of that truth, would be worse than unserviceable; would tend only to expose them to the imputation of making groundless pretensions, and thus to give a colour to the cavils of the infidel, who is ready enough to charge them with falsely laying claim to the original announcement of a doctrine already well established.

It will be advisable therefore to inquire first into the notions entertained on this subject by the ancient Pagans and by the Jews, and into the grounds on which those notions rested; in order that the questions may be, as far as possible, decided, how far natural Reason, and how far the Mosaic Revelation, are calculated to afford, what I can find only in the Gospel, a rational and a well-established assurance of a future state. I say, well-established," because if the doctrine were made to rest even on the most decisive evidence, but on such evidence as could not be comprehended by any but profound philosophers, the mass of mankind would still need a revelation to assure them of it. On the other hand, I say, "rational," as well as "established," because however general and confident the belief of it might be, if that belief rested on no

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"rational" grounds, it would still need to be made known (since conjecture is not knowledge) on sufficient authority. It is important therefore to remember, that there are two points, neither of which should be lost sight of in the present inquiry in what degree the belief of a future state prevailed among the ancients; and how far those who did entertain such belief were correct in their notions of it, and warranted in maintaining them: since it is plain, that no opinion deserves to be called knowledge, except so far as it is not only agreeable to truth, but also supported by adequate evidence.

It ought to be observed, that, in order to avoid vagueness and ambiguity in speaking of the knowledge of a future state, or of any thing else, we should steadily keep in mind the precise signification of the word Knowledge; which implies, when strictly employed, three things; viz. Truth, Proof, and Conviction. It is plain, that no one can, properly speaking, be said to know any thing that is not true, however confident his belief of it may be: but even if to this confident belief, truth be added, still there is properly no knowledge, unless there is suf

ficient proof to justify such confidence: one man, e. g. may feel fully satisfied that the moon is inhabited, and another may feel equally certain that it is not; and one of them must have truth on his side; but neither in fact possesses knowledge, because neither can have sufficient proof to offer. Lastly, both truth and proof are insufficient to constitute knowledge in the mind of one to whom that proof is not completely satisfactory: it is true that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; but though Euclid's demonstration of that truth is complete, no one can be said to know that they are so, who is not fully convinced by that demonstration, but remains in a state of hesitation.

§ 3. The popular mythology of the Greeks and Romans (to direct our attention in the first place to the Pagan nations) did certainly contain ample descriptions of a life after this, and of the places prepared for the reward and punishment, respectively, of the virtuous and the wicked. And though it might be urged, with truth, that this mythology, resting as it did on no other evidence than that of vague, and

incoherent, and contradictory tradition, could not afford any rational assurance of a future state," and also that it did not inculcate the doctrine of a resurrection, and was in many other points greatly at variance with what Christians receive as the authentic and true account; still it must be admitted, that a system so far correct in its outline as to contain the notion of a just judgment, and a state of retribution hereafter, to be influenced by our conduct during the present life, would, in some degree, supply the want of the Gospel-revelation on these points; provided it were (on whatever evidence) fully

a Such, of course, must be the case with the notions of Pagans of the present day on the subject, as well as with those of the barbarous nations of antiquity, of whose mythology we have no distinct and authentic accounts. How far the doctrine of a future state did or does prevail, and prevail as a matter of serious belief, in those nations, it is by no means easy to determine on sufficient evidence. In those of modern times it is also difficult, if not impossible, to decide, whether, and to what degree, some parts of their religion may have been derived, through a remote and corrupt tradition, from the Gospel. The fairest mode of trying the question therefore seems to be, by examining the opinions that prevailed before the promulgation of the Gospel.

and firmly, and generally established among the mass of the community.

Now that this was not the case with respect to the accounts of a future state current among the ancients, is the conclusion which will present itself to any one who examines the question fully and candidly. I say, fully and candidly, because one whose researches are very limited, will not be unlikely to have met with such passages only in ancient writers as would, of themselves, lead to a contrary conclusion; and one who is strongly prepossessed in favour of that conclusion, will confine his attention to those passages, seeking only to explain away all that militate against it. The truth is, there are many passages to be found (and that, frequently in the same authors) of each description; some that seem to imply the general belief, and others the disbelief, of the accounts of a future life. And some have dwelt on the numerical superiority of those passages that favour the doctrine; as if a book were to be regarded in the same light as a legislative assembly, in which we have only to count the votes on each side, and consider the decision of the majority as that of the whole.