man then been left solely to the operation of his own natural powers, it is incumbent upon these writers to show, that his condition would have differed, as to speech, from that of the Hanoverian savage.

As for those writers who admit the Mosaic account, and yet attribute to Adam the formation of language, unassisted by divine instruction, they seem to entertain a notion more incomprehensible than the former; inasmuch as the first exercise of language by the father of mankind, is stated to have preceded the production of Eve, and cannot, consistently with the scripture account, be supposed to have been long subsequent to his own creation. So that according to these theorists, he must have devised a medium of communication, before any human being existed with whom to communicate he must have been able to apply an organ unexercised and inflexible, to the arduous and delicate work of articulation: and he must at once have attained the use of words, without those multiplied preparatory experiments and concurring aids, which seem on all hands admitted to be indispensable to the discovery and production of speech.

To remedy some of these difficulties, it has been said, that the faculty of speech was made natural to man as his reason, and that the use of language was the necessary result of his constitution. If by this were meant, that man spoke as necessarily as he breathed, the notion of an innate language must be allowed, and then the experiment of the Egyptian king to discover the primitive language of man must be confessed to have had its foundation in nature: but if it be merely meant, that man was by nature invested with the powers of speech, and by his condition, his relations, and his wants, impelled to the exercise of these powers, the difficulty returns, and all the obstacles already enumerated oppose themselves to the discovery of those powers, and to the means by which he was enabled to bring them into actual exertion. It may perhaps add strength to the observations already made upon this subject, to remark, that the author who has maintained this last-mentioned theory, and whose work, as containing the ablest and most laborious examination of the question, has been crowned with a prize by the academy of Berlin, and has been honoured with the general applause of the continental literati, has utterly failed, and is admitted to have failed, in that which is the grand difficulty of the question. For whilst he enlarges on the intelligent and social qualities of man, all fitting him for the use of language; the transition from that state which thus prepares man for language, to the actual exercise of the organs of speech, he is obliged to leave totally unexplained. (See the account given of the Essay of

Herder on the origin of language, in Nouveaux Memoirs de l'Acad. Roy. &c. de Berlin, 1771-and again, an Analysis of that work by M. Merian, in the vol. of the same Memoirs for the year 1781.) Enough, perhaps more than enough, has been said, in answer to those theories and objections which have been raised in opposition to that, which scripture* so obviously and unequivocally asserts, namely, the divine institution of language.

It is not necessary to the purpose of this Number, nor does scripture require us, to suppose with Stillingfleet, (Orig. Sac. B. i. cap. i. §. 3.) and with Bochart, (Hieros. P. i. L. i. cap. 9.) that Adam was endued with a full and perfect knowledge of the several creatures, so as to impose names truly expressive of their natures. It is sufficient, if we suppose the use of language taught him with respect to such things as were and that he was then left to the exercise of his own necessary, faculties for farther improvement upon this foundation. But that the terms of worship and adoration were among those which were first communicated, we can entertain little doubt. On the subject discussed in this Number, the reader may consult Morinus Exercit. de Ling. cap. vi. Buxtorfii Dissertat. p. 1-20. Walton. Prol. 1. §. 4. Warburt. Div. Leg. B. iv. S. iv. vol. ii. pp. 81, 82. Delan. Rev. Exam. Diss. 4.

* In addition to the proof which has been already derived from this source, it should be remembered that the laws given by God to the first pair, respecting food for their preservation, (Gen. i. 29. ii. 9.) and marriage for the propagation of their species, (Gen. ii. 22, 23.) together with the other discoveries of his will recorded in the beginning of Genesis, (i. 28. ii. 16-19. iii. 8-12, 14-22.) were communicated through the medium of language: and that the man and the woman are there expressly stated to have conversed with God, and with each other. Besides, in what sense could it be said, that a meet companion for the man was formed, if there were not given to both the power of communicating their thoughts by appropriate speech? If God pronounced it not good for man to be alone: if with multitudes of creatures surrounding him, he was still deemed to be alone, because there was none of these with which he could commune in rational correspondence; if a companion was assigned to him whose society was to rescue him from this solitude; what can be inferred, but that the indispensable requisite for such society, the powers and exercise of speech must have been at the same time vouchsafed?

