CHAPTER XXXIV.

THIRD DAY AT GETTYSBURG-EXPULSION OF LAST NIGHT'S INTRUDERS— POSITION OF ULSTER GUARD AND ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PENNSYLVANIA-STANNARD'S BRIGADE-ARTILLERY FIRE-CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES-STANNARD'S MEN BUILD A BREASTWORK-LEAVE OPENING ON RIGHT OF ULSTER GUARD-A TERRIFIC BOMBARDMENT -THE INFANTRY COME FORWARD-OPENING OF MUSKETRY FIRE-THE ENEMY FACE TO THE LEFT-CORRESPONDING MOVEMENTS BY ULSTER GUARD AND ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST-THE FIGHT FOR THE BLUFF ENEMY REPULSED-HEAVY LOSS IN KILLED, WOUNDED AND PRISONERS-COLONEL HODGES-FOURTEENTH VIRGINIA-LOSSES-LET

TER TO GENERAL DOUBLEDAY-MR. BACHELDER'S MAP INCORRECTGENERAL DOUBLEDAY'S REPLY-LETTER FROM GENERAL HARDENBURG -OPERATIONS OF FIRST DAY-SECOND AND THIRD DAYS-THE EAGLE FROM THE ULSTER GUARD COLOR STAFF-A RIDICULOUS PRETENCEA PROMISE TO INVESTIGATE THAT WAS NOT KEPT-GENERAL DOUBLEDAY'S ORDER.

To allow the enemy to retain his hold upon a section of the line which he had carried the night before was to give him an entering wedge with which he might possibly disrupt the entire right wing. The first thing to be done then was to expel him at any cost, and that too before he could take advantage of his position. At early dawn our artillery opened a terrific cannonade upon Johnson's men, which was kept up until half-past five, when the divisions of Williams and Geary, and the brigade of Shaler, advanced to the attack. The enemy had been greatly strengthened at this point during the night and when our guns opened at four o'clock in the morning, were themselves preparing to press on through our line and dash in between the wings of the army. The intruders made a desperate resistance, and for four hours the infantry struggle was fierce and deadly. At the end of that time Geary's division rushed upon the

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ULSTER GUARD AND 151ST PENN.

463

enemy with the bayonet and drove them out of the works, and the Union line was re-established.

The following narrative of the operations of the 151st Pennsylvania and the "Ulster Guard,” is taken from the official report of their commanding officer:

"About 5 P.M., on the second of July, the brigade was ordered to the left centre to support the Third corps. Two regiments only of the brigade, (the 20th N. Y. S. M., and the 151st Pa. Vol., the latter under command of Captain Owens), reached the front line, where they were halted on the last and lowest of the ridges running nearly north and south between the Taneytown and Emmettsburg roads. Some 350 yards on our right was a bluff, on which were standing a few trees and a battery. The trees on the westerly face of the bluff had been felled to clear a range for the guns. A rail fence stood at the foot of the bluff and extended along the ridge southerly. A little in advance and to our left, was a small grove. The ground in front descended gradually to a little valley, wet and marshy, and then by a corresponding ascent reached the Emmettsburg road and the position occupied by the enemy. Some 300 yards in rear of me was a ridge running parallel to the one I was on, but much higher. On my right was one regiment of Stannard's brigade; on my left two others, and one in rear and partly to my left. Receiving no orders, and finding myself the senior officer of the brigade present, I assumed command of the two regiments, and in the course of the evening, constructed a breast-work of the fence heretofore mentioned, and of such other material as could be found.

