RECOGNITION RESULTS FROM RETENTION AND RECOLLECTION. 373

call of the latter, may be fixed in the retention, and will be brought to light again when an efficient cause for this occurs. It will sometimes also happen that ideas will be recalled into the memory, but not the sensations which produced them. Occasionally, however, when the ideas are recalled with great vividness, a reflection, or shadow, as it were, of the sensation also is produced.

Recognition is an act which results when both the retention and the recollection are jointly exercised about a subject or an idea, which, being in the retention, is recalled by the recollection; not, however, voluntarily, but by the object or sensation which before excited it being again presented to the mind, and acting on the recollection, so as to cause it to recall precisely the same ideas which it before excited, and which are, at once, recognized or pronounced by the understanding and the reason to be identical with those which were before produced. In this case, therefore, the whole function of memory is completely exerted, while two of the intellectual faculties aid it in its operations.

It does not however necessarily follow that when ideas are recalled into the memory, there should be also a consciousness of their previous existence, or a recollection of their being introduced, which are distinct exercises of the memory. only know many ideas to have been before in the mind, because it is necessary that such should have been the case in order to their being now recalled by the memory; but we have no recollection of the time or the mode of their being implanted.

Ideas imprinted on the retention, but not recalled to our remembrance, might be compared to objects deposited in a dark room, which though not seen, are as certainly and as fully there as though they were perceived. The operation of the recollection, whereby the ideas so imprinted on the retention are recalled to remembrance, might be compared to a torch brought into a dark room, which serves to illumine and render visible those objects which were before obscure.

4. Characteristic Varieties in this Endowment, and in both its Powers.

When we bear in mind the multifarious causes of different, and indeed opposite, kinds which contribute to influence the operation of the memory, and of both its powers, we may fairly arrive at the conclusion that the varieties of memory are proportionably as great as are the varieties in character of different persons. Moreover, as there are several sorts of

substances which may be availed of for receiving the impress of figures and letters, some of which retain them more distinctly, some more deeply, and some more durably than others; so, in a corresponding manner, may the power of retention belonging to various memories differ.' And the recollection, which has been compared to a messenger, may also differ as regards its character, in the memories of various persons; just as some messengers are more swift, some more intelligent, some more accurate than others.

As there are several degrees of knowledge, varying according to their relative extent and completeness; so in regard to memory, which is but re-knowledge, there are, in a corresponding manner, several degrees, varying according to the extent, accuracy, and clearness, with which ideas are recalled into the mind. Of these, some appear but as dim and indistinct shadows, while others present themselves in vivid traces.

In addition to this, the character of the understanding, and of each of its capacities, directly affects the character of the memory. Nor is the influence of the other faculties and capacities less powerful, although it may be less directly exercised. I should infer indeed that while the clearness and completeness of the power of retention are dependent mainly on the quality of the understanding; the activity and dexterity of the recollection are principally dependent on the power and vigour of the reason and the genius. The moral and medial endowments, the senses, emotions, appetites, passions, and affections, and the dispositions and desires are, moreover, not without their influence, alike as regards the activity, the strength, and the clearness of the memory. Bodily constitution too, and that in various ways, has much influence on this power. And, lastly, it is probable that the peculiar essential constitution of the soul itself, greatly and directly affects the condition of the memory. Habits and exercise, moreover, as we shall presently see, contribute to influence it in different modes.

Hence the memories of different persons vary both as regards their power of retaining, and their power of recalling ideas, and in several ways in relation to each of these powers. Retention varies mainly with respect to its clearness, strength, and extent; recollection with respect to its readiness, celerity, and the uniformity with which it acts.

The peculiar character which distinguishes the memory of each individual, and which is exhibited by the mode in which it

1 Dugald Stewart, however, considers that "the original disparities of men in regard to memory, are by no means so immense as they seem to be at first view:" and that much is to be ascribed to different habits of attention, and to a difference of selection among different objects and events. -Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, pt. ii. c. vi. s. 2.

MEMORY REFLECTIVE OF MENTAL CHARACTER.

375 retains and recalls ideas, appears to be however primarily, and perhaps mainly, dependent upon, and to be principally regulated, and as it were reflected, by the particular and corresponding character that distinguishes his faculty of understanding, which serves as the inlet to the memory, as well as to the mind; and in passing through which the ideas obtain the impression of its features, which they retain and exhibit on being again presented to our view. Thus, where the understanding is remarkable for exact, minute observation, such as the extensive possession of the capacity of deprehension would serve to render it, the ideas retained in the memory will be accurate and precise. Those who are mainly distinguished by extensive comprehension, in recalling ideas of a subject will be found to have retained general and leading ideas of it of a comprehensive character. If, on the other hand, in any particular individual, the capacity of deprehension be very limited, he will impress on his memory but few ideas of the minute details of the matter. And if his comprehension be limited, his memory will be found deficient in retaining the prominent and leading points.

Those topics on which the reason and genius are engaged, are, as I have already stated, communicated to the memory by the understanding, and depend on the principles above enunciated for the manner of their retention. According also, in some measure, to the vigour and vivacity of the capacities of reason and genius, and of their several operations, will be the farce with which ideas emitted from them, will strike into, and be retained upon the memory.

