The reason is educated by the investigation of science, whether the ideas it compares be those obtained from the study of scientific treatises, or from experimentalizing upon material objects themselves; and both as regards its cultivation and its discipline.' Science indeed thus considered, consists in ascertaining the real relation of different subjects and substances, or their ideas, one to another; and the actual extent and essential nature, so far as our faculties and capacities, or any of them, serve for this purpose, of their agreement and disagreement. Of this study, philosophy forms a branch; and although but a branch, yet doubtless the highest and the most important. In the pursuit of philosophical reasoning or investigation, we include the process of reasoning upon our own being and nature, and upon that of other beings, with respect to their properties and qualities; and also as regards our duty as social and moral creatures, who are looking forward to another state after this life is ended, and for which it is but preparatory. The study of philosophy, may be therefore aptly divided into two principal branches. 1. That by which we reason concerning the qualities and properties of beings and objects of different kinds, and through which we discover in what manner they are constituted, or exist, or may be applied for our use; such as is included in natural, metaphysical, and experimental philosophy. And, 2. That by which we reason concerning the nature of our moral and social relations, and the duties that we owe both to our Creator, and to mankind; or moral philosophy. From what has been remarked in the present, and in preceding chapters, it may therefore be concluded that with regard to the faculty of reason, as is also the case in that of understanding, their different constituent capacities are principally exercised, and in the case of each, both its discipline and cultivation are effected, by different branches of study. For the capacity of sense, education which is natural appears to be best adapted. This capacity is therefore exerted and is cultivated by the act of comparing ideas respecting, and in dealing with and deciding upon, the common affairs of, daily life,* concerning which a determination as regards our course of operation has at once and unhesitatingly to be made, on a general and superficial survey of them; and which is accomplished by comparing together ideas relating to matters of an ordinary kind. The conduct of every-day transactions affords the best exercise for this capacity; and the more we are occupied in the business of the world about us, the more fitly is it developed and educated. 1 "Not only for intellectual discipline is science the best, but also for moral discipline."-Herbert Spencer. Education, c. i. 2 Vide ante, b. iii. c. iii. s. 2, p. 274. APPLICATION OF STUDIES TO PARTICULAR CAPACITIES. 469 Artificial education is but little adapted and little required for this capacity, for which that which is natural is both the most efficient, and for which abundant and ready and frequent opportunities are offered. Sound precepts may possibly be serviceable for this end, although but little, if anything has been attempted in this way, and that only partially. These would moreover appertain strictly to that branch of education which is artificial. For the capacity of analysis, education which is artificial appears best and peculiarly adapted, and is preferable to that which is natural. Such education consists in mathematical and logical exercises, by which this capacity is trained to compare together with the utmost precision, clearness, acuteness, and distinctness, the particular and minute ideas of any subject of a nice, and subtle, and precise quality, corresponding with the character of this capacity. For this capacity therefore a direct and complete system of education has been supplied. The capacity of judgment is perfected by an education of a mixed character, which is partly artificial and partly natural. It is exercised in reasoning respecting matters of an enlarged and comprehensive character; in comparing one with another, so as to draw complete and adequate conclusions from them, the principal and most important ideas of any subject, of a vast and extended nature; and in adducing arguments of this class in controversy, as also in summing up the different arguments that have been urged on both sides, and in drawing a conclusion therefrom. Cultivation of this capacity is directly effected by the study of the reasoning adduced during an important debate or trial, and more especially by noting down as we proceed the points of most weight on each side that might be adduced, and those which have been, or appear to be, omitted. While direct education of analysis is the most frequently resorted to, that of judgment is but very seldom availed of as a systematic and practical branch of education. This is much to be regretted, especially as regards the training of those who are intended for forensic or senatorial life. In the case of each of the studies by which the reason, or either of its capacities, is educated; the discipline that accompanies the cultivation, which is quite independent of it, is as valuable, and as essential, for the perfect development of our intellectual constitution, as is the latter. The capacities of reason, indeed, on the whole, unlike those of the understanding, owe more to discipline, and admit more extensively of this, than they do of cultivation. Both however are essential to this faculty. 3 Tide ante, c. iii. s. 3, p. 277. 6. Education of Genius by the study of Art. As the compounding together of ideas has been shown to be the proper function of the faculty of genius, so the discipline and cultivation of this faculty, and of each of its constituent capacities, is effected by the study of art of each kind; as has, indeed, already been pointed out when considering the nature of this faculty. Genius is however, essentially and really educated, and improved, and invigorated, not by the amount of ideas of this character with which the mind is stored; but, corresponding with the case of the other faculties and capacities, by the exercise of combining together different ideas in various modes, through the several capacities of this faculty, according to the nature of such capacity, and of the particular subject on which it is employed. The capacities of genius, although not equally with those of the other faculties, are improvable by the education bestowed upon them, and are each more or less dependent upon this proceeding for their invigoration and development. Thus, wit is sharpened and enlivened by exercise; and taste improves perceptibly, both in keenness and refinement, as it receives the discipline and cultivation proper for it; while origination is strengthened, and its powers are increased, by use. According indeed as it obtains this requirement, and as the nutriment supplied to it is wholesome and suitable, will be the growth of this faculty; and it will compound together ideas with greater force, dexterity, and efficiency, proportionably as it is thus developed by education. As genius is improvable by education, so it suffers correspondingly from neglect; through which not only is the nutriment derivable to the whole mind lost, but the ability of this faculty to exercise itself efficiently is much weakened. Education of the faculty of genius, consists therefore in the discipline to which each of the capacities of this faculty are subjected through the process of combining ideas; and in the cultivation which they also receive by this means, through the ideas so availed of. Genius is consequently educated by the study of tasteful and imaginative pursuits, whether the ideas applied be derived from the beauties of art, or from those of works of nature, both which render corresponding ideas alike as regards its discipline and its cultivation. By efforts of this kind, the mind is indeed effectively disciplined, as well as extensively cultivated; and thereby much invigorated as well as refined.