tain idea is purely arbitrary in this system, a difficulty which, as we shall now proceed to show, Bishop Wilkins endeavored to overcome in a very ingenious and truly philosophical way.

"If these marks or notes," he writes, "could be so contrived as to have such a dependence upon, and relation to, one another, as might be suitable to the nature of the things and notions which they represented; and so, likewise, if the names of things could be so ordered as to contain such a kind of affinity or opposition in their letters and sounds, as might be some way answerable to the nature of the things which they signified; this would yet be a farther advantage superadded, by which, besides the best way of helping the memory by natural method, the understanding likewise would be highly improved; and we should, by learning the character and the names of things, be instructed likewise in their natures, the knowledge of both of which ought to be conjoined." 1

The Bishop, then, undertakes neither more nor less than a classification of all that is or can be known, and he makes this dictionary of notions the basis of a corresponding dictionary of signs, both written and spoken. All this is done with great circumspection, and if we consider that it was undertaken nearly two hundred years ago, and carried out by one man single-handed, we shall be inclined to judge leniently of what may now seem to us antiquated and imperfect in his catalogue raisonné of human knowledge. A careful consideration of his work will show us why this language, which was meant to be perma

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nent, unchangeable, and universal, would, on the contrary, by its very nature, be constantly shifting. As our knowledge advances, the classification of our notions is constantly remodelled; nay, in a certain sense, all advancement of learning may be called a corrected classification of our notions. If a plant, classified according to the system of Linnæus, or according to that of Bishop Wilkins, has its own. peculiar place in their synopsis of knowledge, and its own peculiar sign in their summary of philosophical language, every change in the classification of plants would necessitate a change in the philosophical nomenclature. The whale, for instance, is classified by Bishop Wilkins as a fish, falling under the division of viviparous and oblong. Fishes, in general, are classed as substances, animate, sensitive, sanguineous, and the sign attached to the whale, by Bishop Wilkins, expresses every one of those differences which mark its place in his system of knowledge. As soon, therefore, as we treat the whale no longer as a fish, but as a mammal, its place is completely shifted, and its sign or name, if retained, would mislead us quite as much as the names of rainbow, thunderbolt, sunset, and others, expressive of ancient ideas which we know to be erroneous. This would happen even in strictly scientific subjects.

Chemistry adopted acid as the technical name of a class of bodies of which those first recognized in science were distinguished by sourness of taste. But as chemical knowledge advanced, it was discovered that there were compounds precisely analogous in essential character, which were not sour, and consequently acidity was but an accidental quality of

some of these bodies, not a necessary or universal character of all. It was thought too late to change the name, and accordingly in all European languages the term acid, or its etymological equivalent, is now applied to rock-crystal, quartz, and flint.

In like manner, from a similar misapplication of sall, in scientific use, chemists class the substance of which junk-bottles, French mirrors, windows, and opera-glasses are made, among the salts, while analysts have declared that the essential character, not only of other so-called salts, but of common kitchen-salt, the salt of salts, has been mistaken; that salt is not salt, and, accordingly, have excluded that substance from the class of bodies upon which, as their truest representative, it had bestowed its name.1

The Bishop begins by dividing all things which may be the subjects of language, into six classes or genera, which he again subdivides by their several differences. These six classes comprise:·

A. TRANSCENDENTAL NOTIONS.

B. SUBSTANCES.

C. QUANTITIES.

D. QUALITIES.
E. ACTIONS.

F. RELATIONS.

In B to F we easily recognize the principal pre dicaments or categories of logic, the pigeon-holes in which the ancient philosophers thought they could stow away all the ideas that ever entered the human

1 Marsh, History of the English Language, p. 211. Liebig, Chemische Briefe, 4th edit., i. p. 96.

mind. Under A we meet with a number of more abstract conceptions, such as kind, cause, condition, &c.

By subdividing these six classes, the Bishop arrives in the end at forty classes, which, according to him, comprehend everything that can be known or imagined, and therefore everything that can possibly claim expression in a language, whether natural or artificial. To begin with the beginning, we find that his transcendental notions refer either to things or to words. Referring to things, we have:

I. TRANSCENDENTALS GENERAL, such as the notions of kind, cause, differences, end, means, mode. Here, under kind, we should find such notions as being, thing, notion, name, substance, accident, &c. Under notions of cause, we meet with author, tool, aim, stuff, &c.

II. TRANSCENDENTALS OF MIXED RELATION, such as the notions of general quantity, continued quantity, discontinued quantity, quality, whole and part. Under general quantity the notions of greatness and littleness, excess and defect; under continued quantity those of length, breadth, depth, &c. would find their places.

III. TRANSCENDENTAL RELATIONS OF ACTIONS, such as the notions of simple action (putting, taking), comparate action (joining, repeating, &c.), business (preparing, designing, beginning), commerce (delivering, paying, reckoning), event (gaining, keeping, refresh ing), motion (going, leading, meeting).

IV. THE TRANSCENDENTAL NOTIONS OF DISCOURSE, comprehending all that is commonly comprehendea under grammar and logic; ideas such as noun, verb, particle, prose, verse, letter, syllogism, question, affirmative, negative, and many more.

After these general notions, which constitute the first four classes, but before what we should call the categories, the Bishop admits two independent classes of transcendental notions, one for God, the other for the World, neither of which, as he says, can be treated as predicaments, because they are not capable of any subordinate species.

V. The fifth class, therefore, consists entirely of the idea of God.

VI. The sixth class comprehends the WORLD OF universe, divided into spiritual and corporeal, and embracing such notions as spirit, angel, soul, heaven, planet, earth, land, &c.

After this we arrive at the five categories, subdivided into thirty-four subaltern genera, which, together with the six classes of transcendental notions, complete, in the end, his forty genera. The Bishop begins with substance, the first difference of which he makes to be inanimate, and distinguishes by the name of

VII. ELEMENT, as his seventh genus. Of this there are several differences, fire, air, water, earth, each comprehending a number of minor species.

Next comes SUBSTANCE INANIMATE, divided into vegetative and sensitive. The vegetative again he subdivides into imperfect, such as minerals, and perfect, such as plants.

The imperfect vegetative he subdivides into
VIII. STONE, and

IX. METAL.

STONE he subdivides by six differences, which, as he tells us, is the usual number of differences that he finds under every genus; and under each of these