because it was the first to which they were tempted. In certain cases, however, the most striking examples of stern and rigid honesty were afforded in the conduct of some of these people.*

From the accounts which we have received of races of mankind who were discovered and observed in an almost pure state of nature, or of natural society, we are best able to reason concerning the real condition of human nature, especially as regards the existence or non-existence of particular dispositions, either to do good or evil. We shall thus find men mainly acting from, and guided by, purely selfish motives; seldom, if ever, committing injury or immorality of any kind, merely for the sake of doing so. As regards their dispositions of benevolence or malevolence, it appears that among savage people, although they will do all in their power to preserve, or benefit a child, a relative, or a friend; yet they regard with unconcern, and without any efforts to save him, the destruction of a stranger. Savages, like animals, who are guided by instinct only, seem to be utterly indifferent about the welfare of their fellow-creatures individually; although they are ever ready to aid each other mutually, when united in bands for general defence. Nevertheless, they appear to have no private sympathy in each other's misfortunes. This must be in part, at least, owing to a deficiency in power of reasoning, which, if duly exercised, would teach them that they themselves are liable to the ills which affect their companions; and that it is their mutual interest to do all they can to provide against such calamities. Men, we find, are oftentimes, in a civilized state, generous and kind, from a desire to obtain applause and influence by this means, rather than from pure benevolence towards their fellow-creatures.

In whatever situation men may be placed, there are, however, certain emotions, and feelings, and dispositions, and desires, and principles, by which they will be ever more or less characterized or influenced, although some may be more directly affected by them than are others. Thus, all persons, whatever be their station in life, are alike liable to be affected by covetousness. Those in power, whatever principles or feelings they may possess, will be more or less disposed to exercise tyranny and oppression. And those of all sects and parties in religion, are alike, if not equally, apt to fall into error and superstition; although, according to the different circumstances in which they are respectively situated, will these various characteristics become developed and manifested, or exhibit their peculiar tendency.

Indeed, it seems as unreasonable to denounce any particular religious denomination as exclusively superstitious or fanatical, and to consider these defects as characteristics, and 4 Cook's Voyages round the World.

5 Habitable World Displayed. (Laplanders).

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not merely corruptions, of the species; as it would be to speak of decay in a tree as of itself characterizing a particular species of vegetation, and not as a defect to which trees of all species are alike liable. Some religious systems indeed, like some kinds of wood, may be more liable to corruption than certain others; and causes, which mightily affect one species, may not at all affect another: but there are none which are altogether free from these defects and blemishes; and, perhaps, on the whole, all are equally subject to them.

So intolerance and persecution are not the especial characteristics of any particular sects or churches, but are the defects incidental to poor human nature itself: although, as different animals display their inherent propensities in a very different mode, according mainly to their physical power and vigour, and the circumstances in which they are placed; in like manner different communities of Christians display their foibles in various ways, according as the temper of the times, and the spirit of the age, may direct or restrain their exhibition.

In many of these cases, it is not the form of religion, but the nature of man, which is at fault. As in the case of bodily infirmity in any part of the material frame, which will be sure to exhibit itself whenever that frame is attacked, with whatever kind of disease; so the liability of man to err and to pervert the truth, is made manifest alike, whatever form of religion he may have adopted: although in these different forms, very different errors may be exhibited, and will be more or less apt to occur.

Not improbably, it may be the intention of the Almighty to render man finally both intellectually and morally perfect, by means of the various trials and excitements of each kind through which he is destined to pass, which particularly, and to the fullest extent, stimulate the reason; and such a being as this alone can be fully meet for Heaven. Moreover, as it has been conjectured that the whole planetary system is destined ultimately to be absorbed in the sun; so may man ultimately be united to, and made one with, God.

9. Moral Direction and Discipline.

Man being gifted with reason, which is given him for his guidance in matters in general, but more especially in reference to those which are of a moral nature; and his will being, as we have seen, free to act according to the determination at which his mind may arrive, and the various influences which simultaneously affect him, springing from different parts of his nature, and so counteracting and balancing each other as to promote and ensure this freedom: it necessarily therefore follows that he possesses the entire control over his moral

conduct; and that he is, on the one hand, fully enabled to direct it, and consequently, on the other, wholly responsible for the course in regard to it which he may pursue. Nevertheless, of all rule, self-rule is the most difficult perfectly to effect. And there is no subject so pertinaciously rebellions to legitimate sovereignty, as is self. Moreover, the more absolute may have been the power in any particular man to rule others; the less extensive will, probably, be his power to rule himself.

In all cases it will be found that the greater is the variety, either with regard to interests or individuals, of which any assemblage is made up, the more susceptible is it of external influence being exerted to sway its deliberations. The vast number of different excitements, and feelings, and propensities, and endowments, and powers, medial as well as moral, and of operations proceeding from them, which together contribute to the constitution of each moral endowment; tend to give an ascendancy to the reason over our conduct here, and to render moral discipline peculiarly efficient in regulating our actions, more especially in subjecting the lower and baser influences to those which are higher and nobler.