From the circumstance of different people being variously endowed as regards the qualities displayed by their memories, we might almost be inclined to divide or classify the memory into so many different and distinct kinds or orders. Some persons indeed, independent of what has already been premised as to the several characteristics of the memory, appear to have a special talent for retaining ideas of one kind, and others for retaining those of another. This however I believe is mainly owing to, and occasioned by, the particular intellectual faculties and capacities which any individual possesses, and the peculiar purposes, and studies, and pursuits, for which he has applied them. Thus the traveller, or the painter, will best remember ideas of visible objects, as these have principally engaged his attention, and will be therefore most firmly impressed on his memory. The musician, on the other hand, for the same

Mr. Sopwith remarks on this paragraph as follows:

"Dr. Buckland told me he never forgot the contour of a mountain. His power of observation was much directed to landscape in connexion with geology.

All this paragraph, I think, is correct and fairly expressed."

reason, will best remember sounds. The metaphysician, or the poet, will retain most strongly the memory of important principles in philosophy, or of exquisite passages from striking descriptions in poetry.

Ideas of sensible objects are, by the generality, more readily retained in the memory than are those of an abstract nature, because they are communicated to the mind more forcibly, and with greater frequency. In all studies of the latter kind, we are greatly aided by diagrams, and even by similitudes or metaphors drawn from visible objects. Indeed, to the decided preference of the mind for such objects, and its proneness for contemplating them, may we attribute the origin of idolatry. These are the simplest and the original of all other ideas, which, however abstract or complex, are derived from them.

Words often aid us extensively in recalling ideas, as it not unfrequently happens that the arbitrary name may be remembered, although the actual thing is forgotten. In this respect, words are to ideas, what, in the currency of a country, paper money is to the coin; forming occasionally a palpable substitute for, and serving ultimately to procure the coin itself.

Men of great talents are said not to be commonly endowed with extensive memories for all kinds of subjects, although they may have considerable power in retaining ideas of particular topics. The reason of this probably is: 1. That the number of ideas connected with matters of high importance which pass through their minds, obliterate the traces in the memory of commonplace ideas; which does not occur in persons of but limited capacity who are conversant chiefly with ordinary matters. 2. Objects and events of this class, are less regarded by men of talent, whose minds are wont to be occupied with some special pursuits and studies. Hence, although memory in general may appear to be deficient in such individuals, yet memory of particular ideas and subjects will be found peculiarly powerful. It may be often observed that persons of much readiness and capacity of memory, and who possess a large share of knowledge, and considerable accuracy of information, and whose minds are very energetic, are nevertheless wanting in general ability, and as reasoners or men of genius. This is not only quite explicable, but very natural and probable, when we consider that their extensive reception and retention of ideas, is greatly owing to their having chiefly, and so exclusively, employed themselves in this practice, and to their being so little engaged in examining or combining them. Indeed, the deficiency alone of power to effect the latter opera

3 It was observed by Lord Bacon, that in the act of memory, images visible, work better than other conceits.-Nat. Hist. Cent. X. 956.

CAN WE FORGET AT PLEASURE?

377

tions, conduces very largely to readiness in the former. On the other hand, the exercise of reasoning, the habit of examining and sifting thoroughly every proposition submitted to us, although a very valuable and desirable one, necessarily proves a considerable hindrance to the simple accumulation of knowledge; and it also tends to efface from the memory, as also to prevent the revival of, ideas already implanted there."

5. Voluntary Control over the Memory.

5

How far, and to what extent, the mind, through the instrumentality of any of its active powers, is able to exercise control over the memory; or whether the memory is capable of exerting any control over itself, whereby it is able with more or less. facility and vigour at its pleasure, either to retain or recall ideas, or to forget them altogether; is another topic which is open to considerable controversy. It is also an interesting and important question, whether, as in the case of subjects which supply nutrition to the material frame, there is any direct and immediate and independent power of expulsion or evacuation of ideas that are no longer required, or have served their purpose, and are consequently no further needed, while their presence in the retention would only occupy the space of more valuable matter. This doubtless arises in the ordinary course of what is termed forgetfulness; which however consists rather in the omission to exercise the recollection, than in any operation of the retention. But whether the mind possesses any distinct voluntary capacity of obliterating or getting rid of ideas, other than by the ordinary course of their gradually fading through want of being recalled, is a question of much doubt and difficulty. So far as there exists in the mind an ability to discharge ideas from its custody, and also to retain them there ready for use, when wanted, such an effort appears to be mainly exercised through a certain active, voluntary and independent power of the memory itself; inasmuch as it is difficult to conceive how this operation can be accomplished by any or either of the intel

4 Upon this paragraph Mr. Sopwith remarks:-"I concur in the view that the memory and judgment are separate exercises of the mind, and cannot both be very actively and successfully exerted. This I think is very well put."

5 According to Des Cartes, the soul in the act of recollection, exercises a volition by means of which the pineal gland inclines itself successively this way and that way, and impels the animal spirits to different parts of the brain, till that part is found upon which the object we wish to recollect has left traces.-Passions of the Mind.