phecy, and that especially in that infancy of the world after the deluge, which both facred and profane hiftory affure us of; inafmuch as both ftates and individuals require much more of the extraordinary interpofition of governors and parents in their infancy, than afterwards: all which has a remarkable correfpondence with the hiftory of revelation, as it is in fact. And the analogical prefumptions for miracles, in this and the laft paragraph, feem at least equal to any prefumption we have, or can have, in this our ftate of ignorance of the whole of things, against them.

But there is another argument in favour of miraculous interpofitions, which may be drawn from the foregoing theory of human nature. I take it for granted, that mankind have not been upon this earth from all eternity. Eternity neither fuits an imperfect, finite race of beings, nor our habitation the earth. It cannot have revolved round the fun, as it does now, from all eternity; it must have had fuch changes made in it, from its own fabrick and principles, from the fhocks of comets, &c. in infinite time, as would be inconfiftent with our furvival. There was therefore a time when man was first placed upon the earth. In what ftate was he then placed? an infant, with his mind a blank, void of ideas, as children now are born? He would perish inftantly, without a series of miracles to preferve, educate, and inftruct him. Or, if he be fuppofed an adult with a blank mind, i. e. without ideas, affociations, and the voluntary powers of walking, handling, fpeaking, &c. the conclufion is the fame; he must perif alfo, unless conducted by a miraculous interpofition and guardianship. He must therefore have fo much of knowledge, and of voluntary and fecondarily automatic powers, amongft which speech must be reckoned as a principal one, impreffed upon him in the way of inftinct, as would be neceffary for his own prefervation, and that of his offfpring; and this inftinct is to all intents and purposes divine revelation, fince he did not acquire it by natural means. It is alfo of the nature of prophecy; for it seems impoffible for mankind to fubfift upon the earth, as it now is, without fome foreknowledge, and the confequent methods of providing for futurity, fuch, for inftance, as brutes have, or even greater, fince man, unprovided with manual arts, is peculiarly expofed to dangers, neceffities, and hardfhips.

Let us next confider, how the first men are to be provided with the knowledge of God, and a moral fenfe: for it feems neceffary, that they should be poffeffed of fome degree of thefe; elfe the fenfual and felfish defires would be fo exorbitant, as to be inconfiftent both with each man's own fafety, and with that of his neighbour; as may be gathered from the accounts of favage nations, who yet are not entirely deftitute of the knowledge of God, and the moral fense. Now to deduce the existence and attributes of God, even in a very imperfect manner, from natural phænomena, requires, as it feems to me, far more knowledge and ratiocination than men could have for many generations, from their natural powers; and that especially, if we fuppofe language not to be infpired, but attained in a natural

way.

way. And it appears, both from the foregoing account of the moral fenfe, and from common obfervation, that this requires much time, care, and cultivation, befides the previous knowledge of God, before it can be a match for the impetuofity of natural defires. We may conclude therefore, that the firft men could not attain to that degree of the knowledge of God, and a moral fenfe, which was neceffary for them, without divine inspiration.

There are feveral particulars in the Mofaic account of the creation, fall, and circumftances of the ancient world, which tally remarkably with the method of reasoning used here. Thus, man is at first placed in a paradife, where there was nothing noxious, and confequently where he would need lefs miraculous interpofition in order to preferve him. He lives upon the fruits of the earth, which want no previous arts of preparing them, and which would strike him by their fmells, and, after an inftance or two, incite him to pluck and taste: whereas animal diet, befides its inconfiftency with a ftate of pure innocence and happiness, requires art and preparation neceffarily. There is only one man, and one woman, created, that fo the occafions for exerting the focial affections may not offer themselves in any great degree, before these affections are generated; but, on the contrary, the affections may grow naturally, as it were, out of the occafions. The nakednefs, and want of frame, in our firft parents, are concurring evidences of the abfence of art, acquired affections, evil, &c. i. e. of a paradifiacal state. In this ftate they learned to give names to the animal world, perhaps from the automatic and femivoluntary exertions of the organs of fpeech, which the fight of the creatures, or the found of their feveral cries, would excite; having probably a sufficient stock of language for communication with God, and for converfing with each other about their daily food, and other neceffary things, given them by immediate inftinct or infpiration. And thus they would be initiated, by naming the animals, into the practice of inventing, learning, and applying words. For the fame reasons we may fuppofe, that they learned many other things, and particularly the habit of learning, during their abode in paradife. Nay, it may perhaps be, that this growth of acquired knowledge, with the pleafantnefs of it, might put them upon learning evil as well as good, and excite the forbidden curiofity. After the fall, we find God providing them with clothes; Cain banished from the prefence of God,. an argument that others were permitted to have recourse to this prefence to afk counfel, &c. his pofterity inventing arts for themselves; Enoch and Noah walking with God before the flood, and Abraham afterwards; all the antediluvian patriarchs long-lived, the postdiluvian long-lived alfo for fome generations; amongst other reafons, that they might inftruct pofterity in religious and other important truths; and the divine interpofitions continuing through the whole antediluvian world, and gradually withdrawn in the pottdiluvian. And it seems to me, to fay the least, a very difficult thing for any man, even at this day, to invent a more probable account of the first peopling of this earth, than that which Moses has given us.

