1862.] MCCLELLAN PROCRASTINATES. 267 through the day and evening, and Franklin does not move. * We are On the morning of the 28th, Halleck adopts new tactics, and writes to Franklin that he parted with McClellan at two o'clock that morning, and that it was understood Franklin was to move to-day. That if he had not received McClellan's order he should act on this. At 1.05 P.M. McClellan telegraphs Halleck, that "The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go." And he thinks the enemy so strong "as to make it necessary for us to move in force." To this Halleck replies that, "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced." At 7.30 P.M. General McClellan telegraphs to Halleck, "General Franklin is with me here (Alexandria). not yet in a condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning." And he again proceeds to urge the garrisoning of the works in front of Washington. In answer to a dispatch from Halleck, he telegraphs him at 6.15 P.M., "Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move or fight a battle. It would be sacrifice to send them out now. * * I repeat that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field; and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to say, will be carried out." Extraordinary condescension! For nearly two days the General-in-Chief had been ordering and pleading that his subordinate would dispatch General Franklin to the assistance of his brother officer, known to be engaged with Lee's entire army, and upon the issue of the pending battles incalculable results were known to depend, and now, at the last moment, Halleck is told that neither Franklin nor Sumner can move. Neither of these corps had fired a gun since the first day of July. They had come up leisurely from Harrison's Landing— most of the way by transports, and now, in this great emergency, were unfit for service, in the judgment of General McClellan. It was a most discouraging business to attempt to get McClellan to throw any of his army towards Manassas, but Halleck persevered, and at 8.40 P.M., telegraphed, "There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas. They must go tomorrow morning, ready or not ready." McClellan answers this peremptory order, by a long telegram, in which he reiterates the statement as to want of horses, &c., but says, "Franklin has been ordered to march at six o'clock to-morrow morning." He then informed Halleck that he has learned that the enemy "with 120,000 men, intend advancing on the forts at Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view to attacking Washington and Baltimore." McClellan seems to have assumed from the first that Pope was to be overcome, and he talks as though no other result were possible. With an army only half as large as the one with which McClellan had made the Peninsula Campaign, and confronted, as he was, by the army which had vanquished McClellan, it was but natural the latter should expect a similar misfortune to befall Pope. Did he wish it? McClellan foresaw that a victory for Pope would place him at the head of the army; that Pope's defeat, and the advance of the Confederate army toward Washington, would force the Government to have recourse to himself, and would result in his restoration to power, if not in his reinvestment with authority, as General-in-Chief. It is hazarding nothing to say, in the light of known facts, that an immediate and cordial co-operation of General McClellan's army would have changed the defeat of the second Bull Run into a victory for the Union arms. Franklin did really set out on the morning of the 29th of August. But McClellan was continually telegraphing Halleck to induce him to allow a suspension 1862.] MCCLELLAN'S IDEA OF OBEYING ORDERS. 269 of the movement. At 12.08 P.M. he asks, "Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue ?" Again: "Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in a condition to accomplish much, if he meets strong opposition. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night." Again, at 12.50 P.M." Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance ?"" At 1.45 he telegraphs that he thinks Franklin ought not to go beyond Anandale. Halleck replies that he wants him to go far enough to find out something about the enemy, and adds, "Our people must move more actively and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses." Franklin had gone but six miles. President Lincoln, now, at 2.40 P.M., telegraphs to McClellan for news, and in reply McClellan gives what news he has, which is very meagre, and then adds: "I am clear one of two courses should be adopted; first, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once to use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.' Then comes the key to all this diplomacy: "Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are." : At 7.50 P.M. of the 29th, Halleck telegraphs McClellan "I have just been told Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders." McClellan replies that he did not think it safe for Franklin to go beyond Anandale, until he knew what was at Vienna. That he is responsible for the halting of the corps and Franklin's presence in Alexandria, but did not suppose it was contrary to orders. He then adds: "Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements to-morrow." As though McClellan misunderstood the wishes of the General-in-Chief. As though he did not know, even without orders, that Franklin's place was at the front. As though he and his subordinates did not know it was treason to their Government, and to their brother soldiers in the field, to hold the splendid troops of Franklin in the leash, almost in sound of the cannon, while a three days' battle was raging but a few miles away. Franklin did finally advance, but reached Centreville only in time to meet Pope's retreating army, on the evening of the 30th day of August, twenty-seven days after McClellan had been ordered to withdraw from the Peninsula, and four days after he had been directed to send Franklin from Alexandria to the battle, a little more than a day's march away, and with railroad communication to within six miles of the battle-field. The foregoing narrative can leave no doubt upon any unprejudiced mind, that McClellan was resolved not to aid Pope, if he could help it, and save his own position in the army. In this unworthy purpose, McClellan had the sympathy of a certain set of his corps and division commanders, and Fitz-John Porter belonged to that set. CHAPTER XIX. THE WOUNDED LEFT ON THE FIELD-DIFFICULTY IN FINDING WAY BACK TO LINES-LOSSES ON THE TWENTY-NINTH-ENEMY BELIEVED TO BE RETREATING-WHAT INDUCED THIS OPINION-FEDERALS EXHAUSTEDHOW MCCLELLAN WAS GOING TO SEND SUPPLIES TO POPE-OPERATIONS ON THE THIRTIETH-RICKETT'S-"ENEMY IN FULL FLIGHT”—A SAD MISTAKE-PATRICK'S BRIGADE ATTACK-REPULSED-ORDERED TO RETIRE ARMY IN RETREAT-PRATT MORTALLY WOUNDED—”TWENTIETH," HALT AT CUB RUN-MARCH INTO CENTREVILLE NEXT MORNING. THE brunt of the attack by King's division, on the evening of the 29th, was borne by Hatch's brigade, which suffered severely. The enemy were found strongly posted in the edge of the woods, and their artillery and musketry fire was murderous to the Union troops, who had to cross a broad, open field from the Federal line up to the very muzzle of the rebel guns. The repulse was so severe and the position so exposed that it was impossible to remove our wounded, and they lay all that night and through the next day, between the lines and in view of both sides, unable to help themselves and beyond the help of their comrades. The poor fellows would signal for aid during the 30th, but it would have been death to approach them from our side. The twenty-four hours during which they lay on the field, suffering from wounds and dying of thirst, with the roar of battle in their ears and shells rushing over and bursting around them, must have seemed an eternity of misery. The red trousers of the Brooklyn Fourteenth were conspicuous among the dead and wounded. It was late in the evening when the division of King got back into its position in line of battle; the night had become excessively dark, and the utmost difficulty was experienced in finding our way. While pausing |