It should be recollected too, that this is not the only instance recorded in scripture of the instantaneous communication of language. The diversity of tongues occasioning the confusion of Babel, and the miraculous gift of speech to the apostles on the day of Pentecost, may render a similar exercise of divine power in the case of our first parents more readily admissible: for it surely will not be contended, that such supernatural interference was less called for from the nature of the occasion, in the last named instance, than in either of the two former.

The writer of Ecclesiasticus pronounces decisively on the subject of this Number. When the Lord created man, he affirms, that having bestowed upon him the five operations of the Lord, in the sixth place he imparted to him understanding and in the seventh, speech, an interpretation of the cogitations thereof. Ecclus. xvii. ♬

Winder's Hist. of Knowledge, chap. i. §. 2. Barrington's Misc. Sacr. vol. iii. pp. 8. 45. Dr. Beattie and Wollaston, as referred to and above all, Dr. Ellis's Inquiry whence cometh wisdom, &c. which together with his work entitled, Knowledge of divine things from Revelation, are too little known, and cannot be too strongly recommended. The former of these tracts of Dr. Ellis, I have never met with, but as bound up in the Collection of Tracts, entitled THE SCHOLAR ARMED.

No. LIV.-ON THE NATURAL UNREASONABLENESS OF THE SACRIFICIAL RITE.

PAGE 41. (g) Outram states, (De Sac. lib. i. cap. 1. §. 3.) that the force of this consideration was in itself so great, as to compel Grotius, who defended the notion of the human institution of sacrifices, to maintain, in defiance of all just criti cism, that Abel did not slay the firstlings of his flock; and that no more is meant, than that he brought the choicest produce of his flock, milk and wool, and offered them, as Cain offered the choicest of his fruits.

Indeed the natural unfitness of the sacrificial rite to obtain the divine favour; the total incongruity between the killing of God's creatures, and the receiving a pardon for the violation of God's laws: are topics, which have afforded the oppo nents of the divine institution of sacrifice too much occasion for triumph, to be controverted on their side of the question. See Philemon to Hydaspes, part 5. p. 10-15. The words of Spencer on this subject are too remarkable to be omitted: "Sacrificiorum materia (pecudum caro, sanguis effusus, &c.) tam vilis est, et a summâ Dei majestate tam longe dissita, quod nemo (nisi plane simplex et rerum rudis) quin sacrificia plane superflua, deoque prorsus indigna facile judica ret. Sane tantum aberat, ut ethnici paulo humaniores sacrificia deorum suorum naturæ consentanea crederent, quod iis non raro mirari subiit, UNDE RITUS TAM TRISTIS, ET A NATURA DEORUM ALIENUS, IN HOMINUM CORDA VENIRET, SE TAM LONGE PROPAGARET, ET EORUM MORIBUS TAM TENACITER ADHÆRERET." De Leg. Heb. lib. iii. diss. ii cap. 4. sect. 2. p. 772.-Revelation would have removed the wonder.

No. LV.-ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF SACRIFICE.

PAGE 41. (h)-What Dr. Kennicot has remarked upon another subject, may well be applied to this. "Whatever custom has prevailed over the world, among nations the most

opposite in polity and customs in general; nations not united by commerce or communication, (when that custom has nothing in nature, or the reason of things, to give it birth, and establish to itself such a currency,) must be derived from some revelation: which revelation may in certain places have been forgotten, though the custom introduced by, and founded on such revelation still continued. And farther, this revelation must have been made antecedent to the dispersion at Babel, when all mankind, being but one nation, and living together in the form of one large family, were of one language, and governed by the same laws and customs." (Two Dissert. p. 161.) For, as Sir Isaac Newton observes, all mankind lived together in Chaldæa, under the government of Noah and his sons, until the days of Peleg. So long they were of one language, one society, and one religion. And then they divided the earth, being forced to leave off building the tower of Babel. And from thence they spread themselves into the several countries which fell to their shares, carrying along with them the laws, customs, and religion, under which they had till those days been educated and governed. (Chronol. p. 186.)

