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Auftrians would be able to throw off the load with which they were oppreffed: but he found that their spirit, however ardent, could not supply the want of ftrength. He saw them fainting under infuperable labors; and that, though they were in no danger of being conquered by the valor of their enemies, they muft foon be wearied in their numbers. His majefty then knew, that by fending them fpeedy affiftance he promoted the intereft of his people, while he gratified his own inclinations in the fupport of injured royalty. On this account he sup plied his Auftrian ally with fuch fums as enabled her to levy new forces, and diftrefs her enemies: while, with his influence, he created her ufeful friends, and recon ciled fome of her potent foes. But to fecure the fuccefs that the queen of Hungary had obtained, and to take from the enemies of liberty all hopes of recovering the advantages they had loft, his majesty no longer confined his affiftance to tedious negotiations and pecuniary supplies: he knew that alliances are always beft obferved when they confer real fecurity, or produce manifeft advantage; and that money is not always equivalent to armies. Befides, her Hungarian majefty had requested, that a British army might appear on the continent in her. favor, because he had an high opinion of the terror and reputation of the British arms: therefore, his majefty acted openly in defence of his ally, filled Flanders once more with British troops, and garrifoned the frontier-towns by the forces of that nation by which they were acquired.

Thefe troops, on their arrival in Flanders, were too inconfiderable a body to commence hoftilities against the French; yet they manifefted the firm intention of

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his Britannic majefty to fupport the house of Auftria; they awed it's enemies, and encouraged it's friends; they alarmed France, obliged her to keep her forces within her own territories, made her apprehenfive of a defign on Dunkirk, and, by drawing her forces near that quarter, kept fo many troops from either relieving her own army in Bohemia, or the Spaniards in Italy: befides, by their fituation, these troops might be reinforced in fuch a manner as to form a potent army.

As foon as the British miniftry received intelligence of the defigns of France, to fend the army commanded by marfhal Maillebois from Weftphalia to the relief of Prague, the council immediately affembled to confult what was the most neceffary step to be taken on this important occafion; when it was determined" to affemble an army in Flanders, capable of acting offenfively against the French." For this purpose, there were already in that country fixteen thousand of the Britifh troops, who could be foon joined by the fix thoufand Heffians in British pay, and by twelve thousand Auftrians, which together would compofe a body of thirty four thousand men. But as fuch a force would be in-, capable of annoying the French, who could foon form a fuperior army in Flanders, it was refolved to take anather body of troops into British pay, to confift of fixteen thousand men, and thereby to augment the army, intended to be affembled in Flanders, to fifty thousand

men.

On July 12, the earl of Stair and Mr. Trevor prefented a mehorial to the States General, wherein they mentioned the refortification of Dunkirk, and in

fifted that the States fhould appoint commiffaries, in conjunction with others from Great Britain, to infpect thofe works, pursuant to the treaty of Utrecht,

At

At this time, by the calculation of regiments, there were twenty-three thousand men on the British establishment: fo that if fixteen thousand had been detached from thefe forces, there would then, if the regiments had been complete, have remained only feven thoufand men to protect the country, and which would not have been a man lefs than was maintained at home in the wars of queen Anne: but, as the regiments were extremely deficient, it was thought proper to raife the fixteen thoufand additional troops, as auxiliaries from fome of the foreign princes or powers. The Hanoverians were fixed on for many reafons *; and as they were fubje&s of the fame prince, whom they highly venerated, it was natural to imagine they would be faithful to him, and fupport his quarrel with a zeal which could never be expected from the mercenary troops of any other foreign power.

