ple of that city were dismayed. Many of them wanted to sail away with their families and treasures to Greece. They had no army able to take the field, and in years they could not organize one that would confront Hannibal. That general was now admitted to be invincible. No officer and no legion wanted to meet him in the open field. Among the victors many entertained the opinion that the hard fighting of the war had been done; that Rome was now helpless. Maharbal, the Carthaginian commander of the Light Numidian Cavalry, said to Hannibal: "If you will let me lead the horse forthwith, and follow quickly, you shall dine in the capitol in five days." But Hannibal rejected this advice, and his reasons for rejecting it are discoverable only by surmise. He knew that the allies were attached to Rome, which, having had 800,000 men fit for arms before the war, and having lost 150,000 men in battle, and having lost efficient control over 250,000 more-these are vague estimates—could still depend upon the fidelity of 400,000 others, strengthened by hundreds of walled towns. He made a round of the allied states, but could obtain possession of only one important city, Capua, which ranked next to Rome among the Italian cities, in population and wealth. But it did not add much to his military or other resources. The Bruttians and Lucanians declared for him, but they counted for little. He sent word to Carthage of his great victory at Cannæ, and of the necessity of further aid to enable him to take Rome. The aid solicited was promised, but did not reach Italy until after a lapse of nine years. During that period Hannibal sought to drive the Romans into a pitched battle on many different occasions, but without success. He moved about from place to place, plundering the districts faithful to Rome, gaining

many little successes, adding nothing to the strength of his army, and losing more than he gained in public credit and military position. Tarentum, an important seaport, surrendered to him, but he could make little use of it. Neither he nor Carthage nor any of his allies had a fleet able to meet that of the Romans. He was shut in. In 212 B. C., while he was at Tarentum, the Romans laid siege to Capua, and having built a fortification outside of their besieging camp, they defied Hannibal. He marched upon Rome, expecting that the besiegers would follow him, but they stayed where they were. He went within bowshot of the walls of the Eternal City, and gave its citizens a good scare, but could do no harm to them, and was compelled to withdraw, while he left Capua to its cruel fate. All its men who had been prominent by wealth, or office, or had rendered military service against Rome, were beheaded or starved to death in prison; their wives and children were sold into slavery; and the obscure and peaceful multitude were despoiled of what little property they had, and allowed to seek homes elsewhere, under penalty of death, if they should return to Capua. The city sank into an insignificance from which it has never recovered.

SEC. 452. Zama.—It was not until 207 B C., nine years after the battle of Cannæ, that a second Carthaginian army, numbering about 50,000 men, mostly Spaniards and Africans, after crossing the Pyrenees and the Alps, made their appearance in the valley of the Po, under Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal. Unfortunately for him, Hannibal was not there to meet him, and, having been treacherously led into a disadvantageous position near the Metaurus River, his army was cut to pieces and he was slain.

After this disaster Hannibal had no hope of further

aid from his native city. She had lost her hold on Spain, she had no fleet, and she had no general to spare; and yet the Romans did not dare to meet Hannibal in the field. While near him they never felt safe unless they were behind fortifications. They could not do much injury to him, and they would not give him a chance to reach them. Three years after the death of Hasdrubal, in 204 B. C., they carried the war into Africa, by sending an invading army under Scipio to ravage the dominions of Carthage. That city, unlike Rome, had no multitude of walled towns filled with loyal citizens or allies trained to the use of arms; and she was unable to offer any effective resistance to the Roman invasion. Her only army and her only great general were in Italy. She was anxious for peace, and so was Rome, and a treaty was signed. In accordance with its provisions Hannibal and his army, or part of it, sailed from Italy, while Scipio and his army remained in Africa.

When their great enemy had withdrawn from their peninsula, the Romans felt secure, and their senate then refused to ratify the treaty. It is probable that many of the mercenaries who had served in the Carthaginian army in Italy remained there, and that Hannibal had to depend to a large extent on raw recruits at Zama, where he was disastrously defeated. The military situation of Carthage was hopeless. She had no army, no navy, no walled towns, no large territory from which she could draw supplies. She might, however, have made a prolonged resistance. She had a great general, great wealth, an extensive commerce, great industrial skill, abundant supplies of metal, timber, and other materials useful in warfare, strong fortifications, and a large number of energetic and brave people.

She was saved from destruction at this time, not by these resources, but by discord among her enemies. Scipio was unpopular in the senate. He had gone to Africa against the wish of that body. After his victory at Zama, the majority of the senators showed their purpose of taking the command from him, and thus depriving him of the main credit of conquering Carthage and closing the war. If some other man should get the army which he had accustomed to victory, and should take Carthage, and dictate the terms of peace, the victor of Zama would occupy a subordinate position. Scipio saw that to defeat his enemies in Italy he must make peace with Carthage. He made it, and with more regard to his own interests than to the habitual policy of his country, he granted the most generous terms ever given by Rome to a vanquished foe. He required Carthage to pay $10,000,000 of war indemnity; to give up all her war ships save ten; to surrender all her elephants (these were regarded as valuable for war); to undertake no war without the permission of Rome; and to give a hundred young men of the leading noble families as hostages. He allowed her to retain her great general, her merchant ships, her own city government, and her dominion over those provinces which she had not taken from Numidia.

The senate disliked the treaty because it made Scipio the most influential man in their city, and because it saved Carthage from plunder and destruction; and they would have rejected it, if they had dared, but the people would not consent that Scipio, their idol, should be insulted and degraded. Under popular compulsion the senate ratified the treaty, and gave the most glorious triumph in the history of their city to Scipio.

SEC. 453. After Zama.-Among the results of Han

nibal's war were the final exclusion of Carthage as a national power from Europe, and its ruin as a great military power; the elevation of Rome to unquestionable preponderance in the basin of the Mediterranean; the destruction of numerous influences in Italy hostile to Roman dominion; and much progress towards the consolidation of the Italians into one people. All those natives of the Po-basin, Etruria, Samnium, Campania, Bruttia, or Lucania, who, under the encouragement of Carthaginian victories, had joined the party of Hannibal, were either slain or sold into slavery; and when the war was at an end, the Roman power in Italy was far more secure than ever before. These results of the Hannibalic war contributed greatly to the foundation of the durable and extensive empire, homogeneous in general culture, civil law, and administrative institutions, and through many of its provinces, homogeneous also in its language and ecclesiastical system.

Carthage could not have built up a solid empire as Rome did. By her Semitic blood she was much farther than her rival from the Latins, Greeks, and Gauls. She might have established her authority over them, but it would have been brief; her government might have been relatively generous, but it would not have been thorough. Having no system of military colonies, and no considerable body of soldiers save mercenary aliens of mixed race, she could not assimilate foreign provinces. For the development of culture among Aryans, who occupied nearly all Europe, it was important that the dominion over the most advanced portions of their continent should be held by someone of their own nationalities. Far better for them was Aryan Rome than Semitic Carthage.

In the first Punic war Rome had taken most of Sic