I.

thought has naturally fuggefted itself both SERM. to ftudious inquirers, and fceptical cavillers. And the understandings of Men being narrow and confined, their paffions too frequently unruly, and their prejudices against the principles of Religion, when they have

been

Beings "originally and really produced only Light; and
that Darkness followed it by confequence, followed it as
"the fhadow does the perfon." Hyde de Relig. Vet. Perf
p..163 & 299. I need not attempt to confute this Hypo-
thefis, because as the peculiarities of it are mere imagina-
tion and fable, and built on no one plain and certain prin-
ciple of reafon, this is a fufficient objection against admit-
ting it to be the true account of the conftitution aud scheme
of things.
And to fhew the abfurdity of the Manichean
doctrine of two independent Principles, it has been juftly
obferved, that if two fuch Beings are confider'd as directly
oppofing each other, it is impoffible for us to conceive, how
either good or evil can exift; there being, on the one hand,
just fo much wisdom and power to hinder the effect, as
there is, on the other, to produce it. The only way to
avoid this confequence is, by fuppofing them to be agreed,
and to act in concert. And the only imaginable ground of fuch
an agreement is a mutual confent, that the proportion of
good and evil in the universe should be exactly equal. But we
not only fee, that a very great part of the evil which fubfifts
in the world is caufed by acting in direct oppofition to Nature,
and has a manifeft tendercy to good upon the whole; but, as
far as our experience and obfervation reach, the precifely
equal mixtures of good and evil appear to be entirely chi-
merical; fince the one, or the other, every where prepon
derates. The Manichee will perhaps fay, that, notwith-
tanding this, there may be a ftrict equality obferved with

B 2

reffect

I.

SERM. been habituated to evil practices, strong and violent; they are apt, either through imperfect views of things, or the influence of corrupt appetites misleading and clouding the judgment, to account of all the evils, that happen in the creation, as fo many Spots and blemishes in the Divine government. And fince these evils have not only been in former times, but are at this day,

To which I answer,

But,

refpect to the universe in general.
That, in just reasoning, it belongs not to him to have re-
courfe to the fuppofition of what may be the cafe upon the
whole, but to the afferter of one First Cause of all things.
For the only foundation in reason for introducing two Prin-
ciples is this, that the appearances of evil are impoffible to be
reconciled with the belief and acknowledgment of but one
Principle, poffefs'd of perfect goodnefs. But this impoffibi-
lity can never be proved, if all things may, upon the
whole, tend to good; which is therefore a fuppofition that
the advocate for one Principle has a right to make.
iu the natural course of the argument, the Manichee ought
not even to affert his opinion, and much lefs has he a right
to defend it by putting cafes of what may be the univerfal
and final fate of things, till he has fhewn, that it cannot
poffibly be, nay, that it could not be defigned to be, good
upon the whole; and, of confequence, that the appearances
of evil, and the existence of one good caufe of the entire
frame and conftitution of Nature, are necessarily incon-
fiftent ideas, which deftroy each other. From whence
it follows, by way of Corollary, That the barely fhewing
how it is poffible that these ideas may be perfectly confiftent,
is a fufficient confutation of the Manichean doctrine.

2

urged

urged as a moft formidable objection against SERM. the Supreme wisdom and goodness, and inJ. deed against the very being of a God; I fhall make this difficulty, which is apprehended to contain the main ftrength of the Atheistic fcheme, the subject of the following discourse; and need use no other argument, besides the vast importance of it in itself, to engage your attention. Evil has been commonly diftinguished into two kinds, natural and moral ---- I fhall begin with an inquiry into the origin of moral evil, and endeavour to vindicate the Providence of God in the permiffion of it: And then, SECONDLY, I fhall add a few obfervations concerning natural evil.

FIRST, I am to inquire into the origin, and endeavour to account for the permiffion, of moral evil. This question has puzzled the greatest wits of antiquity; and, for many ages, confounded the reafon and skill of Philofophers, unenlightened and unaffifted by revelation. But Christianity has presented us with an easy way of solving the difficulty with refpect to Mankind (and the fame may be applied to all Intelligent Beings)

B 3

I.

SERM. Beings) by informing us that they are rational and free creatures, and that all moral evil fprings entirely from their own abuse of their natural liberty. Directly to this purpofe are the words of St. James a few verfes before the text, where he expreffes himself thus: Let no Man fay, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: For God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth be any man. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own luft, and enticed. Then when luft hath conceived, it bringeth forth fin; and fin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death. the true fcheme, or in

Now that this is other words, that

all thofe wrong determinations and purfuits, which conftitute moral evil, were not original or effential to us, but owing to a voluntary abuse of our faculties, will appear to be very probable, if we fet afide the arguments from the perfections of God, from taking a fhort view of Human nature itfelf. For what is Human nature? Is not this the right notion of it, viz. "a rational principle conducting "and governing the inferior paffions?"And, therefore, when the paffions prevail against reafon, muft there not be a perverted and irregular

irregular state? Shall we form our idea of SERM. Human nature from the brutal part of it,or I. from the more noble and excellent, the intellectual ?---Nature is a general term to denote those laws by which the Creator governs the univerfe, and the established order of things. Now this order, with refpect to Mankind is," that the understand

ing, and reflection, fhould prefide over "the animal frame, and regulate its in"clinations and defires." So that whatever in their temper or conduct is contrary to the dictates of reason, whatever is evil and vicious, is inordinate, and confequently unnatural.

I ONLY defire it may be obferved farther, that I am not obliged in this part of my difcourfe to prove the liberty of human actions, because all moral evil plainly fuppofes it; and, on any other scheme, is no more than a weakness and imperfection of Nature which has nothing criminal in it. And therefore the Scripture account of it must be the only just account, if there be indeed any fuch thing as moral evil, or any other befides natural evil in the univerfe. now fee how the Providence of God

Let us