ranked before in the tables under each genus, b expressing the first difference, d the second, and so

on.

The species is then expressed by putting after the consonant which stands for the difference one of the seven vowels, or, if more be wanted, the diphthongs.

Thus we get the following radicals corresponding to the general table of notions, as given above:—

Bab, bad, bag, bap, bat, bac, baz, bas, ban.

The species of the first difference of the first genus would be expressed by,

Baba, baba, babe, babi, babo, babe, baby, babyi, babyu.

Here baba would mean being, baba thing, babe notion, babi name, babo substance, babu, quantity, baby action, b byi relation.

For instance, if De signify element, he says, then Deb must signify the first difference, which, according to the tables, is fire; and Deba will denote the first species, which is flame. Det will be the fifth difference under that genus, which is appearing meteor; Deta the first species, viz. rainbow; Deta the second, viz. halo.

Thus if Ti signify the genus of Sensible Quality, then Tid must denote the second difference, which comprehends colors, and Tida must signify the second species under that difference, viz. redness, &c.

The principal grammatical variations, laid down in the philosophical grammar, are likewise expressed by certain letters. If the word, he writes, is an

adjective, which, according to his method, is always derived from a substantive, the derivation is made by the change of the radical consonant into another consonant, or by adding a vowel to it. Thus, if Da signifies God, dua must signify divine; if De signifies element, then due must signify elementary; if Do signifies stone, then duo must signify stony. In like manner voices and numbers and such-like accidents of words are formed, particles receive their phonetic representatives; and again, all his materials being shaped, a complete grammatical translation of the Lord's Prayer is given by the Bishop in his own newly-invented philosophical language.

I hardly know whether the account here given of the artificial language invented by Bishop Wilkins will be intelligible, for, in spite of the length to which it has run, many points had to be omitted which would have placed the ingenious conceptions of its author in a much brighter light. My object was chiefly to show that to people acquainted with a real language, the invention of an artificial language is by no means an impossibility, nay, that such an artificial language might be much more perfect, more regular, more easy to learn, than any of the spoken tongues of man. The number of radicals in the Bishop's language amounts to not quite 3000, and these, by a judicious contrivance, are sufficient to express every possible idea. Thus the same radical, as we saw, expresses, with certain slight modifications, noun, adjective, and verb. Again, if Di is once known to signify God, then ida must signify that which is opposed to God, namely, idol. If dab be spirit, odab will be body; if dad be heaven odad

will be hell. Again, if saba is king, sava is royalty salba is reigning, samba to be governed, &c.

Let us now resume the thread of our argument. We saw that in an artificial language, the whole system of our notions, once established, may be matched to a system of phonetic exponents; but we maintain, until we are taught the contrary, that no real language was ever made in this manner.

There never was an independent array of determinate conceptions waiting to be matched with an independent array of articulate sounds. As a matter of fact, we never meet with articulate sounds except as wedded to determinate ideas, nor do we ever, I believe, meet with déterminate ideas except as bodied forth in articulate sounds. This is a point of some importance on which there ought not to be any doubt or haze, and I therefore declare my conviction, whether right or wrong, as explicitly as possible, that thought, in one sense of the word, i. e. in the sense of reasoning, is impossible without language. After what I stated in my former lectures, I shall not be understood as here denying the reality of thought or mental activity in animals. Animals and infants that are without language, are alike without reason, the great difference between animal and infant being, that the infant possesses the healthy germs of speech and reason, only not yet developed into actual speech and actual reason, whereas the animal has no such germs or faculties, capable of development in its present state of existence. We must concede to animals "sensation, perception, memory, will, and judgment," but we cannot allow to them a trace of what the Greek called logos,

i. e. reason, literally, gathering, a word which most rightly and naturally expresses in Greek both speech and reason.1 Lógos is derived from légein, which, like Latin legere, means, originally, to gather. Hence Katálogos, a catalogue, a gathering, a list; collectio, a collection. In Homer, légein is hardly ever used in the sense of saying, speaking, or meaning, but always in the sense of gathering, or, more properly, of telling, for to tell is the German Zählen, and means originally to count, to cast up. Lógos, used in the sense of reason, meant originally, like the English tale, gathering; for reason, "though it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth, elevates our thoughts as high as the stars, and leads us through the vast spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric," is nothing more or less than the gathering up of the single by means of the general.1 The Latin intelligo, i. e. interligo, expresses still more graphically the interlacing of the general and the single, which is the peculiar province of the intellect. But Logos used in the sense of word, means likewise a gathering, for every word, or, at least, every name is based on the same process; it represents the gathering of the single under the general.

1 Cf. Farrar, p. 125; Heyse, p. 41.

2 Od xiv. 197, οὗ τι διαπρήξαιμι λέγων ἐμὰ κήδεα θυμού. Ulysses says he should never finish if he were to tell the sorrows of his heart, i. e. if he were to count or record them, not simply if he were to speak of them. • Locke, On the Understanding, iv. 17, 9.

4 This, too, is well put by Locke (iii. 3, 20) in his terse and homely language: "I would say that all the great business of genera and species, and their essences, amounts to no more but this; that men making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds, with names annexed to them, dc thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse of them, as it were, in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge, which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars."