1863.]

LEE WAS OBLIGED TO FIGHT.

407

it is not probable that Lee expected the impending battle would be fought at that particular locality. The role that he was now playing compelled him to fight wherever the Federal army offered battle. He was a great distance from his base, and in a hostile country, and his communications were liable to be interrupted at any moment. He knew the Federal army was growing in numbers daily, and the militia were gathering in great force to oppose his progress eastward. To attempt to retire with no other achievements than the insignificant skirmishes and the inconsiderable spoils which had thus far signalized his march, would have seemed pusillanimous; besides, the Federal army was now so near his line of retreat that it was not possible to retire without having his flank and rear exposed to almost certain attack. He must, therefore, fight; and the sooner the two armies were brought into collision, the better for the Confederates. Meade could afford to wait; Lee could not. It is very probable that the rapid march of the Army of the Potomac had surprised the Confederate commander. He knew that his strategy had misled Hooker, and detained the army at Falmouth a full week after he had set all his corps but Hill's in motion for the North; and his information seems to have been less prompt than usual as to the operations of his adversary after he began his march. This is manifest from the following statement in General Lee's report of the Gettysburg campaign: "Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; but, on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout that the Federal Army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains." General Lee had been deprived of the

source from which his information chiefly came as to his opponent's movements, by a singular disposition of the main body of his cavalry, under Stuart himself, who was the brains and spirit of that arm of the Confederate service. He had been dispatched to watch Hooker; and, if possible, to impede his passage of the Potomac. He was then to cross himself, and take his proper position on the right flank of Lee's advancing columns, presenting a barrier to the Union cavalry, and giving information of the movements and positions of Meade's columns. But Stuart failed, on this occasion, to comprehend the situation; and, having advanced to Fairfax Court House, he faced to the northward, and crossed the Potomac at Seneca, forty miles below the point at which the Army of the Potomac had crossed, and consequently found himself on the right flank of the Union Army, and that entire army between himself and Lee. It was in his endeavor to pass the head of the Federal columns that he reached Hanover, and encountered Kilpatrick and Custer. He expected to find Ewell at Carlisle, whither he went, but did not reach that place till the first of July, and then Ewell was drawing up his forces around the northeast side of Gettysburg, and thither Stuart followed him.

On the night of the 30th of June, Meade issued orders for the movement of the army on the next day. The First, Third and Eleventh Corps constituted the left wing of the Army-nearest the enemy-and was under command of General Reynolds, who was directed to move on Gettysburg. The Fifth and Twelfth Corps were to march to Two Taverns and Hanover; the Second Corps, with headquarters, to Taneytown, and the Sixth Corps to Manchester. These dispositions go far to show that General Meade had no expectation of a general battle at Gettysburg, for the result was to increase the distance between some of the corps and that place. Probably General Meade knew little or nothing about

1863.]

WHAT IT SHOWS.

409

the strategical advantage of that position; and that the great battle which was fought there was the result of chance rather than of design upon the part of either commander.

CHAPTER XXX.

-HILL

GETTYSBURG-REBELS HOVERING AROUND IT-REYNOLDS ON MARSH CREEK AND LONGSTREET NEAR BY QUESTION AS TO STRENGTH OF ARMIES-DID EITHER COMMANDER KNOW OF THE OTHER'S PROXIMITY-LEE DID NOT EXPECT TO FIGHT AT GETTYSBURG NEITHER LEE NOR MEADE KNEW OF THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OF GETTYSBURG-REYNOLDS KNEW THE ENEMY WERE IN CONSIDERABLE FORCE NEAR HIM-PLEASONTON-BUFORD-DEVIN.

GETTYSBURG lies upon the north slope of a hill which rises in its immediate rear, some four hundred and eighty feet above the valley, just north of the town, through which flows a rivulet called "Stevens' Run." The contour of this hill is not unlike a fishing-hook, and taking this familiar figure as a guide, we will briefly describe it. Turning the apex of the convex bend so it will point due north, it will embrace "Cemetery Hill." Standing now, with your back towards Gettysburg, and your eye following the course of the hook on your left and to the southward, and towards its point, you find it crosses a slight depression a few hundred rods from the apex of the bend, and then begins to rise until it attains the top of "Culp's Hill," and passing that, terminates at the point, on "McAllister's Hill." The distance from on this side the hook is a little less than two miles. Along the base of this hilly ridge runs "Rock Creek," and on the east side of it, opposite "McAllister's Hill," abruptly rises another bluff, which swells into "Wolf Hill," at a short distance from the creek, and then continues in a high ridge toward the northeast, for a considerable distance. Turning now to the other side of the hook, you will first observe that it is a mile longer than the left side, and is more uniform in its course, but characterized by the same general outlines. A few hundred rods from the apex of the bend is a bluff, rising higher than "Ceme

1863.]

GETTYSBURG.

411

tery Hill," then follows a depression for a distance of half a mile, where the ridge is but twenty feet above the bed of "Stevens' Run;" then the ground rises again in a bold rocky ledge into "Little Round Top," and making another ascent culminates in "Round Top." The distance across, from point to shank, is about two and a half miles, and the circumference about five miles. Within the hook the ground is low and tolerably level, but as you approach the bend it becomes hilly, and finally rises abruptly into "Cemetery Hill." The Baltimore Pike and the Taneytown Road enter Gettysburg, through the level space within the hook, and cross it at the bend.

66

Retaining the same position but looking to the north, Gettysburg lies at your feet, extending from near the top of Cemetery Hill to the foot of the valley, through which flows Stevens' Run," and which empties into Rock Creek, a mile northeast of the village. This valley curves around the point of the hill, on the slope of which the town stands, and follows the conformation of the fishing-hook until it is interrupted by the opposing ridge of Wolf Hill. Still looking to the north, right over the tops of the houses on the westerly side of Gettysburg, and about a mile from where you stand, you see a ridge on the farther side of the valley, running nearly north and south, but much lower than the Cemetery Hill. On this ridge stands the Lutheran Seminary, and the ridge itself is called "Seminary Ridge." Beyond this, at short intervals, plain ridge and valley succeed each other, until the South Mountain range terminates the scene. To the northward and to the right and left, the landscape was fair to look upon on the first day of July, 1863. Woods, rich in their summer foliage, stood as a glowing and animate frame-work around the cultivated fields and the rural village which was soon to become famous as the scene of the greatest battle of modern times. The Emmetsburg road starts from the