of any mind to view any particular subject at once, in all its different points and bearings, when the generality of minds would see it in an ordinary position only. Some writers have asserted it to be the faculty of invention, and others that it is the power of executing any work which the mind has designed." An examination of the constitution of those minds which, by common consent, have been allowed to be eminently endowed with this noble faculty, will, however, serve to evince that none of the foregoing definitions of it at all serve adequately to describe it.

Many of these definitions do, however, to a certain extent go to confirm my theory, inasmuch as they agree in several of the leading attributes which I have ascribed to genius, although they do not contain them all. They are erroneous, indeed, not so much from incorrectness as far as they go, as from incompleteness in not going further. Thus, genius may be truly in part defined to be the power of accomplishing what any person has designed, inasmuch as the capacity of origination, which principally aids in attaining this end, is one of its most important constituents. On the other hand, it is not the power of viewing a subject comprehensively, which the being largely endowed with comprehension confers. Nor of reasoning acutely, which we owe to analysis. Nor is it the ability to excel in anything, inasmuch as the extensive possession of the capacities especially fitted for certain particular pursuits, mainly insures this result, as that of analysis for acute logical reasoning; although even here, the being largely gifted with genius may often aid, as in supplying new arguments and matter, although it is by no means essential to qualify any one to effect this object.

The faculty of genius may, however, be defined, as regards

4 Thus Helvetius defines genius to be "the faculty possessed by some human beings, of seizing at one glance a whole and its different parts." System of Nature, c. ix. He also asserts that it is "an effect of physical sensibility."-Ibid.

5 Helvetius in another work asserts that the word genius always supposes invention; and this quality is the only one which belongs to all the different kinds of genius.-Essays on the Mind, p. 4, c. i. But he adds that, "though genius always supposes invention, all invention does not suppose genius."-Ibid. He also tells us that "genius, of whatever kind, is always the effect of an infinite number of combinations, that can only be formed in early youth."—Ibid.

Melmoth, in his Lalius and Hortensia, or Thoughts on Taste and Genius, lays it down that "the power of invention, especially when supported by an aptness to learn, may be considered as constituting what we understand by genius."-P. 331.

6 44 Genius has been declared by a great authority to be patience; and patience in this sense means unflinching, undaunted perseverance."Darwin's Descent of Man, vol. ii. p. 32s. Perseverance, however, cannot be considered to be genius itself, although it is undoubtedly one main resuit and manifestation of it.-Vide ante, b. iii. c. i. s. 5, p. 202.

CREATIVE POWER OF THIS FACULTY.

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the operation which it effects, to be that power of the mind whereby it is able to produce results which cannot be attained by the common and ordinary faculties for receiving knowledge and reasoning upon it-of knowing and judging -which adapt us for the common and ordinary pursuits and purposes of life; results which no operations of those faculties (however extensively possessed they may be, or however energetically exerted) can ever effect, and which are quite beyond the sphere of their action, and of a nature altogether different from anything produced by them. Thus, while by understanding and reason we receive ideas and compare them, by genius we are enabled to create them anew altogether, through the original combinations which we accomplish. While the former faculties only enable us to import and to select our wares, the latter enables us to make them ourselves."

There is this great and essential difference, indeed, as regards

7 Dr. L. R. de Sainte Croix of Paris, an elegant and graceful critic and writer upon artistical subjects, has favoured me with the following note to this paragraph, in response to my expresseddesire for his sentiments on what is ordinarily termed "genius:

"What I wish to define here is not what are the most comprehensive definitions of the term, but principally that facility of imagination, of conception, that ingenious reasoning, that quality of the mind of which Voltaire thus speaks: Genius is one of those vague terms to which all who use it generally attach different senses; a word which expresses something else besides judgment, ability, taste, talent, penetration, understanding, grace, refinement; and which ought to comprise all those excellences.'

