passage and the acceptance of the charter of the university.

I have called attention to the political enfeeblement of the states arising from this construction of the phrase, "the obligation of contracts." Unfortunately, states were, in the course of human history, to be still further enfeebled; a great civil war was to be fought; a reconstruction to take place; and three amendments to be added to the Constitution, which would still further limit the powers of states.

I remember, during the darkest days of the reconstruction period, reading a newspaper squib in relation to a certain piece of statuary. Some fragments of the article still remain in my memory. It ran something like this:

"I am glad to see you, John Marshall, my boy,

All fresh from the workshop of Rogers,

The writer goes on to say that if Marshall could see the present condition of the country

"He would shut the book

With Justice inscribed on the cover.

He would get him down from his big brass horse,
And cover his face in shame

For the land that he loved is now District One-
Virginia no longer its name."

It was believed by many people at that time, that the rehabilitation of Virginia and the other Southern States would be indefinitely postponed. Fortunately, the reconstruction days are past, and every state has its place in the Federal Congress. It is said that in the late Civil

War many of the descendants of John Marshall took up arms for the Confederacy, and not one of them took arms against it.

To return now to the obligation of contracts:

The case of Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton, 122, dealt with the impairing of the obligation of ordinary contracts by certain insolvent laws respecting the payment of debts, and held that all state statutes providing for discharge from liability on such contracts are void, if passed after the contract was made.

In McMillen v. McNeal, 4 Wheaton, 409, Judge Marshall intimated that it made no difference whether the act providing an insolvent law was passed before or after the contract was made, and, in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, he dissented from the opinion of the majority of the court, which held that an insolvent law enacted before the contract was made would be regarded as entering into the contract. It was claimed that the provision for a discharge of a liability in insolvency, if made by a state statute, enacted before the contract was entered into, was a part of the contract, and so a majority of the court held; but the matter became of no importance in that particular case, because it was further held, that the discharge under such a law was not a discharge of a debt due a citizen of another state.

The validity of certain state statutes on revenue and taxation came, also, before the court, and, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316, the decision was rendered, that a state can not tax a bank of the United States without the consent of the United States government; and, in Osborne v. The United States Bank, 9 Wheaton, 738,

the same question was decided, and it was further decided that Congress might give the bank the right to sue in the United States courts.

The doctrine of implied powers is clearly laid down in those cases, the language used being: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”

A most important decision was rendered by the court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheaton, 304, the opinion being written by Judge Story. The question was as to powers of the Federal courts. In that case it was held that where a Federal question is involved, judgment of the state court may be revised by the Supreme Court of the United States. This doctrine was most earnestly denied by the Republicans. An inferior court in Virginia had rendered a judgment, which the Supreme Court of that state had reversed. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment and directed the Supreme Court of Virginia to carry out the judgment of the inferior court. This the Virginia Supreme Court refused to do, and the opinions, in which it so decided, are found in 4 Munford, page 1. The Supreme Court of the United States, by its own officer, put the successful party in possession of the land in dispute. It was claimed by the Republicans that there was no court of last resort, but that the two systems, state and Federal, are separate and independent, the state judges and the Federal judges both being bound by the Constitution of the United States, each court acting according to its own construction of the same.

Later, in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 264, Marshall rendering the opinion, it was held that the Supreme Court of the United States may revise a judgment of a state court, enforcing the criminal laws of the state, if a Federal question is involved. In this case Judge Marshall used this language: "These states are constituent parts of the United States; they are members of one great empire; for some purposes sovereign, for some subordi nate." Jefferson was never satisfied with the correctness of this decision. The judgment of the Supreme Court, however, affirmed the judgment of the Virginia court. The Supreme Court held it had jurisdiction to inquire into the correctness of the decision, and, having inquired into the correctness of this particular decision, found it was right.

The great steamboat case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1, dealt with the power of a state legislature to regulate commerce. Ogden claiming, under a grant from the state of New York, the exclusive right to navigate all the waters of the state with vessels moved by steam, filed a bill for perpetual injunction against Gibbons, who had infringed upon this right by navigating the river with steamboats duly enrolled and enlisted for the coast trade under an act of Congress. A judgment was rendered, and the decree had been affirmed by the highest court of the state of New York, but the Supreme Court held that the power to regulate interstate commerce, conferred by the Constitution on Congress, comprehends navigation within the limits of any state of the Union, so far as that navigation may be in any manner connected with commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian tribes.

In the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419, the court held void an act of the Maryland Legislature, which required the importer of any goods, in wholesale, bale or package, to take out a license and pay for it. The doctrine of the original package, which has since cut such a decided figure, is plainly laid down in this case. The development since that time has been very marked, the Supreme Court of the United States holding that a state can not, under its prohibitory liquor laws, without consent of Congress, forbid the sale in original packages, of liquor imported into the state from another state.

The case of Craig v. Missouri, 4 Peters, 410, by a divided court, held an act of the state of Missouri void as authorizing the emission of bills of credit. The certifi cates which were granted were held to be within that clause of the Federal Constitution. In a later case after Marshall's death (Biscoe v. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 267), it was held that the act incorporating a bank was a constitutional exercise of power, and that the bank notes issued were not bills of credit. Judge Story dissented, and afterwards in his commentaries on the Constitution he said that the states could not under a sound construction of the Constitution be authorized to incorporate banks with power to circulate bank paper as currency. Since his time the Federal government by the exercise of the taxing power has settled the question by taxing out of existence all state banks of circulation.

In the case of the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1, certain acts of the legislature of Georgia, with