These distinctions of person cannot be the effect of example alone; for they appear in the earliest infancy, when the mimetic powers are incapable of action, and when mere nature (if the expression may be used) is too natural to be concealed, The Athanasian creed states, that" the SoN is of the FATHER alone not made, nor created, but begotten:" and it is generally understood, that these words imply the generation of the second Person in the Trinity. But is not this a propagation of spirit from spirit, in that sense, utterly inscrutable to reason? and can they, who admit the verity of that creed in this instance, consistently resist a psychogenesis in a subordinate rank of being ?→→→ I tread with awe upon this holy ground, and dare to trespass here no farther, not even in my imagination. One may safely take more liberty with men, and their opinions: and the present abstruse subject may be ventilated, without the least breach of faith, charity, or good manners. As a topic of nature, it may innocently exercise the faculties of the soul respecting its own being; and if grace can draw any instruction from it, which may tend to display the glory of the divine attributes, it may be more than a pleasant speculation for a christian. In this view, I will venture to add some humble thoughts to the preceding considerations. It is readily allowed by writers on both sides of the question, that the body is not the man, but, rather, the soul dwelling in, or informing the body.* How then *Thus Lactantius elegantly: Corpusculum hoc, quo induti sumus, hominis receptaculum est. Nam ipse homo neque tangi, neque aspici, neque comprehendi potest; quia latet intra hoe, quod videtur. De Opif. Dei. §. 19. can can we be properly called the children of men; if that, which is not man, is all that we derive from our parents? If body is allowed to be dead immediately upon its disjunction from the soul; then, not in the earliest instance, can it be admitted to have lived till it possessed the soul. If it did not live in the moment of concep tion, the anatomists will dispute perhaps any later period:* but, if it did, the soul must have been traduced or created, in that individual instant, with it or for it. If traduced with it, then with itself the soul must have lived before in the parent: and this most difficult part of the mystery must take its resolution with the following scriptures; how the first man Adam, being a living soul,† and Eve the mother of all living, could possibly be the progenitors of only dead matter, which the body must be if not generated with the soul; and how in that case their offspring, both in body and soul, became sinful alike before God, and liable to death; and especially as death is not to be considered as natural, but penal. If it be said, with Austin, Anima creatur infundendo, et infunditur creando; we may be puzzled to find out a precise meaning to those words; but we shall perhaps be more puzzled to avoid the charge of imputing to God a positive concurrence in *Charlton, Oecon. Anim. p. 280. + It is granted, that the Hebrew uses great latitude in the word 53, here rendered soul, applying it sometimes to the outward frame; but in Gen, ii. 7. it cannot be understood of that inferior principle of nature alone, but at least of his body and soul together, if not of his soul only; 3 or 1 are the terms generally used to express his intellectual or spiritual part, as is to name the carnal. those those adulterous connexions, which are attended wit issue. The famous and learned St. Jerom, as in all other things which he opposed, was a warm adversary to the doctrine of the soul's traduction. There are several arguments, collected from him by an uncertain author, and annexed to his works under the title of Dialogus Hieronymi & Augustini, which relate to this subject; one or two of which (as they have not been discussed before) may be considered. He cites Exod. xxi. 22. that if a man strike a woman with child, and she miscarry, life should be given for life, if the child were fully formed; but a fine only should be laid, if otherwise: and from thence he argues, that the soul doth not inhabit the body, till the body be completely formed, and consequently that the soul is not traduced. This is a question of fact to be settled by abler physiologists than Jerom. But as to the doctrine, it is rather mis-stated. Moses speaks not of the mischief which might ensue to the fœtus, but to the woman. If she by violence miscarried, yet survived, a fine should be paid by the assaulter to the husband; but if her death ensued, the assaulter, as in other cases of murder, could not be pardoned.* Si cum semine et anima existit ex anima, multæ animæ quotidie pereunt; cum semen fluxu quodam non profecit nativitati. If this did not also compose a complete body, so as to form a child of Adam (which he must have *This comment of Jerom's is taken from the LXX; and it is also adopted by Ramburtius. Thes. Sedan. De homine, vol. ii. p. 264. allowed,) allowed,) then no creature perished. The same answer will serve for the soul. Sed ex quo detur; ex mare an fæmina? This question can only be answered by another: From which is the body? I must here take my leave, upon this subject, of the learned father: only observing, that it cannot be right to say of those, who are on either side of such a question, as he ventures to do, Anathema sint. We know so little concerning the mode of spiritual existences, that we only hazard opinions, when we offer to determine upon their powers. It is a very antient doctrine, which some learned and modern christians have adopted, that the soul doth not so much live in the body, as the body in the soul. However that be, it is certain, that more spirits than one can reside in and actuate one body: witness, the seven evil spirits in Mary Magdalene, and a legion of them in another, who must have had their own particular influence upon both those bodies, in communion either with or without their own proper souls. One would not venture from hence to urge the generation of spirits, or (as they are commonly called) angels, nor yet from the rabbinical sense of that scripture, which relates the intercourse of the sons of God with the daughters of men, Gen. vi. 4. but if the invisible world be peopled with inhabitants in a manner analogous to that which we see about us, there seems neither impiety nor impossibility in such a notion. The etherial regions are infinite; and as creatures, be they what they may, are but finite; their immortality can never be a surcharge upon their increase; and what is innumerable can can never exceed what is unbounded. There is a PROFOUND, which generation and creation together can neither fill nor fathom. I have been the more inclined to the opinion I have here ventured to maintain, from the fullest conviction of that philosophical (I had almost said, divine) argument, that mind is the first agent, and that body is but its instrument in all operations. By this gross medium it is confined to this world, and communicates with the material forms upon it. The objects of sense, and the senses which perceive those objects, do not inform the soul concerning its own nature, for it is above them; nor concerning the nature of God, for he is infinitely more so. To this effect is that luminous observation of F. Mallebranche, which M. Rollin quotes in his account of the antient philosophers: "The senses were given us by God (says he,) not to enable us to know the nature of objects, but their relation to us; not what they are in themselves, but whether they are advantageous or hurtful to our bodies." Upon the whole; it can be no shame, after so great a man as Austin, for an inferior mind to acknowledge embarrassment upon so difficult a subject. In many cases, we may be content to take up with the probable, rather than expect the certain. The string of notions which Tully* gives us, and from him Macrobius,† taken from the greatest philosophers, concerning the nature of the soul, may incline us to pity and bewail the darkness of all our thoughts upon the very fountain from which they spring. But, at the same time, our hearts *Tusc. Quæst. 1. i. § 19, &c. Somn. Scip. l. i. c. 14. should |