MORAL INCLINATION OF CHILDREN. 43 child has no natural inclination either to truth or falsehood, except so far as he is inclined to one or the other by some independent influence. He would not depart from the truth, unless induced to do so by some urgent cause; and he does so with readiness from not being aware of, or considering the sin that he is committing. As he grows older he learns to despise falsehood, because he is taught that it is wicked and despicable. Before the child is instructed in the duty of adhering to truth, the motive to speak falsehood may be stronger in certain cases than the motive to speak truth, and so may induce him to utter the former; but this surely is no proof that he is naturally independently inclined rather to falsehood than to truth. Children are, moreover, more easily led astray than are adults, both from their want of instruction, and their want of experience. But, on the other hand, they are also more easily trained to good. They are not naturally and spontaneously inclined to either good or evil; but are swayed towards either, according to the motive which impels them. The minds of children are, indeed, like pure water, which is ready to receive taste or colour from a foreign ingredient, but is wholly void of taste or colour of any kind of its own. So children are inclined neither to good nor to bad; but imbibe, with the utmost readiness and facility, a tendency to either; and whatever is at this early age impressed on the mind, is vividly retained there, and at once gives a character and bias to the yet untutored disposition. In case, however, the Calvinistic principle of the utter depravity of human nature, and the decided inclination of the infant mind to evil, be correct; it might surely have been surmised that our blessed and benevolent Saviour instead of commanding little children to come unto Him, and saying, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven," and rebuking those who kept them from Him; would have sternly forbidden their approach, have declared that "of such is the kingdom of hell," and have commended those who kept them from Him. 3 On the contrary, we find that here, where Nature is most free to display, and to follow her own original and pure bent and inclinations, vice is the least exhibited; and that it is, as men advance in age, and their emotions, and appetites, and passions, arrive at maturity, and obtain full power and influence, that they run into vicious excesses. Man, indeed, appears to approach nearest to his Maker, as regards his nature at the 'Every child is set to damn itself, if left alone. It is not more prone to runne into the fire then it is to fall into hell, and this maketh chastisement so necessary."-Burgess, Of Original Sinne, part iv. c. iv. p. 448. 3 Mr. Herbert Spencer, however, says that "the popular idea that children are innocent, is totally false with respect to evil impulses."-Education, chap. iii. And that as the children's features resemble for a time those of the savage, so, too, do his instincts.”—Ibid. two extreme periods of his career, childhood and old age. During the former of these he is all innocence and loveliness, fresh from the hands of his Creator. During the latter of these periods, he is dignified, and grave, and reverent; as most befits him, when about to enter into that Maker's presence. Another proof that men are not naturally wholly depraved, and that their theoretical notions of human nature are even higher than what general practical observation might lead us to conclude; may be deduced from the circumstance that children form so high a moral opinion of those about them, especially of their parents and governors, to whom they are ever wont to impute the best and purest motives, and whose conduct they regard as models of correctness. But this would not surely be unless they were induced from their own internal reflection upon what they themselves feel, to attribute the same to others, and to judge of mankind at large from what they experience in their own minds. Nothing, indeed, so truly reflects our own moral state, as our opinion of the state of those around us. Those persons whose minds are full of fraud and guile, are ever prone to suspect others, judging of their motives by their own. From what has here been advanced, may, I hope, be acknowledged the truth of the proposition which I have maintained; that man, independent of temptation, and of the allurements and influences of appetite, and passion, and other medial endowments, is not naturally inclined to evil, nor is induced to this through the inclinations of the mind, however the various medial endowments may impel us in this direction. The true theory, and the strict duty, as to the regulation of our appetites and passions, and the medial influences generally, is, consequently, not to repress or even counteract, much less to extirpate them, but to direct them aright and to their appointed ends. Each of these endowments were given to us by God, and were given to us to be used. He who refuses to use them, errs as much as he who abuses them. To use them, and to use them aright, is the proper, and the only proper course, by which we at once follow nature and obey God, the author and the orderer of nature. It may also be observed that, although many medial influences are the cause of moral evil, yet, on the other hand, the want or weakness of some of those influences which are apt to be regarded as directly pernicious, may, in turn, be the cause of it; as the want of ambition leads to indolence, the absence of According to that eminent prelate, Bishop Burnett, "the animal affections considered in themselves, and as they are implanted in us by nature, are not vicious or blameable;" and "our natural affections are not wholly to be extirpated and destroyed, but only to be moderated and overruled by a superior and more excellent principle."-Life of God in the Soul of Man, pp. 10, 11. NO ENDOWMENT NECESSARILY TENDS TO EVIL. 45 avarice to neglect of our affairs, and our not being to a legitimate extent excitable by anger, to our being imposed upon by unprincipled persons. The view here taken of the subject of the "natural depravity of human nature" is that which appears to me to be most in accordance with reason, and also with Scripture; although I am quite aware that it is not at all in accordance with the interpretation which has by certain persons been put upon the expressions of Scripture on this point. To Scripture and reason, and not to their perverters, do I make my appeal, and by them alone do I claim to be judged, and to which alone I am amenable. Many persons, indeed, are condemned, not because what they advance can be proved to be at variance with Scripture; but because it is at variance with the constrained and false interpretations which have been put upon it by persons equally fallible, and equally liable to erroneous conclusions with themselves. Much less am I desirous of, as it were, bringing into collision Revelation and the apparent system of nature. I would ever rather seek to reconcile, than to oppose them; and would cite them to confirm, instead of to contradict one another. Poor human nature, too, I cannot but consider as sufficiently weak and debased, without making any extraordinary efforts to torture the meaning of expressions in Holy Writ to exaggerate its deficiencies. 