precisely the same power of discerning right from wrong, and of correct reasoning and decision upon these topics; but who will vary in their course of action and conduct, entirely and solely from the constitution of one inducing him to be much more readily influenced by the temptations to commit evil, than does that of the other.

Possibly, both as to their essential nature and as to the mode in which they may be dealt with hereafter, a difference may exist as to those crimes which are corporeal, and are committed directly through the body, such as lust and drunkenness, by which the body mainly is defiled; and those which are spiritual, and committed directly through the soul, such as envy, malice, and the like, by which the soul itself becomes defiled, and which defilement cleaves closely to it, and from which it may not be entirely freed, as in the case of corporeal defilements, by shaking off the gross corporeal frame, and exchanging it for one of a spiritual nature. Possibly, too, and on this account, by "sin against the Holy Ghost," may be meant those sins which are of this latter nature, by which the influence of God's Spirit is counteracted and effaced.

Moral subjects themselves appear also, on a close examination of them, to be in every respect as complex, and to be constituted of as many different elements, as are those of a material nature, which must necessarily add greatly to their abstruseness and obscurity. On the other hand, as we know most subjects mainly by their operations and combinations, the more distinct elements any subject contains, and the more active they are, the greater are the opportunities afforded of investigating their real nature.

As God is the perfection of moral excellence, so to moral excellence and virtue He ever inclines; which is indeed necessarily the case with One Whose intellect is of infinite perfection, Whose knowledge is unbounded, and Who is swayed by no debasing influences of any kind.*

2. The Will, its Nature and Prerogative.

As the line of conduct adopted, resulting from the mutual reciprocal influence of the various medial and mental excitements and endowments, constitutes the general moral character and disposition of any person; so the final free decisive determination of that person in each case to adopt any particular course, is that which constitutes his will, which is nothing more than the

Origen, nevertheless, ascribes a limit to the Deity in His operations, from the imperfect nature of matter.

ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY OF THE WILL.

resolution arrived at by him to perform any particular act,the fiat that he gives forth for the thing to be done."

9

It is the grand prerogative of the mind, wherein it differs entirely from, and is vastly superior to the material frame, to be its own absolute director and self-controller. The body is ever dependent on external causes, and on the operation of the mind, for its own action. The soul relies only on itself, however external objects may influence its exertions; and this power of absolute self-control is what constitutes, and what we call, the will; which essentially consists in the capacity of the mind to act, or be passive, with regard to any particular matter, and to exert itself in the precise direction that it chooses. The mind, however, has not the power to be wholly passive, inasmuch as perpetual, if not ceaseless action, appears to be an essential condition and property of its being. The control of the will over the mind is, probably, directly and closely analogous to that of the mind over the body. We infer, therefore, that the will is no actual independent endowment or faculty by itself belonging to the mind; but is simply the power possessed by the mind of arriving at any particular decision in regard to the course of conduct to be adopted, by the exercise of the reason.

The will in regard to its freedom, much resembles a pair of balances which are quite at liberty to incline to one side or the other when no weight is put into either, but the preponderance of which is determined by the relative weight of the substances placed in them. So the will, independent of external motives and influences, while wholly free and at liberty to act, is balanced, and influenced, and swayed in its determinations,

"We possess a free will, by which we can withhold our assent from what is doubtful, and thus avoid error."-Des Cartes, Princ. Phil., pt. i. As will to do is appetite, and will to omit, fear; the cause of appetite and fear is the cause also of our will."- Hobbes, Hum. Nat., c. 12.

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Dr. H. More remarks that we are conscious of a faculty or "power in ourselves, notwithstanding any outward assaults or importunate temptations, to cleave to that which is virtuous and honest, or to yield to pleasures or other vile advantages."-Works, Immortality of the Soul, b. ii.

c. 2.

"The soul always wills or chooses that which, in the present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable."- Edwards on Free Will, s. 9.

According to Mr. Herbert Spencer, "the will is a simple homogeneous mental state, forming the link between feeling and action, and not admitting of subdivisions."-Psychology.

"We may define volition or will, as a determinate effort to carry out a purpose previously conceived."-Dr. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, c. ix. s. 1. p. 376.

6 Malebranche holds that the will of man essentially depends on the love that God bears to Himself, and that it is only because God loves Himself, that we love anything.-Search after Truth, tome ii. b. v. c. 1. s. 1.

by the external motives that operate upon it,' and over which it has no control, although they control and rule over it; its disposition to submit to them being more powerful than any inducement that can excite it to resist them.

The prerogative of the will may be also said to be analogous to the privilege and power possessed by a court of justice to deliver an authoritative judgment on any particular subject, which privilege is distinct and independent of itself, and is quite separate both from the judge who delivers the judgment, and from the judgment that is delivered. The freedom of the will corresponds, in fact, with that of the freedom of action in a judge, while it is also placed under corresponding restraints. Thus, the judge is entirely free to act and determine as he thinks proper; and yet, at the same time, his decision must ever be in strict conformity both with the principles of justice, and the precise law applicable to the case. So the will is entirely free to act, but its determinations will be ever in favour of pursuing that course which, under all circumstances, the reason points out as the most desirable one to follow. The will is, consequently, the ultimate determination or resolution made by the reason,' between the various conflicting influences alluded to, as to the precise course of action which the individual decides to pursue.' It is, as it were, the pivot or hinge on which the action turns. Indeed, in some operations, particularly those which are directed by mere instinctive impulses, to will implies to act as well. The performance itself, at once and spontaneously, results on the decision of the will. The mainspring which sets the mental machine in action, is constituted of the various emotions, feelings, appetites, passions, and affections, by which we are excited. The will regulates the proceeding of each of these, directs and controls their operations, and allows or disallows of their gratification in each particular case, as each impulse from them arises. In some instances they rebel, and for a time act in opposition to, and overcome the dictates of reason. But even in these cases the acquiescence of the will is obtained, and without its consent no

"A primary and essential element in the due regulation of the will, is a correct knowledge of the truths and motives which tend to influence its determinations."-Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings, pt. ii. s. 1.