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PROP.

THE OBJECTION MADE AGAINST THE MIRACLES RECORDED IN THE SCRIPTURES, FROM THEIR BEING CONTRARY TO THE COURSE OF NATURE, IS OF LITTLE OR NO FORCE.

IT is alledged here by the objectors, that the course of nature is fixed and immutable; and that this is evinced by the concurrent teftimony of all mankind in all ages; and confequently that the testimony of a few perfons, who affirm the contrary, cannot be admitted; but is, ipfo facto, invalidated by its oppofing general, or even univerfal experience. Now, to this I answer,

First, that we do not, by admitting the teftimony of mankind concerning the defcent of heavy bodies upon the furface of our earth, the common effects of heat and cold, &c. fuppofe that this invalidates the teftimony of those who declare they have met with contrary appearances in certain cafes. Each party teftifies what they have feen; and why may not the evidence of both be true? It does not follow, be cause a thing has happened a thousand, or ten thousand times, that it never has failed, nor even can fail. Nothing is more common or conftant than the effect of gravity in making all bodies upon the furface of our earth tend to its centre; yet the rare extraordinary influences of magnetifm and electricity can fufpend this tendency. Now, before magnetism and electricity were difcovered, and verified by a variety of concurrent facts, there would have been as much reafon to difallow the evidence of their particular effects attefted by eye-witneffes, as there is now to difallow the particular miracles recorded in the Scriptures; and yet we fee, that fuch a diffallowance would have been a hafty conclufion, would have been quite contrary to the true nature of things. And, in fact, whatever may be the cafe of a few perfons, and particularly of thofe who think that they have an intereft in difproving Revealed Religion, the generality of mankind, learned and unlearned, philofophical and vulgar, in all ages, have had no fuch difpofition to reject a thing well attefted by witnefies of credit, because it was contrary to the general, or even univerfal, tenor of former obfervations. Now it is evident to confidering perfons, especially if they reflect upon the foregoing hiftory of affociation, that the difpofitions to aflent and diffent are generated in a human mind from the fum total of the influences, which particular obfervations have had upon it. It follows, therefore, fince the bulk of mankind, of all ranks and orders, have been difpofed to receive facts the most furprifing, and contrary to the general tenor, upon their being attefted in a certain limited degree, that extraordinary facts are not, in a certain way of confidering the thing, out of the tenor of nature, but agreeable to it; that here therefore, as well as in common facts, the ftrefs is to be laid upon the credibility of the witneffes; and that to do otherwife is an argument either of fome great fingularity of mind, or of an undue biafs.

Secondly, if it should be alledged by the objectors that they do not mean, by the courfe of nature, that tenor of common obiervations

which occurred to the first rude ages of the world, or even that tenor which is ufually called fo at prefent; but thofe more general laws of matter and motion, to which all the various phænomena of the world, even those which are apparently moft contrary to one another, may be reduced; and that it is probable, that universal experience would concur to fupport the true laws of nature of this kind, were mankind fufficiently induftrious and accurate in bringing together the facts, and drawing the conclufions from them; in which cafe, any deviations from the tenor of nature, thus fupported and explained, would be far more improbable, than according to the fuppofition of the foregoing paragraph; we answer, that this objection is a mere conjecture. Since we do not yet know what thefe true laws of matter and motion are, we cannot prefume to fay whether all phænomena are reducible to them, or not. Modern philofophers have indeed made great advances in natural knowledge; however, we are still in our infant state, in refpect of it, as much as former ages, if the whole of things be taken into confideration. And this objection allows and fuppofes it to be fo. Since therefore it was the proper method for former ages, in order to make advances in real knowledge, to abide by the award of credible teftimonies, however contrary thefe teftimonies might appear to their then notions and analogies, fo this is alfo the proper method for us.

