SIEGE OF ANTWERP

BY THE PRINCE OF PAR MA,

IN THE YEARS 1584 AND 1585.

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Ir is an interesting spectacle to observe the struggle of man's inventive genius in conflict with powerful opposing ele-. ments, and to see the difficulties, which are insurmountable to, ordinary capacities, overcome by prudence, resolution, and a determined will. Less attractive, but only the more instructive, perhaps, is the contrary spectacle, where the absence of those qualities renders all efforts of genius vain, throws away all the favours of fortune, and where inability to improve such advantages renders hopeless a success which otherwise seemed sure and inevitable. Examples of both kinds are afforded by. the celebrated siege of Antwerp, by the Spaniards, towards the close of the sixteenth century, by which that flourishing. city was for ever deprived of its commercial prosperity, but, which, on the other hand, conferred immortal fame on the general who undertook and accomplished it.

Twelve years had the war continued, which the northern provinces of Belgium had commenced at first in vindication, simply of their religious freedom, and the privileges of their states, from the encroachments of the Spanish viceroy, but maintained latterly in the hope of establishing their inde pendence of the Spanish crown. Never completely victors, but never entirely vanquished, they wearied out the Spanish valour by tedious operations on an unfavourable soil, and ex hausted the wealth of the sovereign of both the Indies, while they themselves were called beggars, and in a degree actually

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were so. The League of Ghent, which had united the whole Netherlands, Roman Catholic and Protestant, in a common and (could such a confederation have lasted) invincible body, was indeed dissolved; but in place of this uncertain and un natural combination, the northern provinces had, in the year 1579, formed among themselves the closer Union of Utrecht, which promised to be more lasting, inasmuch as it was linked and held together by common political and religious interests. What the new republic had lost in extent, through this sepa ration from the Roman Catholic provinces, it was fully compensated for by the closeness of alliance, the unity of enterprise, and energy of execution; and, perhaps, it was fortunate in thus timely losing what no exertion, probably, would ever have enabled it to retain.

The greater part of the Walloon provinces had, in the year 1584, partly by voluntary submission, and partly by force of arms, been again reduced under the Spanish yoke. The northern districts alone had been able at all successfully to oppose it. A considerable portion of Brabant and Flanders still obstinately held out against the arms of the Duke Alexander of Parma, who at that time administered the civil government of the provinces, and the supreme command of the army, with equal energy and prudence, and, by a series of splendid victories, had revived the military reputation of Spain. The peculiar formation of the country, which, by its numerous rivers and canals, facilitated the connexion of the towns with one another and with the sea, baffled all attempts effectually to subdue it, and the possession of one place could only be maintained by the occupation of another. So long as this communication was kept up. Holland and Zealand could with little difficulty assist their allies, and supply them abundantly by water as well as by land witn all necessaries, so that valour was of no use, and the strength of the king's troops was fruitlessly wasted on tedious sieges.

Of all the towns in Brabant, Antwerp was the most im portant, as well from its wealth, its population. and its military force, as by its position on the mouth of the Scheldt. This great and populous town, which at this date contained more than 80,000 inhabitants, was one of the most active members of the national league, and had in the course of the war distinguished itself above all the towns of Belgium, by an

untameable spirit of liberty. As it fostered within its bosom all the three Christian churches, and owed much of its prosperity to this unrestricted religious liberty, it had the more cause to dread the Spanish rule, which threatened to abolish this toleration, and by the terror of the Inquisition to drive all the Protestant merchants from its markets. Moreover, it had had but too terrible experience of the brutality of the Spanish garrisons, and it was quite evident that if it once more suffered this insupportable yoke to be imposed upon it, it would never again, during the whole course of the war, be able to throw it off.

But powerful as were the motives which stimulated Antwerp to resistance, equally strong were the reasons which de termined the Spanish general to make himself master of the place at any cost. On the possession of this town depended, in a great measure, that of the whole province of Brabant, which by this channel chiefly derived its supplies of corn from Zealand, while the captu, e of this place would secure to the victor the command of the Scheldt. It would also deprive the League of Brabant, which held its meetings in the town, of its principal support; the whole faction of its dangerous influence, of its example, its counsels, and its money, while the treasures of its inhabitants would open plentiful supplies for the military exigencies of the king. Its fall would, sooner or later, necessarily draw after it that of all Brabant, and the preponderance of power in that quarter would decide the whole dispute in favour of the king. Determined by these grave considerations, the Duke of Parma drew his forces together in July, 1584, and advanced from his position at Dornick to the neighbourhood of Antwerp, with the intention of invest ing it.

