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amount of insincerity which might be inferred from people deceiving one another.

As man possesses in himself the full and complete control over his whole moral conduct, so is he able to subject to proper discipline his various medial propensities and endowments; and according as that discipline is duly and legitimately exerted, will be its efficiency in the proper regulation of the moral being. All the moral endowments of our nature appear to have reference not only to our individual, but to our social adaptation; and fit man not merely to be a perfect being himself, but capacitate him perfectly for society also. And as each medial endowment is requisite in order to render man's constitution perfect; so the moral endowment of man is requisite for the perfection of society, and for social intercourse among men. Supposing a man to exist alone without any other person, there would be but comparatively little application or employment for his moral endowments. Charity, and benevolence, and honesty, could not be exercised, if there was but one individual in the world. And as man is the only creature capable of carrying on mental and social intercourse with the rest of his species; so he is the only creature capable of forming friendships with them, beyond what the impulses of parental affection, or casual attachment, may promote. Little, if any actual sympathy for each other's happiness or pain, seems to exist among animals, except in those cases where immediate apprehension is excited for their own individual wellbeing. Hence, the constant exercise, wherever man is placed in society, of the different moral virtues and through this exercise it is that our medial and moral nature becomes controlled and disciplined; and the more it experiences of this subjection, the more perfect the individual himself becomes. Hence, also, the influence of habit, which is so powerful, especially in moral discipline; and which is the result or offspring of moral education, and of long continuance in a particular course of conduct. Education and habit, probably, direct us in many actions, which, if not actually virtuous in themselves, nevertheless conduce to virtue.7

As regards moral, far more than mental education (which will be treated of separately and particularly in a subsequent chapter), we are influenced by the conduct and habits of those about us, and are dependent upon others for receiving such education. Mental education, indeed, we may obtain to a large extent by ourselves, independent of others. But although, in a certain degree, this is the case as regards moral education also, it is far less so than with respect to mental discipline. From our parents especially we receive, probably, almost to as great an amount our

7 Cicero, alluding to absolute reason, speaks of it as synonymous with virtue.-Tusc. Disp. Whether Virtue be sufficient for a Happy Life, 13. * Vide past, b. iii. c. vii.

moral, as we do our material being; and from them all our first and most important moral nutriment is derived, as to them we look to direct us in our choice of food of this kind. Nevertheless, no precepts are so powerful, as those which are proved to be good through our own practice of them. No exhortations are so encouraging, as those which are enforced by our own example.

With respect to the reciprocal mutual influence between the soul and the body, more especially the medial endowments and propensities springing from the latter, and the power of the mind to discipline and control them; it may be observed that the appetites and passions are comparatively weak during early life, although by indulgence and exercise they each acquire vigour, and increase in their authority over the mental part of our constitution, which, on the other hand, has a tendency to gain strength, and to increase its predominance as the soul developes itself, and the bodily powers become debilitated by age. Hence, in the person of well-regulated habits and conduct, who has duly disciplined his appetites and passions, by which he is more or less influenced, and often led away during youth; he gradually acquires the mastery as his reason advances and becomes matured, and his medial endowments decline. In the epicure and debauchee, on the other hand, his appetites and passions gradually increase, both in power and influence, by indulgence; and in time reduce to their authority the reason itself, ruling through that very power to which they themselves ought properly to be subject.'

There are divers analogies traceable between moral and material, as well as between mental and material subjects and actions. Cleanliness is said to be an indication of moral, as well as of physical purity; and certain it is that the abhorrence of everything that is irregular, and incorrect, and offensive, in the one state, conduces also to repugnance at a corresponding condition in the other. Dirt and depravity are, doubtless, very constant and very choice companions; while a spotless soul most often dwells in a clean body. Neglect and carelessness conduce alike to physical and to spiritual impurity; and idleness and recklessness are the common parents both of spiritual degeneracy, and of physical deterioration.

To this passage Dr. Richardson has appended the following note :

"Yes. The passions may reduce the intelligence to the complete subjection named. But sometimes by very indulgence, the passions themselves may become reduced, and the intelligence may then reawaken to its original condition. This is, however, exceptionable. The rule, though not absolute, is that the intelligence once subjugated by the passions, is permanently reduced, as stated in the text."

10. Qualities and Propensities analogous to Moral Endowment, existent in, and exhibited by, certain Animals.

The question whether animals are any of them capable of moral endowment, and if so, how far, in what respect, and to what extent, forms a very interesting subject of inquiry. On the whole, it appears that animals, many of whose medial endowments are in common with those of man, have, nevertheless, no actual moral endowments of any kind; inasmuch as the possession of intellect, and the consequent knowledge of right and wrong, and a perception of obligations of this description, are essential in order to constitute qualities of this high nature.1 Animals nevertheless possess certain propensities to commit certain actions, and are endowed with certain characteristics also as regards their general habits, closely analogous to the moral endowments of man, which demand a particular consideration here. Hence it would seem that, although animals exhibit several of the medial qualities common to man, to a limited extent only, and very imperfectly; yet they are nevertheless influenced by them in part, so far as the medial excitements extend; while they are wanting in mental direction, and in moral control, as regards the actions in which they result.' Thus, with respect to courage, we have already seen that animals display boldness, which is courage incomplete, comprising it so far as the medial excitement producing or constituting it extends. So also, in a corresponding manner, they may be taught to obey the command to abstain from taking the food that is not allotted to them; which is an exercise of honesty promoted mainly by the medial emotion of fear that prevents its violation. As regards temper, too, in the case of animals, its operation is varied by their relative excitability as regards this propensity, but without any reference whatever to mental operations affecting it.

