DESIRES ORIGINATE IN SELF-LOVE.

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impulses in the body. An irritative impulse, however, arises without an object; while a desire is always stimulated by an object.3

It may be observed that in many cases, and in the pursuit of many employments, we are urged to follow them with great ardour, not actually for the sake of the employments themselves, but on account of some advantage intimately associated with, which is nevertheless altogether independent of them. Thus, the lawyer devotes his whole mind and his utmost energies to his profession, sacrificing every other pursuit, and much enjoyment; not indeed on account of his actual love for the business in which he is so engaged, but from a desire to acquire those honours and emoluments which are attendant on professional success. The student pores diligently over his books, not from the mere fondness for the employment of reading, excess in which is often irksome and painful; but from a desire to acquire knowledge which will aid him in his career. Just so is it with those who are actuated by the moral desires, the immediate objects of which-whether wealth or famethey pursue, not for their own sake, but on account of the advantages and delights, which, although quite independent of, are intimately and inseparately associated with them.

The object of a moral desire seems to possess a kind of magnetic influence, attracting towards itself the whole soul. A desire, whether moral or ordinary, is to the soul somewhat analogous to what an appetite is to the body. The former craves ceaselessly after the object desired, and cannot be tranquillized without it; in the same way that the body when suffering from hunger, does for food. Corresponding languor or lassitude is in each case produced; and in each case, the appeasement of these feelings occasions considerable gratification. The ultimate objects of both are fixed and permanent, until they are satisfied; and, while they continue active, these desires exercise supremacy over all the feelings: so that, so long as they are unsatisfied, neither ease, tranquillity, nor enjoyment can be fully experienced.

Both the moral desires, which are respectively termed ambition and avarice, originate in self-love, and are the result of the efforts which the mind makes in its anxiety to improve the condition of the individual. Envy and jealousy have also their origin here; and even patriotism may be traced to resolve itself into this, as its final, although not its original stimulating motive.

There appears, nevertheless, to be this peculiarity about the

3 According to Aristotle, the causes of all human action are sevenchance, force, nature, custom, reason, anger, and appetite.-Rhetoric, b. i. c. x.

moral desires, which appertains, more or less, to every moral endowment: that while with respect to the emotions and appetites, we are dependent on ourselves alone as regards our excitement by them; in our excitement by the moral desires, we are dependent entirely on our relation to others. Thus, the attainment of neither wealth nor power can afford us any pleasure, except so far as they enable us to exercise ourselves in some way in relation to those about us. Neither riches nor honours can confer any benefit on an individual, unless he is a member of a community which may render him homage on that account. But this is the case, to some extent also, with regard both to the passions and to affection.

ence.

In God, neither ambition nor avarice find place for existAs the Supreme of all beings, no ambition can excite Him, having exceeded the utmost bounds to which ambition can impel. And possessing all things, it is contrary to reason to suppose that avarice can ever in any way influence His proceedings. He is however probably, for the reasons stated, the only intelligent being who is not so moved; as wherever there exists in any being the prospect of obtaining either property or elevation beyond what he has already gained, full scope for both ambition and avarice is at once afforded.*

2. Particular objects of Desire, peculiar to each part of our

nature.

Each department in our constitution, although so intimately and inseparably connected with the other part, and partaking of and affected by all its excitements and impulses, is nevertheless influenced independently, and is peculiarly directed by the respective and distinctive desires appropriate to it, although each of these desires originates in, and springs from, the same source. As each part of our nature is thus in a manner distinct and independent in itself, and carries on operations differing from, and to a certain extent at variance with, those of the other part; so each has its own distinct, and independent, and ever-opposing inclinations.

There are three principal and especial motives, or springs of action, which separately influence man, according to the three constituent parts of which he is made up; and these respectively form the stimulants to or objects of desire, according to the different parts of our nature. 1. The first of these is the

As regards moral desire in the case of God, Behmen asserts that His will is imperceptible without inclination to anything, for it has nothing to which it can incline itself, but only in itself.-Revelation, quest. 3, c. xiii.

Also, that it brings itself forth out of itself.-Ibid.

CAUSES AND CONSTITUTION OF HAPPINESS.

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desire of pleasure, and of the avoidance of pain, which is the principal mainspring of action in every operation carried on, or derived from, the medial part of our constitution. 2. The second of these is the desire of liberty, and of the avoidance of constraint, which is the principal mainspring of action carried on, or derived from, the moral part of our constitution; being that in which the will is immediately concerned, and on the attainment of which its freedom depends. 3. The third of these desires is that of knowledge, and of the avoidance of ignorance, which is the principal mainspring of action in every operation carried on, or derived from, the mental part of our constitution. This is true alike, whichever faculty or capacity is exerted; and the agreeable feeling afforded by novelty, is a proof of the production of pleasure from this source.

In each case, however, and in the operation of each desire, whether ordinary or moral, the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the ultimate and moving objects, and are what are alone either wished for, or shunned for their own sake. Liberty, and ease, and knowledge, are coveted, not for their own sake, but for the sake of the pleasure they insure. Riches and honours are sought after, not for their own sake, but because they bring liberty and ease with them. Hence, in each of these desires, the ultimate object of attainment is the enjoyment of pleasure, coupled with the avoidance of pain.

