availing in stopping men who had lost all presence of mind, and only longed for absence of body. A desperate contest then took place for the possession of the guns of these disabled batteries. Three successive times did the rebels capture them, and three successive times the batteries were recovered, to be again lost. Regiment after regiment was sent into the fight, and the Union troops, finally recovering their ground and their guns, renewed the offensive. Several of the Confederate regiments were almost annihilated. On either side soldiers no longer recognized their officers, nor the officers their men, and it was scarcely possible to procure any obedience to orders.

By this time it was three o'clock in the afternoon, and the Union troops had been on duty since two o'clock in the morning, much of the time on the march or in action. Three days' provisions had been served out to them the night before, but many had thrown them away on the march or during the battle, and were without food. Just then it became known to the Confederates that they had been reinforced by Johnston's army, while the presence of Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy, inspired them with fresh courage. The rebel sharp-shooters, occupying the woods, opened a deadly fire on the Union regiments, and Steuart's cavalry brigade, sweeping to and fro, cut down hundreds of stragglers. The panic became general, and disorder soon degenerated into a retreat. "Finding," said General McDowell in his official report, that this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men

to form in line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost."

Colonel Burnside's brigade encountered the enemy's fire for four hours, receiving crashing volleys of grape-shot and musketry, and sustaining a loss of 123 killed and 236 wounded. Relieved by Colonel Sherman's brigade, Burnside's men were withdrawn from the front, to rest and to receive a fresh supply of ammunition preparatory to orders for another advance. But the order was not to advance — but to cover the retreat on Centreville," and stragglers began to pass to the rear in great numbers. Once in retreat, the regiments became uncontrollable masses of men, and there was an individual stampede for safety.

When the first rush of fugitives had passed, Colonel Burnside, who had kept his brigade together, formed in column and retired in comparatively good condition, Reynolds' and Arnold's batteries of artillery and Armstrong's company of regular dragoons bringing up the rear. The retreat of the brigade continued in tolerably good order until a bridge was reached over a little stream called Cub Run, which was commanded by a Confederate light battery, making it necessary for the retreating Union force to cross the bridge under fire. "The enemy opened fire," says Burnside's report, "upon the retreating mass of men. Upon the bridge crossing Cub Run, a shot took effect upon the horses of a team that was crossing. The wagon was overturned directly in the centre of the bridge, and the passage was completely obstructed. The enemy continued to play his artillery upon the train, carriages,

ambulances, and artillery wagons that filled up the road, and these were reduced to ruin. The artillery could not possibly pass, and five pieces of the Rhode Island battery, which had been safely brought off the field, were here lost."

The guns of two other Union batteries were also lost in the retreat. Indeed, only the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts were lost in the main battle. The retreat became a rout, and Colonel Burnside, seeing that his brigade could not cross the bridge, ordered the men to ford the creek and rally at Centreville. While his command moved there with little demoralization, others fled panic-stricken in a disorderly rout. Army-wagons, hacks containing spectators of the affray, correspondents on horseback, and sutlers' teams choked the road, amid clouds of dust and crowds of horror-stricken fugitives. But it is very evident that an account of this retreat written by the correspondent of the London Times was greatly exaggerated. The terrified Briton evidently "drew on his imagination for his facts."

Colonel Burnside's brigade found at Centreville the bivouacs which they had left in the morning, and were preparing to pass the night there, when orders were received from General McDowell to move on to Washington. Marching all night, with occasional halts, the brigade reached Washington early on the morning of July 22, and the Rhode Island regiments were back in their old camp at nine o'clock.

It was well said of Colonel Burnside that his bearing in all the experiences of the day and night, the battle and the march, was all that could be expected of a man and a soldier, and he at once attracted the attention of the country to his gallantry, generalship, and skill.

THE LESSON OF BULL RUN RETURN OF THE FIRST RHODE ISLAND REGIMENT APPOINTMENT AS BRIGADIER-GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE COAST DIVISION DEPARTURE OF THE ARMADA- TERRIFIC GALE OFF HATTERAS LANDING ON ROANOKE ISLAND.

T

HE battle of Bull Run was a severe rebuke to the politicians who had forced it, while it displayed the superior military skill and scientific strategy of the Confederate leaders. The Union officers, obeying orders, hurled their undisciplined forces into the fight, as though muscle and the musket could decide the day. The Confederate officers economized their forces, avoided any needless exposure of the men, utilized their artillery, and compensated for weakness of battalions by strength of position. But the Union troops fought like veterans, marching gallantly into the concentrated batteries, and loading and firing under fire with the precision of veterans. Volunteers never displayed more bravery, and but for the loss of some officers, and the cowardice of others, the ignorance of the roads, and the want of rallying-points, the retreat unexpected, as it was disastrous-would have been avoided. The Confederates found themselves in no condition to follow up the victory which they had gained, and to press on to Washington.

Resuming the command of the First Rhode Island Regiment, Colonel Burnside tendered its services to President Lincoln, its term of service having expired on the Saturday previous to the battle. His officers and men shared

in his desire to remain so long as the capital was in danger, but when it was evident that the Confederates did not pro

pose to move on Washington, the three-months regiments were all ordered to their respective states, where three-years regiments were being recruited. President Lincoln and Secretary Seward rode out to the camp on the day following the

return of the regiment, to personally compliment General Burnside, and to speak words of encouragement to the

men.

On the night of the 25th of July, the First Rhode Island Regiment broke camp and started for Providence, where it arrived on Sunday morning, the 28th. Addresses of welcome and of congratulation were delivered by Lieutenant-Governor Arnold and the Rt. Rev. Bishop Clark, and on the 2d of August, 1861, the officers and men were mustered out of service. The General Assembly of Rhode Island voted its thanks to the regiment and to Colonel Burnside, and Brown University, at its Commencement in September, honored him with the degree of Master of Arts.