4

each other, serve to restrain and moderate them. Such endowments may therefore most fitly be denominated propensities.

In proof of what I have advanced, we may refer to the accounts given of the propensities of animals by naturalists. The lion, we are told, never slays but when excited by hunger; although tigers and wolves, and some of the most ferocious species of animals, generally fly at and attack whatever creature comes in their way; which, however, they do from being habitually used to kill in order to satisfy their cravings, and from the pleasure which they derive in so doing.

Animals, nevertheless, differ very much as regards their dispositions or propensities in this respect, according to the temperament of body which they possess; those living in mild climates being comparatively gentle and mild as compared with those of the same species which inhabit the torrid regions. In the case of man, as I have already observed, different individuals vary greatly as regards what may be termed their disposition, according to the particular temperament with which they are respectively endowed.

In Captain Cook's" Second Voyage round the World," he records a very remarkable and striking illustration of the natural harmony existing between creatures of different kinds, and which was only broken by the calls of hunger strongly urging them to prey on one another. It appears that the animals here spoken of, had abundance of dead carcasses to feed upon, and therefore were not induced to molest any of the living creatures about them, on whom they might have seized. On the other hand, we find animals not naturally carnivorous, or used to prey upon those of another kind, will, when very strongly pressed by hunger, attack and devour their fellows of the same species; so powerful an effect have the appetites and passions, even in changing the very disposition and nature of those over whom they exercise control.

The existence upon earth of animals as well as man, who are brought into constant communion with him, and by whom his actions are in many ways influenced, is, doubtless, very important in many respects as regards its moral results. It may be that it is of the same use in the development and discipline of the moral endowments, and bears the same analogy to them, as the union of soul and body accomplishes in the development and discipline of the mental powers. It prepares us for many social duties, and

7 He mentions that in Staten Island, the wild animals of different kinds lived together in a state of perfect harmony, and seemed careful not to disturb each other's tranquillity. Sea-lions, bears, shags, and penguins, associated together like domestic cattle and poultry in a farmyard; while eagles and vultures sat together among the shags, neither being disturbed at the other's presence.-Cook's Voyages, vol. ii. p. 685.

MORAL USE OF ANIMALS TO MAN.

79

serves to call forth many latent qualities and emotions, which might otherwise fail of cultivation. Nevertheless, like certain other causes and influences of a corresponding nature in the moral world, when the result of any arrangement appears calculated to be beneficial, it is often discovered to be also capable of being rendered extensively the reverse. Thus, among many persons, where intercourse with animals has failed to call forth their better feelings, its tendency has frequently been to harden and brutalize them; and where this latter result has occurred, it has prevailed to a great extent. So among all people, the influence of women is either refining and humanizing, where they are treated with proper respect and regard; but where this is not the case, and they are degraded, it is hardening and degenerating in the petty tyranny and cruelty that are exercised. The possession of children has also, ordinarily, a very humanizing and beneficial moral effect, in softening the feelings, and drawing out benevolent dispositions and sympathies; but the very reverse is the result where no affection for them is felt, and they are treated with barbarity.

Perhaps, indeed, the best and surest test of goodness as regards moral disposition in man, and of his inclination to virtue and the exercise of benevolence, is his performance of acts of kindness and charity towards the animal race; from whom no direct return can be expected to gratify his self-interest, and for which no reward of any kind, temporal or eternal, is either promised, or to be calculated upon. On the other hand, the spontaneous maltreatment of any of these creatures, cannot but seem, to a certain extent, to be indicative of innate inclination to vice, and to malevolence. In each of these instances, however, both of kindness and of cruelty, the particular acts will in most, if not in all cases, be found to have proceeded, not entirely, or directly, either from virtue or benevolence, or from vice or malevolence; but to have been instigated, as we observe with respect to the other moral actions, by some consideration of selfinterest, either direct or indirect, in one of the various modes already pointed out, which was sought to be gratified, and which the act in question conduced to appease. Nevertheless, as regards the general conduct of man towards the inferior race of creatures, he is not only their tyrant; but from his ceaseless cruelties towards them of every variety, he might be rightly denominated the devil of the animal world. As mankind have many foes among themselves, but the devil is the archtormentor of them all; so, many as are the enemies which animals possess among their own species, the arch-foe and archtormentor of them all is man. Man is, moreover, not only the devil of the animal world; but in nothing do animals so nearly resemble man, as in their ready obedience to their tormentor. If, as some old writers have conjectured, the souls of animals

at their deaths turn into demons, their delight in torturing man must be greatly invigorated by the revenge they will bear him; although their utmost ingenuity could hardly devise torments more intense, or more varied, than what they have endured from him having been subjected to tyranny and slavery of every kind, received the most barbarous treatment, been deprived of their liberty, despoiled of their offspring, had their deepest attachments ruthlessly violated, their habitations destroyed, and their frames tortured; while nearly all of them of every species have been at last put to death by man.