6. Benevolence and Malevolence not innate principles. If, indeed, any moral principles, qualities, or propensities whatever, can be supposed to be originally and naturally innate in the mind, or in the moral department of our constitution; surely those of benevolence and malevolence,-which, of all qualities or propensities with which man can be endowed, most nearly concern his dealings with his fellow creatures, and, therefore, might be expected to be inherently implanted in his nature-would assuredly, be so. Whether man does naturally possess a disposition of benevolence, or malevolence,-whether he is really anxious, or concerned, about the good or evil of his fellow creatures, when such does not in any way whatsoever affect his feelings or his interests,-may on a first view appear very difficult to determine. To ascertain whether there is innate within us any principle of this kind, we must first inquire in what degree that feeling of benevolence is felt towards others, in proportion to the love of ourselves; for we cannot suppose that the mere wish for our neighbour's prosperity, is any evidence of our benevolence, if we are not willing, in any degree to further that wish, by some sacrifice on our part. Our apparent desire for his welfare may arise from our unwillingness to think ourselves so unfeeling, or so uncharitable, as not to desire it, through the flattery which we are apt to bestow upon our own natural dispositions and qualities. The only candid way to decide whether we really have, or have not, this disposition of benevolence, appears therefore to be to inquire of ourselves-1. To what inconvenience we are willing to submit, in order to relieve the necessities and distresses of our fellow creatures; what pain suffered by us, that would relieve them, would be sufficient only to balance the pain which we feel from their distress? And, 2. Whether we are not sometimes led secretly to rejoice at their calamities, when we expect to become richer, or to obtain promotion by it; although such advantage be to us but exceedingly small, and the evil to them very considerable, much greater than what is sufficient to balance any measure of distress which we might experience by our loss, against what they suffer? If, therefore, the sentiment which we experience be no other than a mere preference, or supposed preference for the happiness rather than the misery and misfortune of our neighbours, when both events are alike unconnected with our own welfare and happiness; we must surely admit that this cannot, in the least degree, be taken as evidence of any real, natural, innate disposition of benevolence; inasmuch as this apparent feeling of it may proceed from our flattery of our own disposition, or from our conviction that it is a virtuous feeling, in which latter case it is not innate, but acquired. Or, in certain instances, the narration of some dreadful suffering may fill us with fear for ourselves, or with grief; not however on account of our disposition of benevolence towards those afflicted, but because narrations of this kind call forth ideas in the mind which themselves are painful. The feeling of benevolence is, moreover, altogether distinct from the emotions of pity and sympathy, which are, doubtless, felt more or less, whenever we behold a fellow creature suffering. We may, however, be keenly excited by these emotions, and yet be wholly devoid of benevolence. It may be said, indeed, that the exercise of benevolence is ever accompanied by pleasure, and that of malevolence no less certainly by pain. The one arises from, or rather consists in, the desire of good, the other in the desire of evil, to some being. Conscience, however, probably bears its part in both these "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others."-Adam Smith, Theory of the Moral Sentiments. BENEVOLENCE MAY ORIGINATE IN SELF-LOVE. 4.7 cases; and instils into us the conviction that the sentiment of benevolence is in accordance, and that that of malevolence is more or less at variance, with our social moral duty. We have already inquired" to what extent, and in what precise mode, affection may be supposed to originate, in self-love. But if affection originates in this feeling, why should not benevolence do so, which is but an expansion of affection,-an extension of it from our kindred to our countrymen, or to mankind at large? In favour of this view it may be urged that, while affection is a desire for good to those whom we regard as a part of ourselves, as having sprung from, or as being connected with us; benevolence in many cases indirectly originates in the hope of good resulting directly to ourselves. Self-love and benevolence may appear to be opposed to each other, and to be counteracting impulses. Nevertheless, in reality, much, both of our affection and our benevolence, originates in self-love; even though self-love owes nothing to benevolence, of which it is the parent. Indeed, unless self, and the consideration of our own interest, is the grand turning-point, the pivot on which all our considerations of various matters, and their consequences, revolve, -how shall we reconcile the fact, which we may hold to be as certain as any proposition which admits of mathematical demonstration, and which is proved by that most unerring of all modes of probation, our own experience, that we should at any time prefer the occurrence of a great calamity to a whole race of people, to a comparatively trivial misfortune happening to ourselves. Desire, too, for the good of our country, even after we are dead, may originate, not in benevolence, but in a wish to see accomplished schemes to which our own efforts have been devoted; or in the hope that the interests of those who are sprung from us may be benefited thereby. In many cases, indeed, selfishness is not only the ruling, but the sole acting principle in man; whether prompting him to deeds of benevolence or malevolence, and whether influencing him as regards his conduct towards himself, or towards others. Mentally, as well as materially, our own selves are the main objects of care, and of interest, to each of us. Each individual is indeed the centre of his own system, so that all subjects concentrate in himself; are of importance proportionally as they affect him; are great or small in relation to himself. So light, and heat, and darkness, and motion, are each regarded according to our own condition in relation thereto. Hence also, in our reasoning process, the criterion by which we judge everything, is self. Self is the weight in the balance by which all subjects are tested. When we are materially moving, we seem to be standing still, while the mountains, and trees, • Vide ante, b. i. c. v. s. 1, 4, 6. |