I have already endeavoured to demonstrate, perceived, by the aid of the capacity of apprehension in the faculty of understanding, and are thus converted into what are termed ideas.

The mind may, however, as I have before shown,* be conscious of a sensation only, as is probably the case with animals, without understanding its nature, and an idea being produced from it. A sensation is not received into the memory, unless the mind is either conscious of it, or perceives it, or it becomes converted into an idea by that capacity of the understanding which I have denominated apprehension, and which might be called the observatory of the mind. Of many sensations which strike the senses, the mind is unconscious, and consequently the memory does not grasp them. Unless these sensations are communicated to the mind, or perceived by it, it can no more take notice of them, than an animal does of objects which, although within its range of vision, it does not chance to be aware of, or to observe. A sensation perceived by the mind, but not converted into an idea, is like an object of the presence of which we are conscious, though without actually seeing it. A sensation converted into an idea is like an object of the presence of which we are conscious, because we actually see it. Sensations may, however, be received into the memory at one time, and may be perceived by the apprehension, and converted into an idea, at a period long subsequent.

3. These ideas are in most cases, but not uniformly, made use of by the faculties either of reason or genius.

4. They are received by, and stored up in, the memory. 5. They are recalled out of the memory to our remem

brance.

Ideas are moreover arranged and treasured up in the memory, either in their simple form, or combined with others, until called forth by some willing effort of the mind for that purpose, or by some external circumstance affecting it, which causes them to be again brought into notice.

Certain of our ideas, whether simple or compounded, when received into the mind, are therefore at once transmitted to the memory, and impressed or retained there. A kind of impulse or vibration is apparently produced in the memory by the reception into it of ideas; and without such impression they are not fixed there, or even noticed by it, although transmitted to the mind; and according to the strength or extent of this vibration or impulse, depends the firmness with which they are implanted in the memory. The baro reception of an idea into the mind, is not of itself sufIbid.

Ante, b. iii. c. ü. s. 2.

5 Mr. Serjeant Cox is of opinion that "each faculty has its own memory, and that memory is usually proportioned to the capacity of the faculty." -What am I, &c. P vol. i. c. xxvii. p. 248.

MANY IDEAS FADE FROM THE MEMORY.

359

ficient to inscribe it on the memory; and this is not effected unless the perception of it is accompanied by some reflection or vibration of this description. Thus, there are many ordinary occurrences constantly taking place around us, of which we have a knowledge; and yet from the ideas of them not striking forcibly on the mind, the memory does not retain them. Moreover, in many transactions, during which a multiplicity of sensations and ideas must have passed through the mind, those only which caused this vibration are fixed in the memory, in various degrees of strength, according to the extent of such vibration. Thus also it is with regard to many trivial actions of life which we are every day performing, and which we can achieve without any intellectual effort, and of which we must necessarily have been conscious while engaged in them, but which, from nothing occurring to strike the mind, are totally forgotten immediately afterwards.

It appears indeed that it is from the non-observance of the fact that so many ideas pass through the mind without attracting notice sufficient to excite a vibration which will indent or impress them on the frequently fails to record trivial occurrences, even when they memory; and that the memory are operations of the mind, so that they are apparently performed without the consciousness of our having thus acted, as also from the celerity of the operation of the intellectual faculties; that the notion of what has been denominated "unconscious cerebration"-by means of which it is supposed that the mind, or the brain, can perform intellectual operations without our being conscious of their having been effected-has originated; but which seems to me to be nothing more than the result of ideas being received, or mental operations exerted, which have not been noticed at the time, and so not impressed upon, and retained by the memory.

99.66

Mr. Smee writes to me in reference to this passage: "The idea of a vibration into the memory appears to me to have no meaning which is intelligible, although used by some writers." Whether" vibration " be the proper term applicable, and whether "sensation," "emotion," or some other word might not be preferable, I am willing to leave to the affection," determination of my readers. But it will probably be in the experience of every person who has paid attention to the subject, that, on the occurrence of each of the every-day trivial actions alluded to, we are apt to forget immediately afterwards whether we have done them or not, unless some accident occurs to cause what I have termed a "vibration," to fix the event in the memory. Take the case of winding up a watch at night. Occasionally, a man fails to remember whether he has done it or not, and in consequence omits it. But should the individual happen to drop the watch, or to break the spring, while so engaged, the "vibration caused by the accident would doubtless effectually impress the occurrence on his mind.

7 Vide post, c. vi. s. 9.

8 Dr. Carpenter's Mental Physiology, p. 515. What am I? vol. ii. c. xxi. p. 254.

39

Mr. Serjeant Cox's

A vast proportion of the sensations and ideas which affect or enter into our minds, pass through them without being retained in the memory; and, indeed, fly so rapidly in succession as hardly to be noticed. This I have already observed to be the case in sleep, during which the retention of ideas that then engaged the mind, is what constitutes dreaming. This constant circulation and succession of ideas might be assimilated to the ceaseless circulation of the blood

through our veins. In many respects, as I have before noticed, does the constitution of our material and immaterial frames thus resemble, and serve to illustrate the nature of, each other.

