suppose, that the beneficent Creator communicated to them such a stock of knowledge as was requisite for the common purposes of life? The theory of those who suppose that man was at first a dumb, irrational animal, very little different from those which now roam the forest, that from this state he emerged by his own exertions, that he invented articulate speech and all the arts of life, without ever receiving any aid or any revelation from his Creator, has already been sufficiently refuted.

Men

If then man received at first such ideas as were necessary to his condition, this was a revelation; and if afterwards he should at any time need information on any subject connected with his happiness, why might not the benevolent Creator, who does not abandon the work of his hands, again vouchsafe to make a communication to him? Such an exigency, deists themselves being judges, did arise. almost universally fell into the practice of idolatry, and lost the knowledge of the true God. They betook themselves to the worship of the luminaries of heaven, dead men, beasts, and inanimate things. They invented superstitious rites, not only irrational, but cruel and abominable. These were transmitted from generation to generation; and the children. became still more involved in ignorance than their parents. That the righteous Governor of the universe may leave men to follow their own inventions, and suffer by their own folly, is certain; for he has done so. But is it not consistent with his wisdom and goodness to use extraordinary means to rescue them from a state so degraded and wretched? Would not every sober deist admit, that some means of bringing them back to just ideas of Natural Religion would be desirable? If then the apostasy of man from his Maker should render some further revelation necessary, would it not be highly benevolent to communicate whatever knowledge his circumstances required? Why should it be thought unreasonable, that God should sometimes depart from his common mode of acting, to answer great and valuable ends?

What is there in the established course of nature so sacred or so immutable, that it must never on any occasion or for any purpose be changed? The only reason why the laws of nature are uniform, is, that this is for the benefit of man, but if his interest requires a departure from the regular course, what is there to render it unreasonable? The author of the universe has never bound himself to pursue one undeviating course, in the government of the world. The time may come when he may think proper to change the whole system. As he gave it a beginning, he may also give it an end. General uniformity is expedient, that men may know what to expect, and may have encouragement to use means to obtain necessary ends; but occasional and unfrequent deviations from this uniformity have no tendency to prevent the benefit arising from it. This is so evident a truth that I am almost ashamed to dwell so long upon it; but by the sophistry of infidels a strange darkness has been thrown over the subject, so that it seems to be thought that there would be something immoral, or unwise and inconsistent, in contravening the laws of nature.

Let it be remembered that the object here is not to prove that there must be a revelation; it is only to show that there would be nothing unreasonable in the thing; and further, that it would be a very desirable thing for man, and altogether consistent with the perfections of God, and the principles on which he governs the world.

If God should determine to reveal his will to man, how could this be most conveniently effected? We can conceive of two ways. The first, by inspiring all who needed knowledge with the ideas which he wished to communicate; the second, by inspiring a few persons, and directing them to make known to others the truths received. The first would seem to be the most effectual, but the last is more analogons to his other dispensations. Reason might have been given in perfection at once, and not left to the uncertainty of education and human improvement;

but such is not the fact. By slow degrees and much culture this faculty attains its maturity, and when neglected never acquires any high degree of strength. In regard to the best mode of making a revelation, however, we are totally incompetent to judge; but of one thing we may be certain, that if God should give a revelation to men, he would so attest it as to enable all sincere inquirers to know that it derives its origin from him; for otherwise it would be useless, as there would be no evidence of its truth. Supposing a revelation to be given, what would be a satisfactory attestation of its divine origin? It must be some sign or evidence not capable of being counterfeited; something by which God should in some way manifest himself. And how could this be effected, but by the exertion of his power or the manifestation of his infinite knowledge; that is, by miracles, or by prophecies, or by both? There is then just as much probability that miracles will exist, (for prophecy may be considered one kind of miracle) as that a revelation will be given. The conjunction of these two things is reasonable; if we find the one, we may be sure the other exists also.

It is admitted that a revelation from God would have internal evidence of its origin, but this does not strike the attention at once. It requires time before it can be perceived; but in the first establishment of a revelation, there is need of some evidence which is obvious to the senses and level to the capacities of all. Just such an evidence are miracles. Moreover, internal evidence requires, in order that it may be perceived and appreciated, a certain favourable state of the moral feelings, without which it is apt to be overlooked, and produces no conviction; whereas, external evidence is not only level to every capacity, but adapted to bring home conviction to every description of men, to the bad as well as the good.

Miracles, then, furnish the best proof for the establishment of a revelation; they seem to be its proper seal; they are the manifest attestation of God. Nothing can be conceived which will more strikingly

indicate his power and presence, than a visible suspension of the laws of nature. He is invisible: he must make himself known by his works, and a miracle is such a work as no other can perform. When, therefore, a person professes to have received a revelation from God, and when we behold the effects of Almighty power accompanying his words, all are sure that God is with him, and that he is a teacher sent from God; for otherwise he could never perform such wonderful works; or rather, to speak more correctly, God would never exert his power to confirm the pretensions of an impostor, or to attest doctrines which are not true.

CHAPTER VI.

MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM TESTIMONY.

A

I Do not know that any one has denied that a miracle would be credible if exhibited to our senses. man might, indeed, be deceived by an illusion arising from some disorder in his senses; but if he were conscious of being in a sound state of body and mind, and should witness not only one, but a variety of miracles; not only a few times, but for years in succession; and if he should find that all around him had the same perceptions of these facts as himself, I need not say that it would be reasonable to credit his senses, for the constitution of his nature would leave him no choice: he would be under the necessity of believing what he saw with his eyes, heard with his ears, and handled with his hands. But are there' facts which a man would credit on the evidence of his senses, which cannot possibly be rendered credible by the testimony of any number of witnesses? Then there might be facts, the knowledge of which could never be so communicated as to be worthy of

credit. According to this hypothesis, the constitution of our nature would require us to withhold our assent from what was true, and from what others knew to be true. If a thousand persons of the strictest veracity should testify that they had repeatedly witnessed a miracle, and if all circumstances should concur to corroborate their testimony, yet upon this principle it would be unreasonable to credit them, even if they should consent to die in confirmation of what they declared to be the fact. This is the ground taken by Mr. Hume, in his boasted argument against miracles. But it appears to me that every man, even before examination, must be convinced that it is false; for it is contrary to common sense and universal experience of the effect of testimony. The true principle on this subject is, that any fact which would be believed on the evidence of the senses, may be reasonably believed on sufficient testimony. There may be testimony of such a nature as to produce conviction as strong as any other conceivable evidence; and such testimony in favour of a miracle would establish it as firmly as if we had witnessed it ourselves. But though this is the conclusion of common sense and experience, the metaphysical argument of Mr. Hume has had the effect of perplexing and unsettling the minds of many: and as he boasts that "it will be useful to overthrow miracles as long as the world endures," it seems necessary to enter into an examination of his argument, that we may be able to expose its fallacy. This has already been done in a convincing manner, by several men,* eminent for their learning and discrimination; and if their works. were read by all who peruse Hume, I should think it unnecessary to add a single word on the subject. But it may not be without its use to present a refutation in a condensed form, for the sake of those who will not take the trouble to go through a minute and extended demonstration.

The argument of Mr. Hume will be best exhibited in his own words. "A miracle," says he, "support

* Dr. Campbell, Prof. Vince, Mr. Adam, Dr. Douglas.