* 5 "We ought to spare no pains to educate our souls to grandeur, and to impregnate them, as it were, with generous and enlarged ideas."Longinus on the Sublime, pt. i. s. 9. PURSUITS ADAPTED TO DEVELOPE GENIUS. 471 In genius, as in the other intellectual faculties, as we have already seen, its different constituent capacities are each peculiarly fitted for certain particular branches of the study for which the faculty itself is generally applied, and by exercise in which its education is effected. For the capacity of wit, the only education adapted to improve it, is that which is natural, and which consists in exercising it on suitable opportunities. Artificial education is promoted by reading the best examples of efforts of this description, and by endeavouring to effect compositions in the same style; expertness in which may be useful to those who enter largely into controversial disputation, and who are extensively endowed with the capacity in question. But education of this kind, has scarcely, if at all, been systematically attempted. Taste is mainly educated by artificial appliances, such as the. study of the most perfect examples, whether in poetry, painting, or some other of the Arts, and by endeavouring to produce works of this character. Viewing beautiful scenes in nature, in which consists the natural education of this capacity, is also very desirable. For the natural cultivation of taste, a ready opportunity is indeed afforded in pointing out the charms of nature, especially as regards scenery, and flowers, and the sights presented by the heavenly bodies, as for instance in the rising and setting of the sun. Such education would moreover be the best preparation for that which is artificial, in the study of works of art, whether in poetry or painting, by which a description of those beauties is successfully attained. Never We have nevertheless, been told by one who is at once peculiarly qualified to enter into the subject, and who has had the amplest experience of the matter under discussion, that even Homer, if read at our public schools, is, and probably must be, read only, or in the main, for his diction and poetry (as commonly understood) even by the most advanced; while to those less forward he is little more than a mechanical instrument for acquiring the beginnings of real familiarity with the Greek tongue and its inflexions"-Mr. Gladstone on the place of Homer in Education. Oxford Essays, 1857, p. 13. Lord Byron once remarked, when alluding to his education at Harrow; "We become tired of studying the Greek and Latin poets before we can comprehend their beauty; their freshness is worn away, and the future pleasure and advantage are deadened and destroyed by the didactic anticipation at an age when we can neither feel nor understand the power of compositions which it requires an acquaintance with life, as well as with Latin and Greek to relish or to reason upon; so that when we are old enough to enjoy them, the taste is gone, and the appetite is faded." In a paper read before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, at their meeting in 1872, by the Rev. Edward Hale, M.A., one of the masters at Eton College, it was remarked that "the system of classical education at last degenerated into the mere teaching of Greek and Latin, or rather of Greek and Latin Grammar, and this, too, not in a scientific manner.”— Report of British Association, 1872. See also on this subject The Theory of the Aris, &c., vol. ii. p. 255. theless, to the education of this capacity, but little general attention is paid, important as it is, and necessary for all. And it is capable of being extensively benefited by this means. Origination, on the other hand, is a capacity which is incapable of being extensively benefited by education, either natural or artificial, although it is probably improvable as much by one kind as by the other. And this applies to efforts by this capacity, whether inventive or imaginative. The experience and observation of what others have done in this way, and analyzing their proceedings and mode of operation, seems the best kind of artificial education to be resorted to. But little, if any, direct attention to the education of this capacity, has been devoted, or even attempted. Not only, however, the capacity of origination, but the faculty of genius as a whole, is that which is the least capable of education, at any rate of that which is artificial, and admits of it but to a very limited extent; unless perhaps we except the capacity of taste. Storing the mind with humorous combinations of ideas, cannot be strictly regarded as cultivation of the capacity of wit; as it is not thereby that the latter capacity is actually exercised, inasmuch as the faculty of understanding which receives these ideas, is that which is actually in such a case exerted. Nevertheless, if the understanding is well stored, the reason and genius have the full opportunity of exercising and cultivating themselves; but if the understanding is neglected, and is illsupplied with ideas, reason and genius are necessarily starved. As regards the application of artificial education to origination and wit, they are probably both of them more capable of, and owe much more to discipline than they do to cultivation. They do not admit so much of being actually enlarged, or invigorated, as directed aright; the former of which results in each faculty and capacity is effected by cultivation, the latter by discipline. Taste, indeed, may doubtless be refined and sharpened by cultivation, and by discipline rendered capable of making its combinations with more nicety and propriety; and still more of discerning and selecting those combinations which have been so made. This capacity owes more to artificial education, than it does to that which is natural. From the inaptness of genius, in comparison with the other faculties, to receive artificial education, it results that while for those professions and callings in life for the discharge of which the faculties of understanding and reason are required, men may be regularly educated and brought up; for those for which genius alone can qualify them, they must be born. Indeed, although taste may be improved by cultivation, yet this after all can be accomplished but to a very limited extent as com |