8 Des Cartes remarks that "there is a great difference between willing to be deceived, and willing to yield assent to opinions in which it happens that error is found."-Princ. Phil., pt. i. s. 42.

9 According to Hobbes, in deliberation, the last impulse of the appetites is will.-Leviathan. And he observes that "our wills follow our opinions, as our actions follow our wills; in which sense they say truly and properly, that the world is governed by opinion."-Human Nature,

c. xii. s. 6.

1 Aristotle held that the will is determined to what is good, for good is the only object of rational desires.-Rhetoric, b. i. C. 10.

DIFFERENT MOTIVES SWAY DIFFERENT MEN.

11

voluntary action takes place. It, as it were, keeps the keys to every avenue in the way of action that we can pursue.

The extent of the power and vigour of the will consequently results from, and, in fact, depends upon, the extent to which the individual is bent upon any particular object or resolution, and the unanimity with which the different controlling and active influences or stimuli which sway such person, cooperate together in urging him to pursue one and the same course. If these various influences are opposed to and counteract one another, the will is necessarily weak and vacillating, and the balance is uncertain as to which way it will preponderate. But where they are all thrown into one and the same scale, their united weight at once decides the issue. The whole energy of the soul is, in this case, concentrated in one point.

The nature and character of the will differ, moreover, in different people, according to the motives by which they are peculiarly liable to be actuated; and the relative strength and influence in each particular case of these various motives vary, and are dependent upon the medial, moral, and mental character of the individual; in some persons, sensual, or appetital, in others moral, in others mental motives possessing more power, and in others less. Indeed, the same man, from various causes, differs much at different times in this respect.

The value or relative preponderance of the motive, its adaptation to constitute the chief good or desideratum in which consists the essentially prevailing and biasing influence, must depend on the condition and position of the individual, and varies extensively accordingly. Thus, to a starving man, food may be the chief good; to a poor man, money; to a thirsty man, drink.

It is farther to be observed that the will is ever determined by that which is the strongest among contending influences, whether medial, moral, or mental. The decision made by the will upon any specific question is, indeed, in this respect analogous to the preponderance evinced by a balance, which at once shows the predominance in regard to weight possessed by any particular object, and forthwith decides the

2 According to Professor Bain, "the two fundamental component elements of the will," are, "first, the existence of a spontaneous tendency to excite movements independent of the stimulus of sensations or feelings; and, secondly, the link between a present action and a present feeling, whereby the one comes under the control of the other."-The Emotions and the Will, Second edition, p. 297.

3 Malebranche asserts, however, that the will of man essentially depends upon the body, since it is by reason of the motion of the blood and animal spirits that it is conscious to itself of all its sensible commotions.-Search after Truth, tome ii. b. v. c. 1. s. 1.

question as to that point, which before hung in abeyance and doubt.

In one respect, therefore, the freedom of the will is absolute, in that every one has the entire power to will and determine according to his own inclination. In another respect there is no freedom of the will whatever, in that every one is under the necessity of choosing that course of action which, under all circumstances, whether from its apparent probability to produce pleasure, or safety, or wealth, or whatever other good, appears to him at the time to be preferable. Different people will be swayed by different motives, and the same person by different motives at different periods. But every person alike is absolutely compelled to be determined by that which is the preponderating motive at the time.

It may, however, be said that if men are not free to choose, being compelled to select that course which appears the chief good; it must be unjust to inflict punishment for not acting in a particular course, when men are not free to act. To this I reply that the very introduction of the punishment alters the balance of motive, and leads the individual to act in conformity with the law; which he does, nevertheless, quite voluntarily and from choice, as he still follows the course which will ensure him the greatest good, and preserve him from ill.*

The frustration of the will, when the individual is compelled by circumstances to pursue a course of conduct different to that dictated by his will, as when he is under restraint; occasions direct violence to his feelings and emotions, and produces a vehement perturbation in the soul." Where a course of conduct is pursued different to that which the general result of the concurrent medial and mental influences would have directed, on account of some special evil threatening us in case we do not follow the former course; it is still the will by which we are determined, although in such case the will itself is not free, but is constrained. Nevertheless, even here, the will is the result of the reciprocal influences by which we are affected.

In strict reason, indeed, it may be concluded that there is no act whatever done by us in any case, which is done contrary to the will; inasmuch as the mere act of our doing it

4 "Not the necessity, but the will to break the law, maketh the action unjust; because the law regardeth the will, and no other precedent causes of action."-Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity.

According to Burlamaqui, all human actions are voluntary, but where violence is used, the act is that of the agent exercising the violence.Principles of Natural Law, pt. i. c. ii. s. 12.

"Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent."-Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity.

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"The will is that desire or aversion which is the strongest for the then present time."- Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 371.