I.

FINALLY, As to thofe evils, of which SERM, creatures that act freely are the voluntary causes, it may be faid, that the poffibility of them certainly follows on fuppofing free agents to exist - that the permiffion

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of them, if God can, as has been fhewn, wifely form fuch Beings, muft be entirely reconcileable with the most honourable idea we can form of him; fince it is, in fact, nothing more than the leaving them to the use of their faculties---And that all the irregularities and mischiefs, which are thus occafion'd by the abuse of natural liberty, may be compleatly rectified in another state, and unspeakably to the advantage of the innocent fufferer.

I AM aware that it will be objected to what has been hitherto offer'd: That, indeed, the evils which we now behold, or ourfelves endure, may be a means of procuring for us a greater good, and exceed

and discountenance and opprefs the former. So that to punish impenitent finners is fo far from being inconfiftent with the abfolute goodness of the Deity; "that it is his re"gard to the general good, which is the only true reason "why they are punish'd." And it is highly probable that the cafe would be quite the reverse, if he was a cruel and mischievous Being.

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ingly

SERM. ingly over-ballanc'd by fucceeding pleafures 1. in a future life; that many natural evils

may be useful, and even neceffary, in the prefent fate, and while mankind continue to be as they are, partly Intelligent, and partly Animal; and that, upon the fuppofition of moral evil, penal is fit and reasonable. But all this, though it be true,

will not reach the main difficulty— « For "what need was there, that fuch an im"perfect fyftem of creatures fhould be

brought into being? What need of

mere Animals, with ftrong ungovern'd "instincts, frequently tormenting to themfelves, and injurious, nay deftructive, to others; even to rational Beings, of a

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fuperior order; who in their turn, ty"ranize over, opprefs, and are neceffi"tated to deftroy, the Brute creatures? "What need of fuch a diminutive race. "of Intelligent agents as men are, im

prifon'd in bodies that are a constant "check to the vigorous operations of "reason, and expofe them to number"lefs wants and miferies? Creatures of

fuch limited moral powers, fuch strong paffions, prejudices, and contrary in clinations;

I.

"clinations; who by their vices may SERM. bring the evil of punishment on them"felves, and be the occafions of infinite ❝ calamities to each other? Could not the "all-wise and almighty Author of the uni"verse have made all his Intelligent crea"tures so perfect, as that it should be utterly improbable, that they would debafe and corrupt their own natures, or make their own existence, or that of their fellow"creatures, in any degree miferable? "Might not the inanimate material World "have been fo framed, or at least fo

govern'd, as not to caufe neceflary and “unavoidable evil to any of its rational " inhabitants? And though the present "fcene of things fhould be allow'd to be confiftent with the general notion of "goodness; would it not have been more worthy Supreme and infinite goodness, "to have communicated to all Beings the highest measures of happinefs; or, at "leaft, never to have fuffer'd fuch mov

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ing objects of diftrefs, as common hu"manity teaches us to prevent, or, if that be beyond our power, always ftrongly inclines us to relieve?" Thefe queries,

(SERM. queries, in which the whole force of I. the objections relating both to moral and

natural evil is collected, may feem very fpecious and plaufible: But I hope they will be thought of no great moment, when the following things are confider'd.

FIRST, That the poffibility of natural evil, in fome degree, neceffarily refults from fuppofing any finite Beings at all to exift, though of the most excellent fuperior order. For even fuch exalted creatures as thefe, through imperfect or falfe views, to which every finite understanding is liable, may be perplex'd and uneafy themselves, and the occafions of trouble and pain to others. So that the communicating a being, from whence there is a poffibility that evil fhould arife, is not, in the general confideration of it, inconsistent with the univerfal goodness of the Deity. However it will ftill be faid, that there should be as little imperfection and evil as there can be.---And therefore I add,

IN the SECOND place, That it has been already fhewn in the former part of this difcourfe, that God is not obliged to create

10 Beings but fuch as are of the highest SERM. order poffible, and endued with the highest I. degrees of understanding and moral excellence; but that, without any blemish to to his character, there may be, for any thing fuch short-fighted fhallow reasoners as we are can prove to the contrary, an infinite variety; not only creatures of the lowest rank of Intelligents, but mere Animals of vaftly different claffes in the fenfitive life and, confequently, exactly fuch a universe as really exifts. Nay, it is, I think, almost demonftrable, that a conftitution fo diverfified may yield, upon the whole, the greatest good; and be therefore moft worthy a Being fupremely perfect.---" For it is poffible, that

there may now be as many of the highest "order of Intelligences, as there would "bave been, if only that fingle order had "been created. The number could not "then have been, ftrictly speaking, infi"nite; fince there can be no point of "duration, in which the Deity, if not divefted of his infinite wisdom and power, cannot create other Beings, pof"feffed of the fame capacities and excellencies. Or if the number could be