And again, as Kennicot observes from Delaney, whatever practice has obtained universally in the world, must have obtained from some dictate of reason, or some demand of nature, or some principle of interest, or else from some powerful influence or injunction of some Being of universal authority. Now, the practice of animal sacrifice did not obtain from reason; for no reasonable notions of God could teach men, that he could delight in blood, or in the fat of slain beasts. Nor will any man say, that we have any natural instinct to gratify, in spilling the blood of an innocent creature. Nor could there be any temptation from appetite to do this in those ages, when the whole sacrifice was consumed by fire; or when, if it was not, yet men wholly abstained from flesh; and consequently this practice did not owe its origin to any principle of interest. Nay, so far from any thing of this, that the destruction of innocent and useful creatures is evidently against nature, against reason, and against interest: and therefore must be founded in an authority, whose influence was as powerful, as the practice was universal: and that could be none but the authority of God, the sovereign of the world; or of Adam the founder of the human race. If it be said of Adam, the question still remains, what motive determined him to the practice? It could not be nature, reason, or interest, as has been already shown; it must therefore have been the authority of his Sovereign: and had Adam enjoined it to his posterity, it is not to be imagined

that they would have obeyed him in so extraordinary and expensive a rite from any other motive than the command of God. If it be urged, that superstitions prevailed unaccountably in the world; it may be answered, that all superstition has its origin in true religion: all superstition is an abuse: and all abuse supposes a right and proper use. And if this be the case in superstitious practices that are of lesser moment and extent, what shall be said of a practice existing through all ages, and pervading every nation? See Kennic. Two Diss. pp. 210, 211. and Rev. Exam. Diss. 8. p. 85-89. It is to no purpose, that theorists endeavour to explain the practice as of gradual growth; the first offerings being merely of fruits, and a transition afterwards made from this to animal sacrifice. Not to urge the sacrifice of Abel, and all the early sacrifices recorded in scripture, the transition is itself inconceivable. The two things are toto cœlo different: the one being an act of innocence; the other a cruel and unnatural rite. Dr. Richie's remarks on the subject of this Number, are particularly worthy of attention. Essay on the Rectitude of Divine Moral Government under the Patriarchal dispensation, § 53, 54.

No. LVI.-ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE NOTION OF THE EXPIATORY VIRTUE OF SACRIFICE.

PAGE 41. (i)-It is notorious, as we have already seen in Numbers V. and XXXIII. that all nations, Jews and Heathens, before the time of Christ, entertained the notion, that the displeasure of the offended Deity was to be averted by the sacrifice of an animal; and that, to the shedding of its blood, they imputed their pardon and reconciliation. In the explication of so strange a notion, and of the universality of its extent, unassisted reason must confess itself totally confounded. And accordingly we find Pythagoras, Plato, Porphyry, and other reflecting Heathens, express their wonder, how † an institution so dismal, and big with absurdity, could have spread through the world.

So powerful is the inference which this fact consequently supplies, against the human invention of sacrifice, that Dr. Priestley, labouring to support that doctrine, and at the same time, pressed by the force of the argument, has been obliged boldly to face about, and resolutely deny the fact; contending in defiance, as we have already shown, of all historical evidence, that the notion of expiating guilt by the death of the victim, was not the design of sacrifice, among either the

• See on this also Stanhope, Serm. xiii. Boyle Lect. vol. i. pp. 790, 794. + See Kennic. Two Dissert. p. 202. and Number LIV. of this work.