But while these struggles had been going on in Europe, and partly in consequence of them, a great change had come over the political aspect of the New World. Our country no longer stood alone as the exponent of the American political system, and the object of absolutist jealousy. But this republic found itself at the head of a glorious sisterhood of free and independent states. The whole congeries of Spanish colonies on the continent of America, although in apparently the least possible preparation for the enjoyment of free institutions, had been first thrown loose from the control of the parent country by the breaking up of the regular government, through the ambition of Bonaparte; and having thus been compelled to assume the functions of self-government, they had severally, each by and for itself, successfully asserted and won their independence. The case is presented in a statesman-like way by Mr. Adams, when Secretary of State under President Monroe, in his letter of instructions to Mr. Anderson, the first American Minister to one of the Spanish Republics, dated May 27th, 1823:

"The revolution of the Spanish Colonies was not caused by the oppression under which they had been held, however great it had been. Their independence was first forced upon them by the temporary subjugation of Spain herself to a foreign power. They were, by that event, cast upon themselves, and compelled to establish governments of their own. Spain, through all the vicissitudes of her own revolutions, has clung to the desperate hope of retaining, or of reclaiming them to her own control; and has waged, to the extent of her power, a disastrous war, to that extent. In the mind of every rational man, it has been for years apparent that Spain can never succeed to recover her dominion where it has been abjured; nor is it possible that she can long retain the small remnant of her authority yet acknowledged in some spots of the South American continent."

It was a great and glorious change for America, and was not unappreciated by the great men who were then at the head of affairs in this country. Mr. Webster said, in his celebrated oration at the laying of the corner stone of the Bunker Hill monument, June 17th, 1825, that "among the great events of the half century, we must respect certainly the revolution of South America; and we are not likely to overrate the importance of that revolution, either to the growth of the country itself, or to the rest of the world. When the battle of Bunker Hill was fought, the existence of South America was scarcely felt in the

civilized world. The thirteen little colonies of North America habitually called themselves the continent. Borne down by colonial subjugation, monopoly, and bigotry, those vast regions of the South were hardly visible above the horizon. But in our day there has been, as it were, a new creation. The southern hemisphere emerges from the sea. Its lofty mountains begin to lift themselves into the light of heaven; its broad and fertile plains stretch out in beauty to the eye of civilized man; and at the bidding of the voice of political liberty, the waters of darkness retire."

*

With the exception of the British Provinces north of us, the power of Europe was driven from the continent. From the lakes to Cape Horn, every foot of land had ceased to belong to the European political system, or to be in any way responsible for the "Balance of Power" in the Old World. Mexico, indeed, temporarily, and Brazil permanently, had adopted monarchical forms of government, but they were entirely American in interest. Fortunately, we had men in the administration of our government, who possessed both the wisdom and the patriotism to comprehend the situation, and act as the occasion required. It was the golden period of our political history. The devotion to public interests which characterized the days of the revolution had not died out, for Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Rufus King, and many of their compatriots, were still alive. The native sagacity of our early statesmen which had baffled the diplomatic skill of Europe, had been ripened by the practical experience of thirty years in the administration of affairs at home and abroad. Private interest had not become so large as to withdraw most of the ablest men from public service. Party spirit had not eaten out the keen sense of what becomes the honor of the country. And slvery had not yet extinguished patriotism in half the states of the Union. It was in the lull of party strife called "the era of good feelings." It was the transition period between the patriotic inexperience of our infant government and the dominant selfishness of late years. Some of the men still in public life had participated in the cares of government when the indifference, if not contempt, of Europe for our insignificance was a shield to us against aggression. All of them had participated in the anxious

and critical period of the "second war of independence," by which we had at length gained the respectful consideration of the European governments. It was a crisis in our affairs, and we had men who could see its importance, and who knew how to meet it. And it is not too much to say, that if the policy which they adopted had been properly carried out by their successors, we should have been saved from many humiliations, as well as many political evils, which have been, or will be our portion.

The Holy Alliance had no thought of letting this whole continent slip out of their hands. The instant that they saw "the tranquility of Europe" restored by the suppression of popular freedom in Spain, their attention was turned towards this continent, with a determination first to resubjugate the colonies of Spain, and then to see what might be done towards breaking up the nest of dangerous principles in this country, and, if possible, put the United States into a situation where neither their doctrines nor their examples should again disturb the peace of Europe. The arrangements for this purpose were on the eve of being concluded, indeed were only waiting for the formal adhesion of England, when the sudden death of the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs laid the foundation for a change of policy in that government, which finally altered the whole course of events in Europe.

