we must admit, well baited; and the proper conduct to be adopted, is not to deny the goodness, or the genuineness of the bait, but to discover the hook that is concealed beneath it, and to induce the unwary victim to swallow which is the only object of the angler, and the cause why he has made his bait appear so tempting.

9. Essence of Truth, and Efficiency of the Faculty of Reason.

The essential being and constitution of truth,' although a question which has occasioned much discussion, and one which has afforded to casuists a favourable and a tempting opportunity for exercising their ingenuity to render complex that which God has left clear; appears to be not so incapable, or even so difficult of explanation, to those who sincerely desire to exercise their reason aright, and for the real purpose for which it was given.

The principal and ultimate object aimed at in the exercise of reason, is the discovery of truth, which is the essential end in view of each of the capacities of this faculty, whenever they are exerted. And if these different capacities may admit of distribution in this respect, material truth seems the proper aim of sense, metaphysical truth of analysis, and moral truth of judgment.

But although truth is thus shown to be the only legitimate object of all our faculties and capacities, all our efforts, and all our knowledge; yet, at the same time, it may not inaptly be compared to an animal which, although everybody professes to delight in the pursuit of it, very few chase it with a sincere desire to

"Opinion seems to me to come from the intellect, either voluntarily or involuntarily; voluntarily indeed as regards false opinion, when it comes from him who unlearns it; but involuntarily as regards every true one."-Plato. Republic, b. iii. c. 19.

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Sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though wisdom is not seen by it."-Plato. Phædrus, 65.

According to Helvetius, "there is no truth which is not reducible to a fact."-Treatise on Man, s. 2, c. 23.

3 "If error owes its original to the defect of ideas, or to ideas not properly determined, truth must arise from determinate ideas."- Condillac. Origin of Knowledge, pt. ii. s. 2, c. 1.

4"No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead."-John Stuart Mill on Liberty, c. 2.

According to Cicero, indeed, "Nature herself has given to man the. desire to discover truth, which appears obvious when we are free from care, as we then desire to know even what is being done in the heavens. Urged on by this impulse, we love whatever is true, that is, things that are faithful, simple, and consistent; while we hate whatever is vain, false, and fallacious."-De Fin. Bon. et Mal., ii. 14.

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capture it; and out of those who do so, but a small portion are willing to eat it if it is taken. Even persons of this latter class, entirely mutilate and disguise it when it is served up for their repast, as though their main object was to render it as little as possible like that which nature made it.

Of all things in the world, the most difficult to counterfeit is truth. And yet the attempts to do this are almost ceaseless. The outward semblance may have quite the appearance of genuineness; but directly the nature of the metal is tested, the baseness of the fabrication becomes apparent. By a momentary glance, we may be deceived; but by a steady gaze, the lurking fallacy at once becomes detected. Gilt may serve very well to glitter int he sun, but gold only can pass current on 'Change.

Nevertheless, as truth has often been supported by false reasoning, and error by reasoning that was in itself sound; so it has not unfrequently happened that both force and fraud have been employed to support right principles, even by those who, while they believed implicitly in the justice of the cause which they maintained, must have been fully conscious of the nefariousness of the means by which they upheld it.

Truth may be defined essentially to consist in the exact agreement or accordance between a subject and its relation, or the matter to which the statement refers." The question of truth always exists with regard to the agreement of one subject with another, as whether such a particular measure agrees with the distance to be ascertained. Neither truth nor falsehood can exist except in reference to their accordance between two independent subjects. We cannot say of the sun, or of the sea, that it is either true or false. But of a picture of either, this question may at once be raised, which will be decided by, and depend upon, the agreement or disagreement of the representation with the original. And the real test of the efficiency of the faculty of reason, is its ability to ascertain exactly and clearly the extent of this coincidence or difference. All actual truth is absolute truth. There are no degrees of truth, although there are many degrees of approaches to it, which however are but different degrees and phases of apparent truth. The mind indeed is adapted, and perfectly so, for the attainment, or rather discernment of absolute truth. The hindrances to this attainment are not in the mind itself, but in the many clogs and impediments by which it is beset, and the mazes in which it is liable to be enveloped. A pure mind will discern perfect truth; but to

6 Aristotle defines truth to be the exact conformity of human conception with the real nature of things.-Metaph., 1. 9, c. x.