The slightest eccentric occurrence in any of these matters, would at once create an emotion in the mind connected with the transaction, and thus impress it on the memory. And we find that with regard to certain events of very small importance, but concerning which some violent sensation or emotion has been caused, the remembrance of them is forcibly implanted on the memory, and continues longer than that of other matters of incomparably greater consequence. And in general indeed, the more vigorous the emotion accompanying the reception of an idea into the memory, the more firmly is it retained there.' So far, however, from the memory thus allowing all trivial ideas to escape from its hold, being a defect in, it is, in reality, a very great excellence in the constitution of the memory; and by means of which ideas of a striking, and deeply affecting nature only, are treasured up there, while those of a useless character do not impede our intellectual action, or block up the space required for ideas of a more important nature. In this respect, the memory might not unaptly be compared to a net whose meshes are of a certain size, adapted to retain merely such fish as are large and valuable, and to allow those which are diminutive and worthless to pass through it. We may also observe from the foregoing considerations, that the memory, whether a part of the mind or not, is evidently in itself a distinct and independent power. The repetition of different ideas of the same objects, either immediately after they are communicated, or at different periods, serves both to revive the remembrance of them, and to

9

Might not the human memory be compared to a field of sepulture, thickly stocked with the remains of many generations; but of all these thousands whose dust heaves the surface, a few only are saved from immediate oblivion upon tables and urns; while the many are, at present, utterly lost to knowledge? Nevertheless each of the dead has left in that soil an imperishable germ; and all, without distinction, shall another day start up, and claim their dead."-Physical Theory of Another Life, c. v.

According to Locke, pleasure and pain contribute most to fix ideas in the memory.-Essay on the Understanding, b. ii. c. x. s. 3.

"As a general rule, the power of memory is proportionate to the intensity of the impression."-Smee. Instinct and Reason, c. iv. p. 56.

MEMORY AMALGAMATES IDEAS.

361 imprint them more deeply on the mind; or rather, perhaps, to reprint them anew.

The memory is like the register of a court of justice, in which are recorded, not all the pleadings and arguments relating to each cause that has been tried before it, but only the judg ments and final decrees which are pronounced. Thus, we seldom retain in our memory all the different reasonings and deductions by which we arrived at a conclusion, but merely the conclusion itself. Until we rest, or make a stand at this point, it would seem that no actual impression is produced on the memory.

Ideas when received into the mind from whatever source, and implanted in the memory, amalgamate entirely with the other ideas, and the general fund of knowledge; so that in the case of many of them, when they are recalled to remembrance, we are often unable to determine whether they were obtained into the mind from external sources, and are now recollected in the ordinary way; or whether they are the creations of the mind itself independent of such sources, all remembrance of the mode in which they entered into the memory having been effaced. We are conscious merely of the notion being in the mind; but whether we originated it ourselves, or learnt it from others, we are unable to trace. Hence it may occasionally happen that ideas which were derived from others, present themselves to our understanding as if produced by ourselves; although certain modifications of them, arising from the tinge which has been given to them from the influence of our intellectual operations, will probably be effected.

Sensations as well as ideas, may however be impressed upon, and treasured up in the memory. Sometimes, indeed, sensations alone are received, which are afterwards converted into ideas; and in certain cases these sensations are retained, and are recalled, as sensations only, by the memory. If, indeed, the memory can at any time receive a sensation by itself, without the mind at once converting it into an idea, it may do so on all occasions; and if it does not turn it into an idea until long after it has received it, this may be delayed for an indefinite period, or may never take place at all. Indeed, the conversion of a sensation into an idea, is the act of the capacity of apprehension, which is quite distinct from, and wholly independent of, the memory. The use of the former is in conjunction with the other capacities of the understanding, to obtain, and of the latter to retain, ideas, and sensations also.

It would, moreover, almost seem as though in some cases sensation itself aided the memory, and served to recall ideas; especially in those instauces where the intellectual process termed the association of ideas, fails. Thus, I remember well that I dreamed last night; but I cannot recollect in the least

what I dreamed about: consequently, it is not the association of any ideas with my dream that enables me to recollect the fact; but the sensation only of the action of, or the impression caused by, such dream, which still continues to affect the mind. And if sensation influences the memory in this case, it is probable that it does so correspondingly in many others also.

As in the constitution of each person, there is a spirit as well as a body; so in the case of every subject which is submitted to the mind, there is an intellectual effect produced by its communication, as well as the sensation by which it is conveyed. This intellectual effect on the mind, equally results when the idea is recalled by the memory; and hence, one of the great uses to the mind of the memory, is to refresh and enrich it with ideas which would otherwise be lost.

Inasmuch as during early infancy we appear to be entirely oblivious of all that occurs, however striking the event, and although of a nature peculiarly calculated to produce impressions on the memory; it seems to be uncertain whether at this period ideas are received into the memory and if they are not received into the memory, it is probable that the understanding itself does not receive them. And if, as I have already conjectured, the understanding commences its reception of ideas directly that the soul enters on its existence, or commences its union with the body; it appears to me that doubts might be entertained whether this actually takes place before memory commences its operations. Indeed, the mere circumstance alone that we retain no recollection whatever of the events attendant upon our birth, which are adapted in the strongest manner, on every account, to strike the mind; is of itself a sure proof that during infancy, from whatever cause, the memory is unformed or inefficient. And if the memory is at that period thus imperfect, probably the understanding and the other intellectual faculties are so in a corresponding manner, and to a corresponding extent, from the same causo;-the intellectual organs of the body not being then sufficiently completed and developed for the soul to receive its impressions through them.

2. Its Passive Power, Retention.

The memory appears to be endowed with two distinct separate and independent capacities, or auxiliary powers, varying from one another both as regards their nature and their opera

Vide ante, Prel. Diss., s. vii. a. 1.