But both the natural position and fortifications of the town appeared to defy attacks. Surrounded on the side of Brabant with insurmountable works and moats, and towards Flanders covered by the broad and rapid stream of the Scheldt, it could not be carried by storm; and to blockade a town of such ex tent, seemed to require a land force three times larger than that which the duke had, and moreover a fleet, of which he was utterly destitute. Not only did the river yield the town all necessary supplies from Ghent, it also opened an easy commu. nication with the bordering province of Zealand. For, as the

tide of the North Sea extends far up the Scheldt, and ebbs and flows regularly, Antwerp enjoys the peculiar advantage, that the same tide flows past it at different times in two opposite directions. Besides, the adjacent towns of Brussels, Ma lines, Ghent, Dendermonde, and others, were all at this time in the hands of the league, and could aid the place from the land side also. To blockade, therefore, the town by land, and to cut off its communication with Flanders and Brabant, required two different armies, one on each bank of the river. A sufficient fleet was likewise needed to guard the passage of the Scheldt, and to prevent all attempts at relief, which would most certainly be made from Zealand. But by the war which he had still to carry on in other quarters, and by the numerous garrisons which he was obliged to leave in the towns and fortified places, the army of the duke was reduced to 10,000 infantry and 1700 horse, a force very inadequate for an undertaking of such magnitude. Moreover, these troops were deficient in the most necessary supplies, and the long arrears of pay had excited them to subdued murmurs, which hourly threatened to break out into open mutiny. If, notwithstanding these difficulties, he should still attempt the siege, there would be much occasion to fear from the strongholds of the enemy, which were left in the rear, and from which it would be easy, by vigorous sallies, to annoy an army distributed over so many places, and to expose it to want by cutting off its supplies.

All these considerations were brought forward by the council of war, before which the Duke of Parma now laid his scheme. However great the confidence which they placed in themselves, and in the proved abilities of such a leader, nevertheless, the most experienced generals did not disguise their despair of a fortunate result. Two only were exceptions, Capizucchi and Mondragone, whose ardent courage placed them above all apprehensions, the rest concurred in dissuading the duke from attempting so hazardous an enterprise, by which they ran the risk of forfeiting the fruit of all their former victories, and tarnishing the glory they had already earned.

But objections, which he had already made to himself and refuted, could not shake the Duke of Parma in his purpose. Not in ignorance of its inseparable dangers, not from thought lessly overvaluing his forces, had he taken this bold resolve

But that instinctive genius, which leads great men by paths which inferior. minds either never enter upon or never finish, raised him above the influence of the doubts which a cold and narrow prudence would oppose to his views, and without being able to convince his generals, he felt the correctness of his calculations in a conviction indistinct, indeed, but not on that account less indubitable. A succession of fortunate results had raised his confidence, and the sight of his army, un equalled in Europe for discipline, experience, and valour, and commanded by a chosen body of the most distinguished officers, did not permit him to entertain fear for a moment. To those who objected to the small number of his troops, he answered, that however long the pike, it is only the point that kills; and that in military enterprise, the moving power was of more importance than the mass to be moved. He was aware, indeed, of the discontent of his troops, but he knew also their obedience; and he thought, moreover, that the best means to stifle their murmurs was by keeping them employed in some important undertaking, by stimulating their desire of glory by the splendour of the enterprise, and their rapacity, by hopes of the rich booty which the capture of so wealthy a town would hold out.

In the plan which he now Tormed for the conduct of the siege, he endeavoured to meet all these difficulties. Famine was the only instrument by which he could hope to subdue the town; but effectually to use this formidable weapon, it would be expedient to cut off all its land and water communications. With this view, the first object was to stop, or at least to impede, the arrival of supplies from Zealand. It was, therefore, requisite not only to carry all the outworks, which the people of Antwerp had built on both shores of the Scheldt for the protection of their shipping; but also, wher ever feasible, to throw up new batteries, which should com mand the whole course of the river and to prevent the place from drawing supplies from the land side, while efforts were being made to intercept their transmission by sea, all the adjacent towns of Brabant and Flanders were comprehended in the plan of the siege, and the fall of Antwerp was based on the destruction of all those places. A bold, and con sidering the duke's scanty force, an almost extravagant project,