He who has genius, according to Madame de Caylus, has a ready conception, great penetration, much discernment, memory, and eloquence. 666 Genius,' says J. J. Rousseau, 'is reason well seasoned.' It comprehends besides this the action of the soul in regard to the mental operations, its desires, or, to express oneself more freely, the sentiments of the soul. It is indeed the conglomeration of all the intellectual faculties, aptitude to learn, to seize upon, to judge; it is, in fact, more especially that mental vivacity which effects lively sallies, whether by burning words or through ingenious reflections. It is a power which is able to seize instantaneously upon ideas which the world at large does not catch, because there is a double meaning through which he penetrates vividly and profoundly into the consequences of the principle by which one undertakes a great number of efforts without confusion, following the expression of Pascal, who was distinguished for the force and correctness of his genius, and the greatness of his mind.

"Voltaire in another of his writings says again, 'This what they call genius, is, although a new comparison, merely a fanciful illusion; here it is the misuse of a word which is offered in one sense, while it is sought to be availed of in another. It points out a nice distinction between two ideas, which have little in common. search after an object which is not as yet present, but of which there is The metaphor is singular. It effects a the coming shadow. It is the art of writing two things which are distant, and of dividing those which appear to be joined, or to be opposed one to the other. It is this that suggests bright thoughts to the designer. In fine, if I resorted to all the different figures to show what genius is, I should yet feel that I wanted more."

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the operations of genius and those of understanding and reason, that while by the two latter we are simply enabled to advance in our knowledge of truth-to clear away the mists by which it is surrounded-by the first of them we acquire the power of producing various surprising, pleasing, and original effects and results through the combinations which we make of different ideas and subjects. In many instances, however, genius is of important service to us in the investigation of truth, in enabling us to make further advances, and to achieve fresh discoveries, to which result the capacity of origination or invention mainly conduces.

The faculty of genius, like those of understanding and reason, will be found to be constituted of certain independent capacities. Of this we shall be convinced by a rigid examination of the constitution of those minds which have possessed the highest reputation for being endowed with this faculty.

I do not mean to contend that the extensive possession of each of the constituent capacities with which this faculty is endowed, is absolutely essential in order that a person should obtain the character of a man of genius: it is the possession of them according to the degrees in which he is gifted with them respectively, which forms the individual characteristic of a person of this description.

The connexion between the different efforts and capacities of the faculty of genius, is further evinced by the circumstance that the children of a person largely gifted with this faculty, and evincing it by achievements or attainments in one particular line, while inheriting the endowment from the parent, will display it in efforts of a totally different kind, although all produced by the same capacity. Thus, the child of a person extensively endowed with taste, and who excels greatly in music, may excel in painting or eloquence. And the originality of the scientific discoverer descending to his child, will be developed in efforts of the imagination.

As reason is exercised in separating and in discovering the distinction between different ideas; so genius, on the other hand, is exercised in combining them together, and in discovering their resemblance and contiguity one to another.

The exercise of this faculty by persons extensively so gifted is more agreeable than is that of reason, because more novelty is produced by it. It is not, however, so agreeable, because not so productive of novelty, as that of understanding. By the exercise of genius we obtain only new combinations of ideas.

It is an observation of Coleridge, that "talent lying in the understanding is often inherited; genius, being the action of reason and imagination, rarely or never."-Table Talk.

"Vide ante, Prel. Diss., 8. 1, a. 5, vol. i. p. 18. B. iii. c. i. s. 7, ante, p. 209.

PARTICULAR APPLICATION OF THIS CAPACITY.

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By the exercise of the understanding the ideas themselves which are obtained are altogether new.

As genius is the highest of all the powers of the soul, so is its complete exercise in those exalted pursuits which are in their nature the most Divine.

2. The Capacity of Wit.

Wit is that capacity of the faculty of genius by which it is enabled to bring together,' so as to present a strong contrast or effect, two or more ideas which, although exactly agreeing in some trivial points, are in their general nature altogether different and dissimilar one from another; by means of which is produced a strong and vivid feeling of surprise, or of ridicule, according to the character of the subject, on account of the singularity or incongruity of their position.

