.

senate admired the independence and courage of these replies so much that they not only spared Privernum but immediately conferred full Roman citizenship on all its freemen. After 280 B. c. no city was vanquished by generosity as was Fidenæ, and none conquered by arms was welcomed like Privernum with honor into Roman citizenship.

SEC. 449. Pyrrhus.-Having gained control of all peninsular Italy, save Tarentum, the Romans made war on that city. Pyrrhus, who was king of Epirus, and a distinguished general, possessing an army armed and drilled in Macedonian style, was induced to come to its aid. He landed in southern Italy in 281 B. C., with an army of 25,000 men, and after inflicting several disastrous defeats on the Romans, started northward for the purpose of plundering their territory, threatening their capital, and enticing their allies to join him. While on his way, he sent an ambassador to them, offering them peace on the conditions that Tarentum should be left free, and that other Greek cities of Italy, and parts of Samnium and Apulia should be liberated. As Rome had no general equal to Pyrrhus in strategy, and no army that could meet him in the open field, and as he was able to plunder much of their territory, most of the senators were disposed to accept his terms. They were shamed out of their purpose, however, by Appius Claudius Cæcus, then a blind and very old man. He had been consul and censor, and in the latter capacity had built the first great military road (the Appian) leading from the capital, and also the first aqueduct (the Claudian) to supply it with water. On account of his age, his distinguished public services, his strong character, his influential family connections, and his vigorous eloquence, he was regarded with much

veneration. When he heard that a session of the senate was to be held for the purpose of considering the terms proposed by Pyrrhus, he summoned his four sons and his five sons-in-law to take him to the senate hall, where he carried the day by his emphatic protest against peace on any terms with an invader of Italy. The ambassador returned with a message of defiance to Pyrrhus, who continued his march until he arrived within eighteen miles of Rome. He met with no encouragement among the Latins, and little among the other allies of Rome, and he encountered a large number of walled towns, which he could not stop to take, which were not rich enough to reward long and costly sieges, but which he could not safely leave behind if he wished to maintain his communications with Tarentum. He therefore returned to Campania, followed by the Romans, who, discouraged by previous defeats, refused to meet him in pitched battle, but watched his movements, surprised his foraging parties, and compelled him to be constantly on his guard. This situation soon became tiresome to his army, and he and they were glad to accept an invitation from the Sicilian Greeks to help them against the Carthaginians. Pyrrhus spent two years in Sicily, without achieving any great result, and in 276 B. c. returned to Italy, where he remained a year, and then crossed over to Epirus, leaving his Taren ine, Lucanian, and Samnite allies to the mercy of the Romans, who, three years afterwards, took Tarentum, and thus established their dominion over all of peninsular Italy.

In the Tarentine war the Roman legions were twice defeated, in pitched battles, by the Macedonian phalanxes; but these defeats were not decisive, nor could they be credited to the superior excellence of the phalanx, The

skill of Pyrrhus as a general, and his possession of elephants, which the Romans then met in battle for the first time, had much influence on both occasions. It has been the general opinion of military authorities that the Macedonian spear was better for meeting an enemy in front, especially on level open ground, but that the Roman javelin and sword were better for the average requirements, which include preparation for attacks in flank, in the rear, in broken ground, and in brush or timber.

SEC. 450. Hannibal.-The first difficult war in which Rome engaged after her acquisition of Tarentum was the conquest of Sicily, undertaken under the pretext of protecting the Greeks of that island against the aggressions of Carthage. This first Punic war, as it was called (Punica being the Latin for Carthaginian or Phoenician), lasted twenty-three years, from 264 till 241 B. C., and after many victories and defeats on land and sea, for each side, it ended with the triumph of Rome, though she, as well as her enemy, was nearly exhausted by great losses of men and great expenditures of money. For the sake of peace, Carthage consented to withdraw all her troops from Sicily, and pay an indemnity of $3,500,000, which at that time was considered a very large sum. One result of the war was that Carthage, which had been the most formidable naval power in the Mediterranean, had, after its close, no navy of note; but she retained her pre-eminence in commerce, shipping, and manufactures.

Sardinia was acquired by Rome in 238 B. C. Having been part of the Carthaginian dominion, and held by garrisons of mercenary troops, these, after the close of the first Punic war, revolted, and then, fearing punishment by Carthage, they delivered the fortresses and

cities to Rome, which took them under the pretense that, as they had become independent, their acceptance was not a violation of the treaty of peace. Carthage was not strong enough to punish this perfidy, and therefore submitted quietly to the violation of her rights.

After resting from difficult wars for nineteen years, in 222 B. C. Rome attacked the independent Gallic tribes in the Po-basin, and, having subjugated them, her authority was undisputed in subalpine as well as in peninsular Italy. The vanquished Gauls were not satisfied with the new dominion, and their discontent stimulated the activity of Hannibal, then the commander of the Carthaginian forces in Spain, a young man (born in 247 B. C.), who had made. it the purpose of his life to conquer Rome. After a long and difficult march, in the course of which he had to cross the Pyrenees and the Alps, he reached the valley of the Po in October, 218 B. C., with an army of about 26,000 Spaniards and Africans. These were well drilled troops, full of confidence in their general, whose courage, tact, and military genius had become apparent on many occasions. On the bank of the Trebbia, Hannibal was attacked by a Rɔman army of 40,000 men, whom he defeated, leaving 20,000 dead on the field. This great victory gave him the alliance of all the Gallic tribes in the basin of the Po, a large number of recruits, and comfortable and secure quarters for his soldiers through the winter. When mild weather permitted him to move, he started for the south, with perhaps 40,000 men, and in April, while passing Lake Thrasymene, about ninety miles north of Rome, he attacked a pursuing force of 30,000 Romans, and defeated them, slaughtering 15,000 and capturing one-third as many others. His victory was so complete, and his loss so small, that the Romans

perceived his vast superiority in generalship, and determined to avoid pitched battles as far as possible, and to worry him out by defensive strategy.

Having neither siege artillery nor a body of skillful engineers to construct it, Hannibal did not feel confident of being able to take Rome; and, besides, he thought the better policy for him would be to present himself to the allied states and gain them to his side. He therefore continued his southward course until he reached the fertile valleys east of Naples, presenting himself before a number of subject or allied cities, but not one of them opened its gates to him, or showed any disposition to aid the cause of Carthage. The people disliked his Spaniards, Africans, and Gauls, and feared that at some later time any defection from Rome would be punished unmercifully.

SEC. 451. Cannæ.-After Hannibal had spent a year in Southern Italy, in June, 216 B. C., the Romans thought that they could venture to give him battle. They had an army of 96,000 men, and he had only 50,000. They were among their friends, and he among his enemies. He was living at their expense, exhausting the patience of their allies, and gradually weakening their military credit. They chose their own ground at Cannæ, and their own time, but he inflicted upon them the greatest defeat in history. He slew 72,000 and captured 20,000 men. All who escaped alive were not sufficient to make up a full legion. Among the dead were eighty senators. Such are the numbers given by Polybius, who is the best authority in regard to this war.

Many distinguished military authorities have expressed the opinion that Hannibal should have marched upon Rome immediately after gaining this victory. The peo