"About 5 A.M., on the third, the enemy opened with artillery, and for some time kept up a brisk fire upon our position. This finally ceased, and until about 1 P.M., no further firing took place on this part of the line. During this interval the Vermont troops threw up a breastwork to my left, and about one hundred feet in advance

of my line, masked by the small grove before mentioned. The regiment of that brigade on my right, took position in rear of this new work, leaving the space between my right and the bluff, on which the nearest battery was, uncovered. At one o'clock the enemy opened from his right centre battery, which was soon followed by all his guns on his right and centre, and the position occupied by my command was swept by a tempest of shot and shell from upwards of a hundred guns for nearly two hours. Then the cannonading subsided and the enemy's infantry debouched from the orchard and woods on his right centre, and moved in two lines of battle across the fields towards the position I have described. Our skirmishers (from the Vermont brigade) fell back before them, and sought cover behind the breastworks on my left. The enemy came forward rapidly, and began firing as soon as they were within range of our men. When they had approached within about two hundred feet of the bottom of the valley heretofore mentioned, the troops of my command opened a warm fire upon them. Almost immediately, the first line faced by the left flank, and moved at a double-quick up the valley and towards Gettysburg. The second line followed the movement. Reaching a position opposite the bluff, they faced to the right, and moved forward rapidly in line of battle. Perceiving that their purpose was to gain the bluff, I moved my command by the right flank up to the foot of the bluff, delivering our fire as we marched, and keeping between the enemy and the object of his enterprise. He succeeded in reaching the fence at the foot of the bluff, but with ranks broken, and his men evidently disheartened. Some succeeded in getting over the fence into the slashing, from which and behind the fence they kept up a murderous fire. The men were now within quarter pistol range; and as the fence and fallen trees gave the enemy considerable cover, I ordered the 20th,

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FIGHT FOR THE BLUFF-HEAVY LOSS.

465

N. Y. S. M., and the 151st Pa. Vol., to advance to the fence, which they did, cheering and in gallant style, and poured a volley into the enemy at very short range, who now completely broke, and those who did not seek to escape by flight threw down their arms. Very few of those who fled reached their own lines. Many turned, after having run several rods, and surrendered themselves. We took a large number of prisoners, and the ground in front of us was strewn with their dead and wounded. During the latter part of this struggle, and after it ceased, the enemy's batteries played upon friend and foe alike. The troops engaged with us were Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps.

"Among the killed and wounded in my immediate front was Colonel Hodges, 14th Va., and seven line officers. Two colors were left upon the ground on our front by the enemy.

"This terminated the final and main attack upon our left centre. It was now nearly six o'clock, P. M., and my command was relieved by a portion of the Second corps, and withdrawn to the Taneytown road, where it remained through the night. It will thus be perceived that the two regiments I had the honor to command were either actually engaged with the enemy, or occupying a position in the front line from the beginning of the battle on the morning of July first, until its close on the evening of the third, excepting only about six hours on the second.

"My loss in killed and wounded was two-thirds of my officers and half of my men. I have no report of the casualties in the 151st Pa. Vol. They behaved with the utmost gallantry; and their loss was very heavy." The following letter was addressed to General Doubleday with reference to Mr. Bachelder's Map of the Battle of Gettysburg.

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HEADQUARTERS 20th N. Y. S. M.

Brandy Station, Va., Feb. 4, 1864.

Major-General ABNER DOUBLEDAY,

U. S. Volunteers.

DEAR GENERAL-Mr. Bachelder called on me a few evenings since, and exhibited the draft of his proposed map of the Battle of Gettysburg. I was sorry to find it wholly inaccurate in the position it assigns to my command on the 3d of July. He represents my regiment and the 151st Pa. Vols., (then under my command) as lying in rear of General Stannard's Brigade. The truth is the exact reverse of this. A portion of General Stannard's brigade was lying behind me, and at no time was there so much as a file of his command in front of me, saving only his skirmishers. One regiment of his brigade constructed a breast-work in the forenoon, to my left, and perhaps one hundred feet in advance of me, and in rear of the little grove, but in no wise covering my line.

Then again he has the space between my right and the bluff where the severest fighting along that part of the line took place, filled up with other troops. When the enemy made his attack there was not a man between my right flank and the bluff-a distance of three hundred yards.

I therefore moved my command over this interval to the bluff when it became apparent that that was the point of assault, and did so because there were no other troops there to defend it.

Whether Mr. Bachelder will make the proper corrections I do not know, but I desire to put you in possession of the facts, and with that view send you herewith a report covering every movement of my command, not only on the third, but during the three days ñighting, and it is accurate in every particular.