2

Thus, the mind unites these ideas when, as in the case of what in verbal combinations of this nature is termed punning,' they appear when so combined to be at once similar and dissimilar. Hence, also, it is the double simultaneous perception both of the similarity and the difference in the ideas of any subject or object, and the absolute and inseparable amalgamation together of these ideas of similitude and dissimilitude, that renders mimicry of any person ludicrous; and which also causes emotions of ridicule to arise when we suddenly and unexpectedly discover a striking likeness of one who is absent, afforded by an individual who is present, and between whom there is no relationship or real connexion.*

"Wit is nothing but an assemblage of new ideas and combinations." -Helvetius. Essays on the Mind, Ep. iv. c. iii.

2 It is remarked by Dugald Stewart, that "the pleasure we derive from the assemblage of ideas which wit presents, is greatly heightened and enlivened by our surprise at the command displayed over a part of our constitution which, in our own case, we find to be so little subject to the will."-Elements of Philos. of Human Mind, pt. i. c. v. s. 4.

Dr. Carpenter defines wit to be "a felicitous association of objects not usually connected, so as to produce a pleasant surprise."-Mental Physiology, b. ii. c. xii.

3 Punning is defined by Addison to be "a conceit arising from the use of two words that agree in sound, but differ in the sense."-Spectator. 4 Hobbes lays it down that judgment without fancy is wit; but fancy, without judgment, not.-Leriathan, pt. i. c. viii.

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Locke defines wit as putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found 'consisting in the assemblage of ideas, and any resemblance or congruity."-Essay on the Understanding, b. ii. c. xi. s. 2. Locke also remarks on the difference between wit and judgment, and on the causes contributing to quickness of parts, exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason.—Ibid.

VOL. II.

Y

The capacity of wit confers upon the mind a power of seizing at once on the minute points of coincidence in any matter, and in being able with rapidity to place together or contrast them. It does not, however, include a very deep or exact discovery of the real and actual nature of the qualities of the subject, but the reverse is often found to be the fact. In these respects it corresponds with the capacities of apprehension and sense, although these capacities are by no means necessarily coexistent with it. Ideas, whether received or obtained through apprehension, deprehension, or comprehension, are alike fitted for its exercise; although those obtained by the first of these capacities are ordinarily best adapted for this purpose. The term wit is here used to denote the capacity of the mind by which we combine together ideas that are dissimilar, although each combination of this kind may not result in those lively sallies which are ordinarily termed wit.

The operation of this capacity may be indeed divided into two kinds; the one of a light and pleasing, the other of a grave or severe character. The former of these we ordinarily term ridicule, or humour; the latter, satire, or effect. By the last of these operations a deep impression is produced through the strong contrast of ideas brought together. Pathos is occasioned through combinations of the nature of what is here termed effect, so far that all pathos is constituted by a union of dissimilar ideas. Nevertheless, all combinations of this sort do not constitute pathos, and pathos is not effect, nor effect pathos. But effect is a constituent element in the production of pathos. Satire appears to me to be the result of the joint application of ridicule and effect to the same subject. Each of these efforts is performed by this capacity in a similar mode; by placing together, and contrasting ideas, or objects of a very dissimilar nature.

A farther division has also been made of wit and humour, as being each distinct exercises of this capacity. In reality, however, it appears to me that in both cases the effort is the same, although the materials by which it is carried out are different. What is commonly called wit is merely exercised about words, as in the case of punning; humour about sentiments or things, and is effected quite independent of words.

Nevertheless, while the action of humour or ridicule is swift and sudden, and transient in its operation; that of satire and

According to Dugald Stewart, "wit implies a power of calling up at pleasure the ideas which it combines."-Elements of Philos. of Human Mind, pt. i. c. v. s. 4.

says,

"Men

Coleridge recognizes the distinction in question when he of humour are always in some degree men of genius; wits are rarely so, although a man of genius may, amongst other gifts, possess wit, as Shakespeare."-Coleridge. Table Talk.