If indeed we put the course of nature for that series of events which follow each other in the order of caufe and effect by the divine appointment, this would be an accurate and philofophical way of fpeaking; but then we must at once acknowledge, that we are so ignorant of what may be the divine purposes and appointments, of fecret caufes, and of the correfponding variety of events, that we can only appeal to the facts, to credible relations of what actually has been, in order to know what is agreeable to the course of nature, thus explained. The Scripture miracles may not be at all contrary to its fixedness and immutability. Nor can any objection lie against them, if we confider things in this light, from the prefent notions of philo fophical men, i. e. from the courfe of nature, understood in a popular fense; fince this falls fo fhort of the true course of nature as here defined, i. e. as admitting the inftrumentality of beings fuperior to us, men divinely inspired, good angels, evil fpirits, and many other influences, of which our prefent philofophy can take no cognizance.

With respect to moral analogy, the cafe is fomewhat different. If the moral attributes of God, and the general rules of his provi dence, be supposed to be established upon a fure footing, then a feries of events, which thould be contrary to thefe, would have a ftrong prefumption against them. And yet it becomes us to be very diffident here alfo. God is infinite, and we finite: we may therefore, from feeing only a fmall portion, judge what we fee to be different from what it is. However, Revealed Religion has no occafion in general for any fuch apology. Natural and Revealed Religion, the word and works of God, are in all principal things moft wonderfully analogous; as has been fufficiently fhewn by the advocates for Re

vealed

vealed Religion, and moft efpecially by Bishop Butler in his Analogy. As far therefore as moral analogy carries weight, there is pofitive evidence for the Scripture miracles. And our comprehenfion of natural analogy is fo imperfect as scarce to afford any prefumption against them; but leaves the evidence in their favour, of nearly the fame ftrength as it would have had for other facts.

Thirdly, Let it be obferved, that the evidences for the Scripture miracles are fo numerous, and in other refpects fo ftrong, as to be nearly equal to any evidences that can be brought for the most common facts. For it is very manifeft, as has been obferved before, that a great number of credible evidences make a fum total, that is equal to unity, or abfolute certainty, as this has been confidered in the foregoing part of this work, nearer than by any perceptible difference: and the greatest number can never arrive quite to unity. The evidence therefore for common facts cannot exceed that for the Scripture miracles by more than an imperceptible difference, if we estimate evidences according to the trueft and moft accurate manner. Hence the nearly equal evidences for each muft eftablish each in nearly an equal degree, unless we fuppofe either fome fuch inconfiftency between them, as that, common facts being allowed, the Scripture miracles must be abfolutely rejected, or that there is fome evidence against the Scripture miracles, which may be put in competition with that for them; neither of which things can be faid with any colour of reafon.

Fourthly, This whole matter may be put in another, and perhaps a more natural, as well as a more philofophical light; and that efpecially if the foregoing account of the mind be allowed. Affociation, i. e, analogy, perfect and imperfect, is the only foundation upon which we in fact do, or can, or ought to affent; and confequently a diffonance from analogy, or a repugnancy thereto, is a neceffary foundation for diffent. Now, it happens fometimes, that the fame thing is fupported and impugned by different analogies; or, if we put repugnance to analogy as equivalent to miracle, that both a fact and its non-existence imply a miracle; or, fince this cannot be, that that fide alone which is repugnant to the moft, and the moft perfect analogies, is miraculous, and therefore incredible. Let us weigh the Scripture miracles in this fcale. Now the progrefs of the human mind, as may be feen by all the inquiries into it, and particularly by the hiftory of affociation, is a thing of a determinate nature; a man's thoughts, words, and actions, are all generated by fomething previous; there is an established courfe for these things, an analogy, of which every man is a judge from what he feels in himfelf, and fees in others; and to fuppofe any number of men, in determinate circumftances, to vary from this general tenor of human nature in like circumftances, is a miracle, and may be made a miracle of any magnitude, i. e. incredible to any degree, by increafing the number and magnitude of the deviations. It is therefore a miracle in the human mind, as great as any can be conceived in the human body, to fuppofe that infinite multitudes of Chriftians, Jews, and

Heathens,

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