depravity, of the prince of evil demons, than that suggested by the poet, when he makes him say,

Evil, be thou my good.""

The converse of this sentiment is no less true, that there is no pleasure so great as that which arises from the cultivation of the affections. Of these, the highest of all are the religious; but it is of the benevolent that I at present speak. David was deeply sensible of this, and has beautifully expressed his feelings with regard to both. Speaking of the latter, he says, "Behold how good and how pleasant a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." He compares it to the holy ointment with which Aaron was consecrated to the service of God, at once graceful and ennobling; and to the dew which descended on the mountains of Zion, sparkling in the beams of the morning, and shedding refreshment and fertility around. Paul has equally extolled this virtue, in that celebrated passage in his Epistle to the Corinthians, in which he describes it under the name of charity. His last characteristic of this principle is that which crowns the whole. It survives death, and is perfected in heaven. 66 Charity never faileth; but whether there be prophesies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away; for we know in part, and prophesy in part; but when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." "And now abideth faith, hope, charity,-these three; but the greatest of these is charity."

Love is, indeed, the perfection of our being, and the source of our highest happiness. It is the very soul of angelic natures; and the cultivation of it on earth, is the best preparation for the heavenly society, when time shall be no more. The various arrangements, therefore, alluded to in former papers, by which the domestic and social affections are called forth and exercised, have a far higher ultimate object than that of binding society

together, and contributing to our enjoyments in our present imperfect state. They have reference to eternity, and the faculties which they cultivate shall find their noblest exercise in heaven.

EIGHTH WEEK-MONDAY.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OPERATIONS OF REASON AND INSTINCT, AS AFFORDING ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE DIVINE PERFECTIONS.

IN turning, as we are now about to do, from the effects produced by the instincts of the inferior creation, to those accomplished by the exercise of the rational faculties of man, in aiding the productive powers impressed on nature, it will be necessary to attend to some circumstances, which serve, in a certain degree, to give a new character to our reasoning. The instincts by which the lower animals perform the important offices necessary for the production and rearing of their young, are obviously contrivances with which they have nothing to do, farther than to execute a task assigned to them by a Superior Power. It is clear that there is a great end to be attained, that they perform certain actions necessary for the attainment of that end, and yet that they are altogether unconscious of the part which they are acting, and even entirely ignorant of the end itself; and it hence follows, that every movement which they make, tending to the preservation of their species, comes irresistibly home to our understandings, as a proof of wise intention, not in themselves, but in the unseen Author of their nature. Thus, when the bird builds its curious nest, and, having deposited its eggs, patiently broods upon them for the appointed time; and then, after the fostering warmth of her body has produced the callow young, when she tenderly watches over them, catering for them

with the most assiduous toil, and teaching them to flutter their little wings, to sport in the liquid air, and to forage for themselves; in all this, it is impossible not to perceive, that, by whatever second causes such instincts are prompted, they can be no other than the original ordination of Creative Intelligence.

It is different, however, with the labours of man. He too, indeed, has his instinctive propensities, some of which have for their object the production and preservation of the species; while they lead, as we have seen, by necessary consequences, to important results, which he neither contrived nor anticipated; and, thus far, the argument is the same for him as for the brutes. But he is also endowed with rational powers, in virtue of which he speculates on the future, and, deciding on the conclusions of his own mind, lays plans on which he acts, and bends the powers of nature to his will. It is in this way that he proceeds, in his agricultural schemes and employments. They are the fruit of his own skill. He has reasoned on the properties and functions of the soil, and of its vegetable productions, and on the vicissitudes and the genial powers of the climate; he has profited by his own experience and that of others; and thus he converts the barren waste into a fruitful field, and causes the desert to blossom as the rose. There is here something altogether different from instinct; and, in looking for the hand of the Creator, we find another, and seemingly independent, intelligence at work, which interrupts our view, and causes us to consider the matter more deeply. We have, however, but to turn back a single step. Who endowed man with his rational faculties? Who so contrived the soil, and the vegetable world, and even the seasons themselves, as to be subservient to the use of man, and under the control of these rational faculties? Undoubtedly the same Eternal Being, who bestowed on the rest of the living world their instincts. Every thing, therefore, resolves itself ultimately into the appointment of Creative Wisdom.

But, besides this original creation, there is a superintending Providence, which guides, controls, and overrules all events, so as to render that in reality a providential occurrence, which appears, at first sight, to be the mere result of human ingenuity. Look, for example, at the invention of the steam-engine, which has caused, and is now causing, such a revolution in human affairs, by bestowing on man such extraordinary powers. It was the Creator who endowed steam with the amazing expansive force which it possesses, and with the quality of instant condensation by cold. It is true, that these properties remained long unemployed,—that for many ages the steam poured uselessly from the teakettle and the caldron, and, though so familiar to man, was passed by without a suspicion of the benefits it was capable of conferring. But the powers were there, ready to be used when the progress of society demanded their aid; and the human faculties were, meanwhile, undergoing a discipline and a training, which sharpened their ingenuity, and added activity and enterprise to skill; knowledge accumulated, human wants increased, commerce extended, manufactures rose in importance. It was then that a force was required, which might give new energy to human exertions, and proportion them to the growing demands of society. This was sought for, and found to be at hand. Is any one so sceptical as to deny, that, though the steam-engine be the result of human contrivance, steam itself received from its Creator its extraordinary qualities, for the express purpose of becoming thus, at the proper period, subservient to the wants of man?

And what is human contrivance? Is it not the result of faculties impressed on the mind by the hand of the Eternal, and brought to maturity by the various adaptations, incitements, and suggestions of His providential arrangements? In every way, then, the invention in question may be traced, by a devout mind, to the Supreme Being, as its final cause.

Now, this is but an example of the operations of Providence, as they regard the rational creation. The believer sees the Divine Hand everywhere, and the light, which is thus thrown on the operations of Nature, in connexion with human reason, is most wonderful and edifying.

But, although this view is altogether satisfactory to a mind already, by other evidence, convinced of the being and perfections of the Infinite Mind, I am by no means sure that the same train of reasoning can be brought to bear against the prejudices of the infidel, with a force at all equal to that which overpowers him in contemplating the blind, and yet intelligent and admirably contrived, operations of instinct. Here the intelligence and contrivance, as I have said, being, obviously, not in the animal itself, force us to look up to the unseen Creator; but, with regard to the actions of rational creatures, it is much easier to rest in the second cause. An objector may say, "I see, in the human faculties, sufficient power and intelligence for the production of such a piece of mechanism, or for the contrivance of such an improvement; on the one hand are the materials, and on the other are the results of his ingenuity in operating upon them. I rest here, and see no reason to go farther." When we are opposed by such an objection as this, we are thrown back upon the independent arguments from which Creative Wisdom and a Superintending Providence are adduced; and, convincing as the reasoning is to ourselves, we feel that it is not suited to such a frame of mind.

In speaking, then, of agricultural improvements produced by human ingenuity, the only argument we can hold with the atheist is this,-that there is an astonishing and obviously intended adaptation, in natural objects, to human wants, and to the powers and faculties of the human mind. The one is, in every respect, suited to the other; and in that suitableness there is creative contrivance. To this extent, at least, the infidel may be met upon his own ground.

VOL. II.

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