liberty, laws, territories, and all their property belonging either to the state or to individuals, provided that they should deliver three hundred hostages of their noblest youth to the consuls at Lilybæum," and further should "obey the commands of the consuls." The Carthaginian senate accepted these terms, notwithstanding the objection that the last condition was so vague that it might conceal some great danger. The most influential senators argued that these commands of the consuls must refer only to minor matters such as the manner in which the hostages should be surrendered and treated; the promise of the protection of life, liberty, and property was plain. The people approved the action of the senate, and the hostages were delivered. Having obtained possession of these, the consuls demanded all the arms and armor. The Carthaginians objected that they needed them for the defense of their lives and property against hostile Numidians. The consuls replied that they would furnish the needed protection. Although the possession of these arms had been promised to them by the Roman senate, the Carthaginians surrendered them, including two thousand catapults, and arms and armor for 200,000 men. When the city had thus given up her weapons, the consuls announced to the Carthaginians that they must move out of their city, which was to be destroyed, and find new homes at least ten miles from the site of Carthage.

This meant the abandonment, not only of their dwellings and workshops, but also of their temples and tombs. It required the surrender not only of most of their wealth, but of their seaport, which, by its advantages for maritime commerce and manufacturing industry, furnished the means of their support. To the majority of the Cartha

ginians this command left no hope to escape starvation save by migrating not only from the city, but also from the district of Carthage.

For this order of exile against all the people of a great city, issued with so little provocation, planned with so much deliberate malignity and executed with so much perfidy, there is no parallel in history. The Carthaginians knew that there was no probability of success in resistance, but they could have no respect for themselves in submission. Almost unanimously they decided to resist. Having to choose between the danger of starvation in peace and that of slaughter in war, they preferred the latter. Though disarmed, they were numerous, rich, and courageous; and, besides, they had good walls. They demanded leave to send another appeal for mercy to Rome, and devoted all their energies to the manufacture of arms, armor, and machines of war. They built war ships, equipped armies, and for three years in the third Punic war beat off the besieging Romans. But at last Carthage fell, and as Punic Carthage it ceased to exist. Of its 700,000 inhabitants, 650,000 died by starvation, disease, or the sword in the siege; the surviving 50,000 were sold as slaves; the city was utterly destroyed, and a law of Rome forbade any person to make his residence there. The malice of the Roman senate had here obtained its highest gratification.

SEC. 456. Pergamus.-Thirteen years after the destruction of Carthage, a document purporting to be the will of King Attalus II., of Pergamus, was submitted to and accepted by the senate. It bequeathed to the Roman people his kingdom, which included a large part of Asia Minor. While living, Attalus had made no public announcement of a purpose to dispose of his realm in

this way, nor had he done anything indicative of an intention to deprive his heirs of their regal inheritance or his subjects of their national independence. All classes of his people, rich as well as poor, knew the evil repute of Roman provincial administration, and looked forward with sad forebodings to the time when it should. be established in their country. The Roman traders resident in the kingdom, and the small class of natives who looked to the Romans for their profits, and for opportunities to plunder their richer neighbors, ardently desired that Pergamus should become a Roman province; and we may reasonably presume that by some of these, the document produced as the will of Attalus II. was forged. After the senate had declared the will to be genuine, and had accepted its bequest, the people of Pergamus understood that they must submit, and so they did. They had neither an able monarch to lead them in war, nor a large, well disciplined army, nor a well consolidated nationality, nor a powerful ally ready to protect them. Though resistance was hopeless, it was, nevertheless, made by several small popular outbreaks which were easily suppressed, and Asia Minor became a province of Rome.

The destruction of Carthage and the reduction of Macedon, Epirus, Greece, and part of Asia Minor to pr vincial subjection, made an important change in the position of Rome. Although more than a match for any one enemy, she was previously in danger from a combination of several. Pyrrhus and Hannibal had each brought her into imminent peril, and if the former had been aided with all her means by Carthage, or the latter by Macedon, Rome would have been crushed. After the second Punic war, Carthage still had large revenues, in

addition to her remarkable enterprise and organizing genius. Macedon, Asia Minor, and Egypt also were wealthy. The Numidian and Thessalian cavalry were of unsurpassed excellence. Greece, Epirus, and Macedon had military talent and considerable bodies of well drilled troops or of men whose martial spirit and hereditary feelings fitted them to become formidable after a little training. Greece, Carthage, and Asia Minor had good sailors and numerous ships, which might have had great influence upon the fate of Rome. All these nations were within convenient reach of one another, and being intimately connected by commercial relations might have formed an irresistible combination against the enemy that was to overwhelm them separately.

But after the close of the third Punic war, there was no serious danger from these nations. Egypt and Numidia had neither organizing talent nor good infantry; and infantry was the main dependence in ancient as well as in modern warfare. With her provinces, Rome had most of the seacoast, ships, and wealth in the basin of the Mediterranean. She could feel secure against any known enemy or any probable combination of enemies in Africa, Asia, or eastern Europe. The only formidable foreign foe was Gaul, which had remained quiet since the victories of Marius.

SEC. 457. T. Gracchus.-The Romans were a fighting and conquering people. In the middle of the IInd century B. C. plunder taken in war was, directly and indirectly, the chief source of their public and private wealth. They had few manufactures. They were not eminent merchants. Most of the ships trading on their ports were owned and manned by their Greek subjects. Pasturage was encroaching on their tillage. Their free

laborers and their middle class were decreasing; and their slaves were rapidly increasing.

In 133 B. C. Tiberius Gracchus, a grandson of the second Scipio, and, although only thirty years of age, already eminent as a soldier and orator, became one of the tribunes of the people. He seems to have been the first person who perceived that the tribunitian office in the hands of a man who could control the plebeians might be a position of predominant influence in the city. He had all the qualities needed for the acquisition and maintenance of that control. In the combination of fluency of speech, with plausibility, courage, readiness to express the prejudices and excite the passions of the mob, and skill in the partisan tricks needed for the management of an ignorant and violent multitude, Tiberius Gracchus has had few superiors in the history of the world. That he had abundant reason to complain of the senatorial government is unquestionable; but the mob which he proposed to make the dominant power in the state was far less competent to rule than the senate.

We have no means of ascertaining with certainty the main purpose of Tiberius Gracchus. He was cut off at the beginning of his political career, very soon after he had shown his capacity and his ambition to lead the plebeians. But we can see clearly what the end of his career would have been if he had continued to wield his influence over the people for ten years or more, and if he had carried, to its logical results, the policy with which he commenced. He would have founded a despotism on the ruins of a republic that had become anarchical and had outlived its usefulness.

He submitted to the people a bill to re-enact and enforce the general principles of the Licinian agrarian law;