According to Locke, "truth signifies nothing but the joining or separating of signs, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another."-Essay on the Understanding, b. iv. c. v. s. 2.

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a debased mind, simple truth is difficult of perception. Many of our medial endowments have a tendency, direct or indirect, to shut out truth from the mind. Even sensation, which conveys knowledge, not unfrequently perverts it in the very conveyance.

Nevertheless, while the balance by which truth is weighed may be accurate and trustworthy in itself; if other substances obtrude and interfere with the weights, the test is of course to that extent destroyed. So particular balances may be adapted for certain substances, but not be applicable for others; and those of each kind should be applied to test those subjects, and those only, for which they are peculiarly adapted. The criterion of truth is, as it were, the weight in the balance by which the truth is tested.

Truth is, consequently, the genuine fruit and product of reason, as knowledge is of the understanding. Thus, though the only proper material for the exercise of the reason is knowledge, yet the final result of reason is but to obtain certain knowledge. Hence knowledge and truth are to a great extent identical in their essence; and each of them constitutes alike the only legitimate end of all intellectual exertion. Truth is in itself moreover whole and complete. The destruction of any one part is the ruin of the whole. The grossest falsehood of all, consists in telling only half the truth.

It may therefore appear somewhat difficult to explain how it is that it frequently happens that totally opposite conclusions from the same premises, are arrived at by persons of equal reasoning power, where all the premises and facts appear clear. This results in most cases from the undue importance which, from the influence of prejudice, different people attribute to particular arguments and facts, which are thus allowed to outweigh others that are really of greater consequence; so that what one person deems highly momentous, another regards as trivial. If however pure reason alone decided the controversy in each case, all men would think and act alike; inasmuch as the determinations of reason are in all cases the same, where the same premises are argued from. A variety of opinions by different persons about the same matter, or even the alteration of opinion in a person on a particular subject, does not therefore by any means necessarily imply a defect in the reasoning power, or that it is liable to err, and is incapable of correct decision. The premises upon which the conclusion is based are ever fluctuating; but the conclusion itself remains unchanged. The view before us varies with every alteration of our position, although the objects themselves are immoveable.

7 Locke observes that judgment supplies the want of certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had.-Essay on the Understanding, b. iv.

c. xiv. s. 3.

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On the other hand, occasionally upon those matters respecting which people differ most widely in their general notions, they arrive at precisely the same conclusions on essential points; which proves how precisely the same faculties and capacities in each person act alike, although the premises on which they reason may be wholly different. Probably, indeed, there is no subject on which men differ so widely, as they do on that of religion. And yet even here, on general leading and important matters, most if not all reasonable persons appear to have arrived at nearly the same conclusions. Coincidences in invention are moreover no less striking than are those in reasoning.

But although the reason is the same in each person as regards its nature, while varying in each as to its extent and quality; yet the passions, and desires, and affections, operate very differently in different persons, and in each largely influence the decisions of the reason; whence such different determinations are made on the same subject by different persons, and by the same person at different times. Probably, however, the main source of error, especially when deciding on the merits either of private persons or political parties, is that to which I referred in the last section, of applying the reason to one side of the question only, instead of drawing a conclusion from the premises adduced on both sides; in consequence of which we omit entirely to take into our calculation the arguments on the side adverse to that in favour of which we decide. Thus, as I said before, a person's general character is estimated either by his merits, or by his demerits only, and separately considered, instead of ascertaining the preponderating balance of the one above the other. A political or religious party we judge of by those of its principles only which accord with our own; instead of, and without taking into account, those which it also espouses with which we disagree. We must, in general, indeed judge of mankind as we do of most other matters; not by what they are, but by what they appear. by what actually is, but by what we really know. How often, and We can determine only, not how extensively, moreover, do appearances, seemingly plain and obvious, entirely deceive us, whereby conclusions utterly erroneous are deduced from facts supposed to be indisputable. Hence, how commonly is hypocrisy mistaken for fervour, and modesty for lukewarmness. Judas would pass off for a sincere friend to Christ, because he salutes Him with a kiss. Nicodemus is condemned as merely a lukewarm ally, because he timidly comes to Him at night.

Prejudice, as already pointed out,' is another very extensive cause of error in, and contributes much to mar the efficiency of, 8 Aristotle remarks on the mode in which a man's judgments vary with love or hatred, with joy or sorrow.-Rhet., b. i. c. ii.

"Vide ante, s. 7, p. 291.