SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF OTHER WORLDS BY RICHARD A. PROCTOR. (From "Other Worlds than Ours.") [RICHARD ANTHONY PROCTOR: An English astronomer and author; born in Chelsea, March 23, 1837; died in New York city, September 12, 1888. He was educated at St. John's College, Cambridge, read law for a time, and from 1863 devoted himself to the study of astronomy and mathematics. He afterward taught in private schools, lectured, and traveled, settling in America in 1881. His published volumes are fifty-seven in number. Among the more notable are "Other Worlds than Ours" (1870), "The Orbs around Us" (1872), "The Borderland of Science" (1873), "Myths and Marvels of Astronomy " (1877), "The Universe of Stars" (1878), “The Poetry of Astronomy (1880), "Familiar Science Studies" (1882), "The Seasons" (1885), and "Halfhours with the Stars" (1887). His greatest work, “New and Old Astronomy," was left unfinished at the time of his death, and was completed by Arthur Cowper Ranyard, being published in 1892.] It is a peculiarity of the subject of other worlds than ours that it suggests, more strikingly than any other, certain difficulties in connection with conceptions as to supervision and control exercised over the universe. Let us consider definitely (even though we must be unable to conceive clearly or at all) the infinities we have to deal with. We know that space must be infinite. If the region amid which stars and nebulæ are scattered in inconceivable profusion be limited, if beyond lies on all sides a vast void, or if, instead, there be material bounds inclosing the universe of worlds on every hand, yet where are the limits of void or bound? Infinity of space, occupied or unoccupied, there must undoubtedly be. Of this infinity it has been finely said that its center is everywhere, its boundary nowhere. Now, whether within this infinity of space there be an infinity of matter is a question which we cannot so certainly answer. Only, if we were to accept this as certain, that the proportion which unoccupied bears to occupied space cannot be infinitely great, a view which at least seems reasonable and probable, - then it would follow that matter as well as space must be infinite, since any finite proportion of infinity must itself also be infinite. Time also must undoubtedly be infinite. If the portion of time which has hitherto been, or which will hereafter be, occupied with the occurrence of events (of whatever sort) were pre ceded and will be followed by a vast void interval, yet there can be neither beginning nor end to either of those bounding voids. Infinity of time, occupied or unoccupied, there must undoubtedly be. And though it is not possible for us to know certainly that there has been no beginning, or that there will be no end to that portion of time which is occupied with the occurrence of events (of whatever sort), yet it appears so unreasonable to conceive that unoccupied time bears an infinitely great proportion to occupied time that we seem led to the conclusion that occupied time is infinite — or, more definitely, that there has been no beginning and will be no end to the sequence of events throughout the infinitely extended universe. Now to conceive of limits to the wisdom and power of One whose realm is infinite in extent and in duration is obviously to conclude that the Ruler is infinitely incompetent to rule over His kingdom; for there can be no relation between the finite and the infinite save the relation of infinite disproportion. Senses such as we have we can no more attribute to such a Ruler than we can assign to Him hands and feet. Nor can we conceive in what way He can be cognizant of material processes which we only recognize through their material effects. Yet we can scarcely conceive of Him as other than cognizant of all those processes by which our senses can be affected. But before considering the nature of such a Being's supervision of His universe, we may proceed a step further. The senses we possess are sufficient to indicate to us the possible existence of senses not merely far more acute, but of a wholly different kind. By the sense of touch, for instance, we can indeed recognize the feeling of heat; but it is easy to conceive of a sense (analogous to that by which light is made to teach us of the aspect of external objects) enabling men to judge of the figure, substance, internal structure, and other qualities of an object by the action of the heat waves proceeding from it. Or again, electricity, instead either of light or of heat, might be the means of communicating intelligence as to the qualities of objects. We can conceive also of a sense bearing the same analogy to sight that the spectroscope bears to the telescope. And a hundred kinds of sense, or in other words a hundred modes of receiving intelligence about what exists or is going on around us, might be readily conceived. Yet once more, we know that reason is able to range beyond the action of the senses. Man is able to assure himself that events have happened which yet have produced no direct effect upon any of his senses. By the exercise of reason he becomes as well assured of such events as though they had actually passed before his eyes. An analogous power, but infinite in degree, infinitely rapid in its operation, and infinite in the extent of space and time over which it ranges, we may conceive to be possessed by a true Ruler over the universe. And now let us notice some of the conclusions to which these considerations tend. Let us first deal with the teachings of that sense which is the most far reaching of all the faculties given to man - the sense of sight. In a little treatise called "The Stars and the Earth," published anonymously several years since, some results of modern discoveries respecting light were dealt with in a very interesting manner. I propose to follow the path of thought indicated in that treatise, as a fitting introduction to wider conceptions of supervision and control over the universe. We know from Römer's researches, and even more surely from the phenomenon termed the aberration of the fixed stars, that light does not travel with infinite velocity. Its speed is indeed so enormous that, compared with every form of motion with which we are familiar, the velocity of light appears infinitely great. In a single second light traverses a space equal to eight times the circumference of the earth; and therefore in traveling from any visible object on the earth to the eye of a terrestrial observer, light occupies a space of time indefinitely short. Yet even as regards such objects as these, light has occupied a real interval of time, however minute, in reaching the eye; insomuch that we see objects not as they are at the moment we perceive them, but as they were the minutest fraction of a second before. Raising our eyes from the earth to regard the celestial objects, we find, in place of the indefinitely minute interval before considered, a really appreciable space of time occupied by light in carrying to us information as to the condition of those distant orbs. From the moon light takes little more than a second and a quarter in reaching us; so that we obtain sufficiently early information of the condition of our satellite. But light occupies more than eight minutes in reaching us from the sun; a longer or shorter interval in traveling to us from Mercury, Venus, and Mars, according to the position of |