No. 12.

The measures of the divine Legislator and Governor of the universe, may vary, notwithstanding the immutability of his divine nature.

According as the various members of the intellectual creation change their situation, in relation to their Creator, by obedience or disobedience; so, they being more or less the objects of his righteousness or benevolence, the divine measures respecting them could not always be the same in such cases; and (strange as it may appear to some) the divine measures could not always be the same in such cases, purely because the Creator is immutable; that is, his measures vary, in proportion as his immutable righteousness or benevolence demands; the measures of immutable righteousness or benevolence being certainly not the same to the obedient as to the disobedient, no, not even to the same individual that proves alternately obedient and disobedient; hence, (in perfect concurrence with immutable and omniscient righteousness or benevolence,) the same people may be upheld while obedient, punished while disobedient, and finally cast off when (to use the language of scripture)" their iniquity is full." And the like also, may be inferred, as to individuals. The measures, there

fore, of the divine Legislator and Governor of the Universe, may vary, notwithstanding the immutability of his divine nature.

No. 13.

Of all the moral evils that have existed, or that could exist, in the intellectual creation, not one could be otherwise than the effect, whether immediately or remotely, of disobedience to the requisitions of the divine wisdom.

If all intellectual beings proved invariably obedient to the requisitions of divine wisdom; then, as never deviating therefrom freely constitutes a source of happiness to the Creator, they would all be invariably happy; for whatever constitutes divine felicity, must also be a fountain of joy to all incessantly under its influence. Till, therefore, the divine wisdom prove disobeyed by some being or other, (taking our view from the earliest era of the creation,) not even one moral evil could possibly spring into birth; or prior to such an act of disobedience it could not be possible for any moral evil whatever to arise in such a happy state as a sinless world would present. Hence, ultimately, of all the moral evils that have existed, or that could exist, in the intellectual creation, not one could be otherwise than the effect, whether immediately or

remotely, of disobedience to the requisitions of the divine wisdom.

OBSERVATIONS.

Where any effect may arise in direct opposition to its cause, such an effect we accordingly consider entirely incongruous thereto : and, for any moral evil accompanying such an effect, we acquit the assigned incongruous cause of any culpability whatever, under the conviction that, of two diametrical opposites, if the one be morally evil, the other must be morally good.

No. 14.

The Creator is not the congruous cause of any moral evil whatever that has appeared, or that may appear, in the intellectual creation.

As (by No. 13) of all the moral evils of the intellectual creation, not one could be otherwise than, whether immediately or remotely, the effect of disobedience to the divine wisdom; and (by No. 10) as all intelligent beings were originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect; so all moral evils whatever that have arisen, or that may arise, in the intellectual world, are each in opposition to what the Creator approves of, and consequently in opposition to anything that he would prove

the congruous cause of being at any time produced.

If, therefore, any of the measures of his divine wisdom not only fail to produce a good effect on some of his rebellious creatures, but (if possible) tend to harden them still more in hostility; who is to blame? God for being always transcendently good in his measures? or those of his creatures who obstinately rebel against him? The question rationally resolves itself. To contemplate, however, a remarkable illustration, we learn that those very sublime measures of divine wisdom which would have overawed and completely subdued other hearts, even tended to harden Pharaoh's heart to a surprising extent. Here, then, where two diametrically opposite effects may be assumed as flowing from the same cause; if one of these opposite effects be congruous, the other consequently must be incongruous. The effect, therefore, produced on the self-diffident though divinely commissioned and obedient Moses, being unquestionably and incontrovertibly congruous to its divine cause; it is conclusive that the effect produced on Pharaoh was entirely incongruous. And, in like manner, in all other cases the incongruity of moral evil to any thing like a divine cause, could be similarly elucidated: so that, finally, we shall be constrained to infer that the omnisciently benevolent

Father of the Universe is not the congruous cause of any moral evil whatever that has appeared, or that may appear, in the intellectual creation.

No. 15.

In all cases of moral evil, man is intellectually free, and is culpable and accountable, according to circumstances, in proportion to his measure of unrighteousness and impiety.

1st. As (by No. 14) the Creator is not the congruous cause of any moral evil whatever that has occurred, or that may occur, in the intellectual world; it is conclusive that the congruous cause, or source of culpability, of every moral evil (without even one exception) must exist solely among the finite beings of the uni

verse.

2ndly. That every intelligent finite being (by. No. 10) was originally rendered susceptible of acting in conformity to the wisdom that is perfect, implies that God approved originally of every sincere attempt at conformity to the requisitions thereof; with which side of the question essentially and immutably concurring, his divine perfections, though completely free and unshackled, will ever renounce whatsoever is in opposition to that all perfect wisdom. Hence,