The Marquis of Londonderry, best known by the title of Lord Castlereagh, which he bore during the life of his father, died by his own hand, in a fit of insanity, caused, it was believed, by excessive care and labor in the session of parliament then just closed. He had managed the foreign affairs of England with consummate ability during all the latter years of the great continental conflict in Europe, which ended with the battle of Waterloo, and had taken a distinguished part in all the negotiations for the readjustment of boundaries and other relations of all the countries of Europe. He was in full sympathy with the reactionary governments, and as earnest as any in favor of such measures as were thought best calculated to protect legitimate and established dynasties against all future revolutions in favor

* In August, 1822.

For technical reasons,

of popular rights or democratic ideas. such as the forms of administration in England, he declined to make his government a party in form to the league of the Holy Alliance. But he acquiesced, tacitly at least, in the French invasion of Spain to suppress the Cortes. And he declared to Mr. Rush, our minister, that England would not assent to any pacification between Spain and the Spanish American states, that did not embrace the re-establishment of the supremacy of the Spanish crown.*

The death of Lord Castlereagh (Londonderry) gave the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to Mr. George Canning, who looked at public relations in a light entirely different from that seen by his predecessor. He is regarded as the most philosophical statesman that Great Britain has had during the century. An original thinker, with sound common-sense and liberal views, his character is not to be estimated without taking into consideration the circumstances and influences with which he was surrounded.† He not only declined to take part in any measures for the military coercion of the Spanish American States, but he soon came to look at the full recognition of their independence as the only practicable method of restoring peace in South America. At the earliest practicable period after getting possession of his office,

*"His lordship expressed regret that the United States viewed the question of independence in the colonies differently from England, giving as a reason the probable weight of their counsels with the colonies; so that, although my government was no formal party to the mediation, if, nevertheless, it had harmonized with England on the question of independence, the hope would have been increased of seeing the dispute healed the sooner, through influence which, from local and political causes, the United States might mutually be supposed to have with the colonies. How far it was practicable to settle it, giving back to Spain her supremacy, and granting to the colonies a just government under her sway, was not for him to say; but it was the hope to which the European Alliance still clung." Feb. 12, 1819. Rush's Memoranda, Vol. II., p. 17.

+ Mr. Canning was an orator of the highest rank, as well as a wise statesman and skillful diplomatist. His predecessor's oratory was lampooned in "The Twopenny Post-Bag."

"Why is a pump like Viscount Castlereagh?
Because it is an ugly thing of wood,

That up and down its awkward arm doth play,
And coolly spout, and spout, and spout away,

In one weak, washy, everlasting flood."

and prior to the actual invasion of Spain by the French, under the Duke D'Angouleme, he intimated to the French government that "England considered the course of events as having substantially decided the question of the separation of the colonies from Spain," although the formal recognition of their independence by her might be hastened or retarded by various causes. Mr. Rush, in giving an account of his first formal diplomatic interview with Mr. Canning, which was on the 16th of August, 1823, describes the informal conversation which they held on Spanish American affairs. After the regular business of the interview was disposed of, Mr. Rush introduced the subject by referring to Mr. Canning's intimation made to France, in March, and remarked that he considered that note as a distinct avowal that England would not remain passive under any attempt by France to re-subjugate the Spanish colonies. Mr. Canning then asked Mr. Rush whether it was practicable for the United States to go hand in hand with England in such a policy. Thereupon arose a free and candid interchange of thoughts, broadly covering the whole case. Mr. Rush persistently pressed the inquiry to learn the precise intentions of England in regard to the acknowledgment of the independence of the late colonies, as he was satisfied that the course of the United States would be influenced in no small degree by this consideration. Mr. Canning said that the question of recognition was yet an open one, but finally said that he was about to send a commission of inquiry which might lead to recognition.*

We come now to the point which is of some importance, both historical and political, in its bearing on the importance to be attached to the course taken by our government. Which gov

ernment, the American or the English, is entitled to the credit of taking the lead in the recognition of the Spanish-American states as independent nations? On this general question there is no uncertainty. The United States originated every step, in sending out a commission of inquiry, then in appointing consuls to these governments, and finally in conceding a full recognition of their nationality, and sending ministers to negotiate treaties of amity and commerce. All this was done before the first step *Rush, Vol. II., pp. 400-404.