both." When St. Paul therefore so affirmed himself to be a Pharisee, his belief in the spiritual or immaterial world, as opposed to Sadducean materialism, is here completely appa

rent.

Nor hath our Saviour himself been silent on the subject: hath he not said, "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak ;" meaning thereby, that the spirit or soul of man is willing to endure greater watchfulness, and to accomplish far more than the weakness of his body may admit of in the present state? Or, when he stated that "a spirit hath not flesh and bones," did he not intimate, that a spirit purely in itself is not at all corporeal? Or, when he revealed that "God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth;" was it not unquestionably implied (exclusive of other considerations) that the mental or spiritual world alone can worship God; and that consequently, the more sublime part of man (that which only can hold converse with its Creator) is truly spiritual or immaterial?

Now, if we combine this last adduced testimony of our Saviour, " that God is a Spirit," with a passage in the first chapter of Genesis, (to which we have already referred,) we shall ascertain how soon the immateriality of the soul is

revealed in Scripture, (ver. 26.) “God said, let us complete man in our own image, after our ikeness;" that is, after the likeness of the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, whose nature (being divine) is immaterial. As God is illimitable, parts and passions are not properly ascribable to him: of Him, therefore, there cannot be any corporeal image whatever. Consequently, the image and likeness here recorded, must be purely intellectual, and relate altogether to that spirit which constitutes the soul of man.

Hence, also, we may derive (if requisite) an additional reason in favour of that union which afterwards took place (at the Christian era) between the divine Word and "the son of man ;" the latter having a spirit within him, created after the divine image, and thence suited (under all the circumstances of his coming) even for a most intimate union with the divine nature.

The immortality of the soul, moreover, is likewise deducible from this early record of revelation, as necessarily flowing from its immateriality and divine similitude.

Sufficient for our purpose having been advanced, it would be needless to adduce a multitude of other scriptural passages to the same effect.

OBSERVATIONS.

Whoever may desire to be furnished with some of the best arguments from reason in favour of the immortality of the soul, should consult the 96th, 97th, and 98th Lectures of Dr. Thomas Brown, on the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

PART THE SECOND.

SECTION I.

On human conduct, respecting which Christ recognises the free-agency of man.

RESPECTING moral conduct, true reason, that lover of impartiality, would teach man not to pardon in himself whatever faults, vices, or crimes he would condemn in another. Nor can we suppose any rational being, in the commencement of an evil career, to be void of so much discernment.

Certainly, the frequent perpetration of evil may so darken a transgressor's mind, as to render him blind, more or less, to his awful condition : but in this he is equally culpable as if he were actually conscious of all his improprieties, since to have hurled himself into such a deep gulph of mental darkness and depravity is so extremely reprehensible.

As to free-agency, it is not here intended to be confined to cases of moral evil. For, according to circumstances, man being accountable respecting the perpetration of moral evil, implies that he possesses such a power (whether derived or otherwise) as would have enabled him to avoid

such culpability; free-agents having thence a power to do good (whether derived or otherwise) as well as to act on the opposite side of the question. In short, if man had no more than a power to be always wrong, I cannot discern how he could ever be justly accountable for not doing what he never could do.

As, however, where man acts rightly he proves conformable to the divine will; he could not from this alone be necessarily inferred a free-agent. Demonstration, therefore, in this complexion of the subject, must be deduced from cases of moral evil; which, when obtained, leads us to conclude that as man is culpable for doing evil, or (in other words) for not doing good when he had it in his power; so, as having a power to do good (whether derived or otherwise) he is a free-agent also in this point of view.

Christians, indeed, are truly said to derive through Christ whatever power of doing good they may possess: yet that interferes not with free-agency, as they are free to embrace and free to use the gifts of their Creator; which freedom is not less than if they embraced and used gifts merely derived from their fellowmen. In either instance something is offered which may either be embraced or rejected, used or not used, which implies a power of freely choosing, &c. And, in the opinion of Christ himself, the free-agency