penalty of the law? The answer must be, either that the sin of impenitence is so great as to deserve this severe treatment, or the merit of repentance is such as to atone for the greatest sins. But supposing that impenitence draws after it deeper guilt than all other sins, that does not prove that this alone should be punished; it only proves that it should be punished more. If there be a plain principle in jurisprudence, it is, that every sin should certainly be visited with punishment, but exactly according to its nature. There is no reason why a less sin should be suffered to pass rather than a greater. Strict justice says, let every sin have its due retribution. The greatness of the sin of impenitence, therefore, cannot be a reason why the impenitent alone are to be punished. Nor can this great difference in the treatment of sinners be owing to the merit of repentance; for it would be difficult to tell wherein its extraordinary merit consists. It must either be in the obedience or the suffering involved in the exercise of repentance. But` it cannot consist in the degree of obedience which it contains; for if this were perfect, it could do no more than answer the demands of the moral law for the time being, but could have no effect on sins already committed. I think it a self-evident truth, that my obedience this moment cannot atone or satisfy for my disobedience the preceding moment; for I do no more than my duty. Then certainly the obedience included in repentance cannot atone for all past sins, however enormous, for it is imperfect, and moreover has nothing in it which enhances its value above other acts of obedience. Neither can the suffering involved in repentance atone for past sins; for these pangs of compunction owe all their virtue to the obedience with which they are connected, and without which they would not even be of a moral nature. Unless some one should be of opinion, that these penitential sorrows are to be considered as an equivalent for the penalty of the law: but this cannot be correct, because an equivalent for the penalty of the law would be an equal degree and duration of suffer

ing. If indeed a person of higher dignity and greater worth is permitted to suffer in the place of another, in proportion to the difference in dignity, the sufferings may be diminished. It is, however, always a matter in the breast of the Supreme Judge, whether to allow of such a substitution. I see nothing unreasonable in it. But in the case under inquiry, the same person who owes the suffering, if I may so speak, endures the sorrows of repentance; and how, I would ask, can the pious grief of a few hours or days be an equivalent for the punishment of the most heinous transgressions? Besides, the penitent sinner ever feels, and is ready to confess, that he deserves other punishment. No one who ever truly repented, entertained the idea that by this he had made a complete atonement for his sins. These stains are of too deep a dye to be washed out by a few penitential tears. Nothing can be more opposed to this opinion than the views and feelings involved in the exercises of true repentance. Every true penitent is deeply convinced, that he deserves heavier punishment than is involved in the sorrows which he now experiences.

There is, however, one ground for the opinion, that there is a reasonable connexion between repentance and forgiveness, perhaps more plausible than any other argument; it therefore merits a distinct consideration. It is, that all good men acknowledge that it is a virtue to forgive those who offend us, when they appear to be penitent; and Christians cannot deny that this is a part of moral duty, for it is repeatedly and emphatically enjoined in the New Testament, as a thing essential. What is here alleged we fully admit, and are willing to go further and say, that it is made the duty of Christians to forgive those who injure them, whether they repent or not; for they are required to "love their enemies, to do good to them that hate them, to bless them that curse them, and pray for them which despitefully use them." But this is entirely a distinct case, and resting on principles entirely different from the one under consideration.

It is no part of the duty of

Christians to inflict condign punishment on those who sin, even if they have been injured by them. They are forbidden to seek revenge, or to render to the wicked according to their iniquities; not because there is any thing improper or inconsistent with moral goodness in punishing the guilty as they deserve; but because this is the peculiar prerogative of the Governor of the universe. In those very passages of Scripture where vengeance is forbidden to the creature, in express and emphatical language it is claimed for the Almighty. "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord; therefore, if thine enemy hunger, feed him, if he thirst, give him drink, for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head." If this duty of forgiveness in the Christian proved any thing, it would prove more than is wished; it would follow, that God would certainly pardon not only the penitent, but all sinners, however obstinate in their rebellion. But this conclusion is altogether at variance with the opinion which we have had under discussion, and is not even held by the deist.

Another argument in favour of the doctrine that repentance is naturally connected with pardon, is derived from the practice of granting pardon in human governments. But here there is a mistake respecting the real state of the fact; for although it is true that in all human governments, it is found expedient to have a pardoning power lodged somewhere, yet no government ever yet professed to act on the principle of pardoning all offences on the condition of repentance; nor indeed is the extension of mercy to certain criminals, who have incurred the penalty of the law, at all connected with this principle. The reason why it is sometimes right to pardon offences against the state, is either because, in some particular case, the rigid execution of law would not be entirely just; or, because on account of the number of persons implicated, sound policy may dictate that only the most guilty should be held up as an example. It appears, then, that the weakness of human governments is the ground on which the penalty of

the law is remitted; but no such reason can exist in the divine government. In the execution of human laws, no inquiry is ever instituted whether the criminal be penitent; nay, though his repentance should be most evident, this never disarms the law of its penalty. The penitent thief or murderer is punished by our laws, as well as the obstinate and impenitent. If in a few cases rulers who possessed the power of granting pardon have acted on the principle, that criminals who discovered signs of penitence should be on that account pardoned, it only proves, that men entrusted with power may be misled; for undoubtedly this principle carried out would soon be subversive of all law. If the only end of punishment were the good of the culprit, then, indeed, such a course might be defended; but as long as the good of the community is the chief end of punishment, it never can be safe to offer pardon to all who profess repentance, or who for a time appear to be reformed.

I think it is manifest from the preceding discussion, that the idea of a certain connexion between repentance and pardon in the moral government of God, is not derived from the light of nature, but from the gospel; and therefore, if pardon is to be had in this way, it is only on the ground of the atonement of Christ, and not on account of any merit or efficacy in repentance to take away the guilt of sin.

If these views are correct, then is a divine revelation absolutely necessary to teach us that God is willing to receive the penitent into favour, and to show on what terms this is practicable.

Hence we may learn the deplorable situation of our whole race, and the infinite obligations which we are under to God for the gospel. All our wellgrounded hopes of pardon and salvation we owe to the free mercy of God in Christ, and to the expiatory efficacy of the great atonement

THERE IS NOTHING IMPROBABLE OR UNREASONABLE IN THE IDEA OF A REVELATION FROM GOD, AND CONSEQUENTLY NOTHING IMPROBABLE OR UNREASONABLE IN SUCH A MANIFEST DIVINE INTERPOSITION, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A REVELATION.

THAT a revelation is possible, will not be called in question by any who believe in the existence of a God; nor can it be believed that there is any thing in the notion of a revelation repugnant to the moral attributes of the Supreme Being. It cannot be inconsistent with the wisdom, goodness or holiness of God, to increase the knowledge of his intelligent creatures. The whole end of a revelation is to make men wiser, better, and happier; and what can be conceived more accordant with our ideas of divine perfection than this?

That man is capable of receiving benefit from a revelation is a truth so evident, that it would be folly to spend time in demonstrating it; for whatever may be thought of the sufficiency of Natural Religion if it were fully understood and improved, all must admit, that men, generally, have not been sufficiently enlightened on the subject of religion. The history of the world in all ages proves the deplorable ignorance of the greater part of the human race, even on those subjects which the advocates of Natural Religion confess to be most important and fundamental, as has been proved in the preceding chapter.

It cannot be thought an unreasonable supposition, that when God made the original progenitors of our race, he should furnish them with such knowledge as was absolutely necessary, not only for their comfort but for their preservation. As they were without experience, and had none upon earth from whom they could derive instruction, is it unreasonable to