It is further to be observed that there is no desire of any kind excited in any branch of our nature, without the determination of the will. Indeed, this determination of the will is absolutely essential to constitute the desire, and the will always points, as it were, in the direction towards which the desire impels us.

As pleasure is the immediate object of desire in our medial nature, so self-preservation is probably the ultimate object here, and destruction the ultimate object of avoidance. It appears to me, however, that it is not so much the love of life as the dread of death and its attendant pangs, by which we are mainly actuated. All change is naturally obnoxious, especially to an unknown condition. Particularly so must be that change which is the greatest of all that we can undergo, and to a state of the nature of which we are utterly ignorant.

Next to the desire of self-preservation, is that for the preservation and well-being of those immediately connected with us. The desire of protecting their young, evinced by the whole animal creation, is probably derived from that of self-preservation; and the horror of death in any being, from the dread of destruction to self.

Some have considered happiness as the ultimate object of desire generally. It is not, however, happiness, but what produces or insures happiness, that is the apparent object

of desire, whether liberty, or power, or knowledge be the subject of pursuit. The happiness of heaven, which is the highest happiness that man can attain, consists, according to the notions of some races of men, in having every desire gratified to the full. On the other hand, most of the unhappiness endured on earth, arises from the numerous disappointments to which our desires are here doomed.

Terrestrial happiness depends, however, in reality, much more upon our constitution, than our condition. The ills that are insufferable to one man, are trifles to another; and comforts which one man deems indispensable, another regards as useless superfluities. Some persons, too, are excited by every casualty which befalls them; while others regard with stoical indifference the most important events in their career. It is, moreover, a singular circumstance connected with happiness, which appears to be so peculiarly positive in its nature, that it is itself dependent far more on negatives than on positives; more on the absence of certain ills, than on the presence of any particular goods, for its existence. But this is mainly owing to, and of itself proves, the adaptation of man for this state; and that this is in reality his natural condition, unless disturbed in, and driven from it, by external causes. So prone, indeed, are we by nature to be in a condition of happiness, that almost every affection, either of the mind or of the body, which does not do violence to nature, is directly pleasurable; while nearly every such affection that does violence to nature, is painful. Happiness appears, consequently, to be the natural condition of man, and misery his unnatural state; inasmuch as perfect health, accompanied by freedom from annoyance, either through mental, moral, or physical causes, almost of itself conduces to promote and insure happiness; while, on the other hand, the impairment of health, and the presence of care or pain, at once conduce to create a

Epicurus placed happiness in the tranquillity of the mind, and indolence of the body.

According to Aristotle, happiness may be defined to be "a state of virtuous and prosperous exertion, or a state of independence and contentment, or one overflowing with safe pleasures; or one abundant in worldly goods, with power to preserve, and wisdom to enjoy them."-Rhetoric, b. i. c. 5.

He also asserts that the greatest human happiness is theoretic and intellectual. And that the exercise of intellectual energy, constitutes the best and firmest portion of human happiness.-Ethics, b. x. cc. vii., viii. Cicero tells us that "they who are under no apprehensions, no ways uneasy, who covet nothing, are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy."Tusculan Disputations; Whether Virtue be sufficient for a Happy Life. vi. Locke states as regards happiness that "in its fullest extent it is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain; and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness, is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content."-Essay on the Understanding, b. ii. c. xxi. s. 42.

LIBERTY A LEADING INCENTIVE TO ACTION.

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condition of unhappiness. And as happiness is our natural, so is it also our most perfect condition, and will be completely enjoyed only when our state is rendered perfect, either by the soul being freed from the bondage of the body, or united to a spiritual body fitted alike for its complete action and complete happiness. And as misery is a condition unnatural to man, so is it one of punishment also, both here and hereafter; and in both states is the consequence of a departure from the correct course set before us. Moreover, as is the case with our happiness, so our misery too, will only be complete in a future state. Nevertheless, the soul while united to the body may possibly be capable of as extensive and vivid happiness as when in a separate state, and enjoying the bliss of heaven; the main difference between the two being, that it is incapable while in this condition of enjoying it for any permanence. It obtains here but a transient and momentary glance, of what hereafter it will have the full

view.

It is no proof of the attainment of the immediate object of a desire not producing grati cation and happiness, that the condition occasioning it is not permanent, but soon subsides into one of ordinary feeling; inasmuch as (which I observed when treating on the emotions') all mental pleasure is pro uced by some change in our condition out of a worse state to a better; and the contrast presented in our favour on a review of the two states, which is but a temporary and transient feeling, soon subsides into one of insensibility, and of apathy, regarding it. Thus, a person who has long desired any particular object of ambition, on his obtaining it is filled with great joy; which continues just so long as the novelty of his condition continues to excite him, and he is led to contrast it with that in which he was lately placed, which was one of continual uneasiness and dissatisfaction, in consequence of his being excited by this desire. Just so is it also with regard to any loss or deprivation which we may sustain, the remorse concerning which soon ceases actively and permanently to affect us. bably, moreover, this love of novelty which is so strongly implanted in our nature, is one of the most vigorous and active stimulants to invention, and enterprise, and advancement, that could have been supplied to us. It is like the principle of gravitation in matter, which causes a stone to be continually rolling until it has reached the lowest point on the earth's surface to which it is capable of descending. Indeed, it is mainly from the love of novelty that the desire of knowledge springs.

Pro

A sensation somewhat similar to, or rather corresponding