The electoral troops of Hanover were augmented to twenty eight thousand men, which were full as many

* Denmark, Pruffia, Saxony, Hanover,Holland and Switzerland, were the only powers that could furnish this force; and to the first three, and the last two, were many objections. The Danes were inclined to France; they had aiready broke through a fimilar engagement with Great Britain, by refufing to furnish the 12,000 men formerly contracted for, and were upon the point of engaging in a quarrel of their own, which would require all their force. The Pruffians, if they could be procured, were not to be depended upon at that time, when under the influence of France. The elector of Saxony was too apprehenfive of darger from the power and dcfign of Pruffia, to hazard his own fecu

C 3

rity in fuch precarious circum-
ftances, by fending out fo many
troops, when his Pruflian majesty
was daily collecting his armies.
The Dutch could not be folicited
for this purpofe, because if they
had found the British nation ready
to pay the Republican troops,
they would not have done it them-
felves; they would rot have ex-
erted their proper force, nor would
they have been induced to accord
with that alliance, which was o e
of the most principal reafons for
collecting fo great a force.
as to the Swifs canto: s, it was
impoffible to effect their march into
Flanders, having above 400 miles
to pass upon the borders of the
Rhine, expofed to the interruption
of France.

And

a's

as the revenue of the Elector could maintain at home, and greatly too numerous for that revenue to support the one half of them abroad; for the whole annual revenue of Hanover seldom exceeds four hundred and fifty thoufand pounds fterling. It was therefore refolved by the British ministry to take a body of Hanoverians into their pay, and a contract was concluded, whereby these troops were ftipulated to confift of five thousand five hundred and thirteen horfe, and ten thousand seven hundred and fifty five foot; in all fixteen thousand two hundred and fixty eight men; for which the British ministry was to allow the annual fum of five hundred and ninety two thoufand fix hundred and ninety feven pounds, for the pay of the forces; and for levy-money one hundred and thirty nine thousand three hundred and thirteen pounds fterling.

*

The campaign and negotiations in 1742, terminated quite contrary to the hopes and fyftem of the court of Verfailles. Saxony and Pruffia were disjoined from the

*This article of levy-money, in fuch treaties, is always meant for the furnishing and completing both horfe and foot. In other contracts, the customary fum for levymoney, in almost every inftance, was 8 crowns for each horfeman, 60 crowns for each dragoon, and 30 for each foot foldier. According to this computation, the 16,268 Hanoverians, furnished by this contract, fhould have been allowed for levy-money 171,796 1. which was 32,483 1. more than was charged by the contract and it was always ufual, in fuch treaties, for the furnishing prince or power, to receive a yearly fubfidy, befides other allowances, which were eneirely remitted by this contra&; and if infifted upon, according to

the proportion paid to the king of Sweden, who, befides levy-money and pay, received, for only 6,000 Heffians, the annual fubfidy of 33,000l. this for 16,000 Hanoverians, would have amounted to near 100,000l. a year; and, though omitted on the prefent occafion, this was an article which every other German prince had done, then did, and ever will infift upon, however arbitrary againft their fubfidients. But, to make this contract the more favourable, his Britannic majefty, in his electoral capacity, confented that their pay fhould commence only upon the day they began to march out of the electorate; infifting upon no terms, as to the time they should be retained in pay.

alliance

alliance of France, and with circumftances that promifed an impoffibility of their uniting again during the prefent contention. Bavaria was not only incapable of affording any material affiftance to the views of France, but actually a confiderable part of it in poffeffion of the Auftrians: two great armies of the veteran, troops of France totally deftroyed; difcafes and defpair the vifible companions of the remaining forces of the emperor and France, cooped up in Bavaria and a corner of Bohemia, in the utmost diftrefs for provifions, and not to be recruited until fpring: while the Auftrians, fuperior in number, were flushed with fuccefs, enriched by plunder, and inured to arms. The French minifery deteffed and defpifed by their own people, for their ill fuccefs, and ruinous meafures: the queen of Hungary repoffeffed of the greatest part of her dominions; and, of a treasure inestimable, the united hearts of all her fubjects, moved to the greateft degree of tenderne's by her danger and the injuftice of her enemies, and warmed with the moft fervent zeal by her magnanimous condact. The king of Sardinia firm to his engagements, and infinitely ferviceable in repelling the attempts of Spain: the Spaniards checked and difappointed in altheir Italian views; and the king of Naples awed by the British fleet. Sweden confounded by French councils, and punished by the Ruffian arms, courting the mediation of his Britannic majefty for their prefervation; though, but the year before, they had been led by France to difturb the peace of the north in contempt of Great-Britain, and probably not without a remote view her own deftruction. The Ruffians fenfible of the

diffimulation of France, triumphant over the Swedes,

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