CHAPTER II.

THE MORAL DESIRES.

1. Origin, Constitution, and Quality of these Desires.

HAVING investigated the process, and traced the course of moral action, as regards the various medial impulses, counteracted and diverted, although ultimately guided and directed by different opposite and contending causes; and having considered, in conjunction therewith, the influence and exercise of the reason and the will, through the operation of which the general moral disposition and character are at length consummated and rendered complete: we have next to inquire into the nature of what may be most correctly termed the moral desires, which also belong to the moral part of our constitution; and to consider their respective influence and use in the general economy of our nature.

In the elementary constitution of a desire of this kind, the same principle is observable as in that of a moral quality or disposition. Thus, a desire springs from an impulse, originally arising in most cases in the medial, although occasionally in the mental part of our nature, directed, and in many instances produced, by a mental operation, and relating, or having immediate reference, to some moral action

or

course of conduct. Where a simple excitement only, urging us to the possession of some object, exists, not a moral desire, but a mere complex emotion or appetite, is that which is called forth. Hope, for example, is not an actual moral desire, but merely an accompaniment to it, a concomitant emotion which aids the impulse of each moral desire. Nevertheless, whenever the mind is influenced by any ardent wish for, which implies also the determination of the will towards, any particular object, it may strictly be said to be excited by a desire in respect of it; which is, however, only a desire of an ordinary kind, and not a moral desire.' There are, nevertheless, certain feelings or excitements of this description, of a very

1 "Desire is the immediate movement or act of the mind towards an object, which presents some quality on account of which we wish to obtain it."-Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings, pt. i. s. 1.

VOL. II.

Ꮐ

complex nature, which especially claim to be denominated moral desires. As we proceed analytically to inquire into the nature of a moral desire, we find that it is essential and peculiar to the constitution of every moral desire, that it should possess two objects, altogether separate and distinct, and even opposite in their kind, by which such desire is stimulated. 1. An immediate object of the desire; which is in its nature uncertain and changeable, and varies from time to time with the condition or position of the individual. 2. An ultimate object of the desire, which is ever fixed, certain, and determinate."

The immediate objects of a moral desire, are such as are obvious to us, and at once perceptible, both as to their actual existence and mode of operation. These immediate objects may be either a condition of life, or some article which is applied for our use, and which is the subject of a continual longing or anxiety of the soul towards it, either for its own sake, or for the sake of some good; which may be either a state of being, or thing, supposed to be intimately and inseparably associated or connected with it, and which may prove to be the ultimate object of the desire. The ultimate objects of a moral desire, consisting in the advantages themselves supposed to be secured by the immediate object of it, often lie concealed, and as it were beneath the surface; and their influence, however extensive, is nevertheless imperceptible, or but dimly seen.

Each moral desire, moreover, has reference not only to a particular object of it, but also to some especial moral action in regard to such object, without which, indeed, it would not be complete as a moral endowment. Thus, both riches and power are desired, not for themselves, but for the sake of the actions which they enable the possessors of them to pursue.

The moral desires of each kind, are primarily excited and stimulated by mental irritation, analogous to irritation of the body, which agitates and sets in motion, in the first instance, the mental emotions, and also the mental faculties; after which the other medial endowments generally are affected and operated upon, and made to sustain and consummate the progress and constitution of these desires. By means of this irritation is produced, in the first place, a sensation of uneasiness or restlessness, which is ever urging the individual affected by it to endeavour to move out of his present condition. Succeeding to, and consequent upon this feeling, is the longing of the soul, already alluded to, after the new object or condition, whether immediate or ultimate. Hence, the moral desires in the soul are, in a manner, analogous to the instinctive irritative animal

2 Malebranche holds that the mind of man has two essential, or necessary relations, extremely different; the one to God, the other to its own body.-Search after Truth, tome ii. b. v. c. i. s. 1.