ought to regulate them by fome Standard.

The Acts of the understanding are by fome men thought as free from all Law as the Acts of the will are from all necessity, and accordingly they give every one a Toleration to abound in his own fenfe and (provided his actions be conformable to the Rule) to think what he please. Now fince a Man cannot be accountable for an Opinion of himself in particular, unless it be firft granted that he is under a Law as to the Acts of his understanding in general, before I can proceed any farther I find it necessary to lay down this Preparatory Pofition, That we are under an Obligation as to the Acts of our understanding, or (which is all one) that we are accountable for them. Nay I believe I may venture higher and affirm that the understanding is not only under Obligation but that 'tis the Primary and immediate Subject of of it. For the proof of which Paradox, I defire the Patrons of the Intellectual Libertinifm to confider, that that must be the Primary and immediate fubject of all Obligation which is fo of Liberty. Now that this cannot be the Will,I fuppofe will be acknowledged a clear con sequence if the Will neceffarily follows the Practical Dictate of the Understanding. And that it does fo, I think there is Demonftration..

'Tis

'Tis an unquestionable Axiom in all the Schools of Learning in the world, that the Object of the Will is apparent good; Now apparent good in other words, is that which is apprehended or judg'd to be good, and if fo, then it follows that the Will cannot but conform to the Dictate of the Understanding, because otherwife fome thing might be the object of the Will that is not apprehended good, which is contrary to the fuppofition. In short, the Will (as Aquinas has well expreffed it) is the Conclufion of an Operative Syllogifm, and follows as neceffa rily from the Dictate of the Understanding as as any other Conclufion does from its Premifes, and confequently cannot be the immediate fubject of Liberty, and confequently not of Obligation.

2

But then are we not involv'd in the fame difficulty as to the understanding? Does not that act with equal (if not more) neceffity than the Will? So I know it is ordinarily taught. But if this be abfolutely and univerfally true, I must confefs it above the reach of my Capacity to falve the Notion of Morality, or Religion, or to find out an expedient how the Foundations of the Intellectual world fhould not be out of courfe. For fince 'tis evident both from the preceding Demonftration, and from experimental Reflection, that the Will neceffaB

rily

rily acts in Conformity to the Dictates of the Understanding, if thofe very Dictates are also wholely and altogether neccffary, there can be no fuch thing as a ', the man is bound hand and foot, has nothing left whereby to render him a Moral Agent, to qualify him for Law or Obligation, Vertue or Vice, Reward or Punishment. But thefe are Abfurdities not to be indured, and therefore I conclude according to the Rules of right Reasoning, the Principle from which they flow to be fo too. 20

To clear up then the whole Difficulty with as much Brevity and Perfpicuity as in a matter of this intricacy is poffible, I fhall no longer confider the Understanding and Will as Faculties really distinct either from the Soul it self, or from one another, but that the Soul does immediately understand and will by it felf, without the intervention of any Faculty whatfoever. And that for this demonstrative reafon in fhort, because in the contrary Hypothefis, either Fudgement must be afcribed to the Will, and then the will immediately commences Understanding, or the Affent of the Will muft be blind, brutish, and accountable, both which are as great Abfurdities as they are true Confes quences. This being premifed, I grant that as the Soul neceffarily Wolls as he understands,

E

&

fo

fo likewife does fhe neceffarily understand as the Object appears. And thus far our fight terminates in Fatality, and Neceffity bounds our Horizon. That then that must give us a Profpect beyond it, must be this, that altho the Soul neceffarily understands or judges accor ding to the Appearance of things, yet that things fhould fo appear (unless it be in Propofitions that are felf-evident, as that the whole is greater than any one part, or the like) is not alike neceffary, but depends upon the degrees of Advertency or Attention which the Soul uses, and which to use either more or lefs is fully and immediately in her own power. And this indifferency of the Soul as to attending or not attending I take to be the only rò ihr, the bottom and foundation into which the Morality of every action must be at length refolv'd. For a farther proof as well as Illustration of which Hypothefis let us apply it to a particular cafe and try how well it will answer the Phanomena. In the cafe then of Martyrdom, I look upon fin as an evil, and not only fo but (while I attend fully to its Nature) the greatest of evils. And as long as I continue this Judgement 'tis utterly impoffible I fhould commit it, there being according to my prefent apprehenfion no greater evil for the declining of which I fhould think it eligible. But now the evil of Pain being presented before

me, and I not fufficiently attending to the evil of Sin, this latter appears to be the leffer evil of the two, and I accordingly pro hic & nunc fo pronounc it, and in Conformity to that judgement neceffarily chufe it. But because 'twas abfolutely in my power to have attended more heedfully there was Liberty in the Principle, the mistake which influenc'd the action was vincible, and confequently the action it felf imputable. This Hypothefis however strange it may feem to those that have fworn Faith and Allegiance to the Dictates of the Schools, I believe will be the more approv'd the more it is examin'd, and that not only as rational and confistent in it self, but also as a refuge from those Abfurdities which attend the ordinary Solutions. Neither is this account wholely unlicens'd by Authority, for I find fome hints and intima*See Hiero. tions of it in the School of Plato, where the cles upon the reason why thofe middle fort of Beings call'd Golden Ver- Heroes are not fo uniformly pure as the A'd varos deo or Nées, is affign'd to be because they do not fo equally attend to the Beauty of the Supream Good.

fes of Pythagoras.

t

From what has been faid it appears plainly that the Morality of every humane action must be at length refolv'd into an immediate indifference that the Soul has of attending or not attending, and confequently that we are not only

under