Animals, although differing from each other in this respect, appear to be more good-tempered generally than is man, in so far that they are less liable to be excited to anger; as, in the first place, the provocations of temper are more

"The moral sense, perhaps, affords the best and highest distinction between man and the lower animals.”—Darwin's Descent of Man, &c., vol. i. p. 106.

2 Smellie remarks that "on every animal nature has imprinted a certain character, which is indelibly fixed, and distinguishes the species," and which character, however modified by education or domestication, is never fully obliterated.-Philosophy of Natural History, c. xviii. p. 464. 3 Buffon observes that man has the greatest tendency to knowledge, and the brute to appetite.-Natural History. Nature of Animals.

Sir W. Lawrence attributes the differences between man and animals in moral endowments, to a difference in organization.-Natural History of Man, s. 1, c. vii.

frequently mental than physical. And in the next place, the superior bodily health which animals enjoy, renders them considerably less liable to irritation, such as ordinarily produces attacks of temper.*

Animals, although devoid of reason, and consequently incapable of government by moral rule, not only live together in greater harmony than do mankind, but commit very few crimes; inasmuch as, in the absence of moral obligation, there can be no moral breach. Moreover, without moral rule to guide them, they fulfil more regularly both their parental and social duties than is the custom with mankind." And even their appetites and passions they appear to keep under better control than we do; the main cause of which is, that although they have not reason to restrain them, yet, on the other hand, they are never liable to be urged on to excesses by reason, as is the case with man, when this faculty has become wholly subjugated to the medial endowments. Animals are therefore less prone to evil than man is, because, in the first place, the indulgence of their appetites incurring the breach of no moral rule, can never conduce to sin; more especially as they do not stimulate the over-excitement and abuse of their appetites and passions by artificial means. In the next place, animals, as we shall see in the next chapter, are not liable to be stimulated by ambition and avarice, which both directly and indirectly are the cause of so much crime among mankind. Indeed, these desires among the brute creation appear only to develope themselves so far as the emotions extend of emulation and prudence, and are consequently mild and harmless.

But it may be said that animals are fully capable of, and do evince gratitude, which is doubtless a moral quality, and requires the exertion of intellectual operations to constitute it. I question, however, whether animals do really exercise what may be strictly termed gratitude. All that they can do is to evince attachment towards those who show kindness to them; and, becoming so attached, they are willing to exert themselves for their protection. This disposition has doubtless the semblance of gratitude, but not the substance."

4 Dr. Richardson remarks with regard to this statement :-" Of this I have no doubt."

• Mr. Darwin says that "birds sometimes exhibit benevolent feelings; they will feed the deserted young, even of distinct species; but this, perhaps, ought to be considered as a mistaken instinct."-Selection in relation to Sex, vol. ii. p. 109.

Dr. Richardson has suggested that the two last words in this paragraph might have been more properly rendered, "a mistake of instinct."

As regards certain points of interest connected with animal nature, about which considerable differences must necessarily exist, I have referred for his opinion to the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A., F.L.S., author of "Homes without Hands," whose deeply interesting and highly instruc

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Animals, as well as men, appear to derive pleasure from the exercise of those particular habits to which they are most prone; and it and it may reasonably be inferred that they are most prone to those for which they are by nature peculiarly adapted. Thus, animals of prey, whose chief occupation is the capturing, and slaying, and devouring other animals, exhibit great enjoyment in this pursuit, which developes all their energies and propensities: and they seem even to revel over and delight in the very agonies which they occasion, correspondingly with the mode in which men of high principle exhibit the utmost gratification in the performance of deeds of virtue or heroism; or as those of exalted and highly cultivated mental endowments, are eager to exercise themselves in those lofty pursuits in which they peculiarly excel.

But if any animals exhibit the proneness here stated, to kill other animals, and appear to delight in the sufferings which they occasion; does it not necessarily follow that at any rate certain animals, if not the whole race, must possess an inherent and natural disposition towards vice and cruelty? If, however, we examine closely into their nature, it will be found that in each case, as in man, between whose nature and theirs a strict analogy may be observed, they are stimulated to the actions from which they acquire this character, solely by their appetites and passions; and that independently of the influence of these endowments, they are devoid of any disposition either to do good or harm. Thus, beasts of prey possess a proneness to pursue and kill animals upon which they live, in order to appease the cravings of appetite. Independent, however, of these wants, they would be wholly indifferent about efforts of this kind, and would not be inclined to exert themselves; but to which they are roused only by their appetites, and passions, and affections. When these cravings are satiated, we find these propensities no longer excited.

Hence, their dispositions originate entirely in the manner I have pointed out, and are independent of any exercise of a reasoning faculty, as in man, by which, therefore, they are altogether unrestrained. The emotions alone, by counteracting tive work, "Man and Beast," has been published, and has reached me, while the present sheet was passing through the press, the first volume, and the sheets preceding the present one in Vol. II. having already been printed off. Mr. Wood very naturally prefers referring me to what he has already advanced in his recent work, as a reply to my queries, to repeating his opinions to me. From the book in question, it appears that Mr. Wood does consider that animals are influenced by gratitude, and adduces several anecdotes in support of his views. Whether the facts there stated can be admitted as evidence of what is strictly meant by gratitude, and not mere attachment, I must leave it to the readers of them to determine. The question appears indeed ultimately to turn on whether animals have reason or not, in favour of which Mr. Wood expresses himself, while I am unable to assent to this opinion.