Nevertheless, although it is the province of the intellectual part of our nature, like the highest authorities in a state, not only to direct the general course of affairs, but to prescribe what particular measures shall be adopted; and of the medial portion of it to obey and follow what is so laid down: yet it often happens that, while the former has nominally the command, the latter is, in reality, both the originator and the director of most of the measures that are espoused; and which, though designed and carried out by the legitimate authorities, are, in reality, proposed by them, not because from their skill and judgment they believe those measures to be the best, but because they suppose them most likely to be accepted and adopted by those lower influences, of which, instead of being the rulers, they are in reality the slaves. This is extensively the case, alike in the political constitution of every civil community, and in the individual constitution of each man.

It may, however, appear remarkable, perhaps unaccountable, at any rate to a large extent inconsistent with some of the foregoing arguments and conclusions, that, as already pointed out, persons of great intellectual power are also frequently endowed with peculiarly and strong animal or medial endowments and propensities. But it should here be borne in mind that, while, on the one hand, the more vigorous are these medial impulses, correspondingly the more vigorous also is the power which restrains them. Moreover, as a vigorous soul is most perfectly developed in a vigorous body; so it often happens that those whose medial qualities are from this cause the strongest, are also those whose intellectual endowments are the

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most complete and the most energetic, and consequently the best adapted to regulate the medial influences."

As regards the control which man is enabled to exercise over his mind and conduct, apparent inconsistencies not unfrequently occur; although, in reality, the higher influences of our nature prevail, and are those by which we aim and believe ourselves to be governed, however thwarted and diverted by those of an opposite nature. As gold and the precious metals are never found unmixed with ore, while the baser products of the earth are discovered without any other substances being intermingled with them; so religion of the most fervent and pure nature is often wont to be tainted with uncharitableness and superstition, which, in our weak nature, are almost the necessary adjuncts to so sublime a subject, and are produced by the very heat and earnestness with which religion is followed up. On the other hand, religion of that dull, and spiritless, and sickly nature, which is too feeble to exhibit any glow of fervour; is that alone which is found to be wholly free from any alloy or impurity of this kind. Hence the numerous perversions, and superstitions, and inconsistencies, which characterize alike the best of men, and the purest of churches. Some, even among ardent and professedly devout Christians, who are led away by a partial view of their duty, are wont to talk and act as if profession and practice were quite distinct and independent matters; as though the end of religion was not to make men better, but to serve them as an excuse for being bad. Thus, one atones for his licentiousness or his dishonesty, not by repenting of it, but by referring to his devotion in private, or to his regular attendance on public worship. Another excuses his profanity, by setting off against this, his charity to the poor. All such Christians will, nevertheless, find that there is no such law as the law of set-off among the ordinances of God. A man must be influenced and controlled by religion as regards his conduct as a whole, and cannot serve God by one act, while he obeys the Devil by another; any more than he can please two different and adverse masters, by obeying and disobeying each in turn. In all these cases, however, it is not that religion or reason has no control over our conduct,* but that the proper direction of that control is neglected, or lost, either through error of judgment, or self-deceit. Man, indeed, deceives extensively several of his fellow-creatures, but himself most completely of all. He misleads many of his friends, but himself more than any of them. Each man, moreover, has many enemies, but none so great as himself. He is as false to himself as the Devil is to him. God alone is true and just, both

According to Hobbes, "fools and madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice; the images of things being by disease altered."-Of Liberty and Necessity.

to each man individually and to all men alike. As ingratitude is the basest of crimes, and one which God especially abhors; so it is that crime in particular of which man is most prone to be guilty, and above all towards his Maker, to whom he owes the most.

Not only are many persons unable with certainty to trace and define the motives by which they are actuated, but it will often happen that an entirely contrary origin to their actions is ascribed by differently constituted minds, each being influenced by the feelings and disposition with which it is mainly endowed. Thus, the meek and humble-minded may estimate very lowly their own motives; while the proud and self-confident may assume that they were led by those which are the highest and purest. Hence, it may be that those who think they were influenced by the noblest principles, were, in reality, stimulated by the most ignoble; and that those who considered they were fulfilling only an ordinary duty, may have been impelled by sentiments the most laudable. The publican was, in reality, actuated by higher motives than the Pharisee; although the Pharisee took credit to himself for superior principle to that of the publican.

How often do we find persons renouncing certain amusements, when the age for enjoying them has gone by, on the ground that they are lawless, as ministering to pride or vanity; and yet unscrupulously engaging to a large extent in other occupations where these faults are as easily and as frequently fallen into. How much better would it be, if, instead of renouncing such amusements, and severely denouncing all who continue to follow them; they would simply avoid the errors to which they are supposed to lead, but to which many other things besides will quite as often tend.

Real genuine insincerity is probably, however, as I before observed, a far less frequent failing than is generally imagined. Fickleness is, in ordinary cases, the actual fault, which is mistaken for insincerity; and which is one of a far less pernicious kind, and, indeed, rather weakness than actual wickedness. Thus, men in general do really mean what they profess at the time; but, from fickleness they either change their intention, or fail in carrying out their resolution. When a positive promise is given, this of course ought to restrain the exercise of fickleness; inasmuch as where the performance is unfulfilled, other, and worse crime than that of either fickleness or insincerity, one of actual fraud, is perpetrated.

Much, too, as we deceive other people, I again repeat that we each deceive our own selves most of all. Self-deceit is, nevertheless, always done unwillingly. It may therefore be fairly inferred that deceit of other people is unwilling also. Hence, there is not by any means, as a necessary consequence, that