Donations to the Missionary Society of Connecticut.

August 13th. A Friend of Missions,

An unknown Widow,

16th. A Friend of Missions,

25th. Eliza W. Huntington, Agent for Female Society, Litchfield, for purchase of the Holy Bible,

of revelation, it is to be avowed as such, and cordially received by the friends of Jesus.

The object of the following remarks is not, directly to prove that the existence of one God in three distinct persons is a truth of revelation; but rather to an swer some questions that are proposed by way of objection to the doctrine.

The questions proposed to be considered are the following:

head, tho' acknowledged by the fathers, and believed by most Protestant divines for ages, is a disputed doctrine, and, in the present day, discarded by some who are set for the defence of the gospel. Many specious objections are raised against it, and much said to stagger the faith and disturb the minds of somie who are, yet, honest and sincere friends of Christ, and those truths contained in his gospel. Not only weak minded Christians are wounded by those observations that are raised a gainst this fundamental doctrine of Christianity, but injury is done in another view. Weapons are put into the hands of the enemies of the cross, and the cause of infidelity is strengthened. If III. Is it not a contradiction professors of religion-if the to say there are three persons teachers of Christianity raise possessed of perception and voobjections against the most im-lition, constituting one being portant doctrines of that gospel possessed of perception and vo they are set to defend, it lition? strengthens the cause of the adVOL. V. No. 4.

I. In what doth personality consist-doth it not involve the idea of perception and volition?

II. If personality involve the idea of perception and volition, how is a person distinguished from a being.

I. In what doth personality
Q

men do not admit of any distinction. Every distinct person is viewed as a distinct being.— James, Peter and John are persons, each distinct, as to person

consist-doth it not involve the idea of perception and volition? It is readily granted that the idea that first presents itself when a person is spoken of is that it is a rational intelligence-ality, from the other. Their a being possessed of percep- being is also as distinct as their tion and volition. To such an personality. They are three one only can personal proper persons, and three distinct beties and characters be applied. ings. The human mind, indeed, The word person cannot, with is not capable of abstracting, or any propriety, be applied to any making a distinction between but one that has a rational mind person and being, as applied to -one capable of distinguishing men. This is readily conceded, good from evil, and of choosing although the doctrine of the and refusing. The most impor- Trinity is owned as lying at the tant creatures, of the inanimate foundation of the Christian kind, are not persons, however scheme. useful to mankind. Nor can the word, in strictness of propriety, be applied to any of the irrational animals. The Psalm-lition, constituting one being possessed of perception and volition?

ist, it is true, compares the sun to a "Bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoicing as a strong man to run a race."But this is, evidently, to be taken in a figurative sense; and so are all personal properties when applied either to mere animals, or to inanimate things. Nothing short of a rational mind, capable of wishing and exercising choice, can constitute a person. Without entering into any metaphysical disquisitions, it may be said, in the plain language of common sense, that personality consisteth in a rational mind, capable of choosing and refusing, and that in view of moral good and evil; and, there fore, that perception and volition are, necessarily, involved in it.

II. If personality involve the idea of perception and volition, how is a person distinguished from a being?

The words person and being when applied to finite rational existencies, such as angels or

III. Is it not a contradiction to say there are three persons possessed of perception and vo

In attending to this question it seems necessary to answer two others. One is whether the proposition be contrary to reason? The other is, whether it be, in fact, a contradiction in terms?

1. Is the proposition contrary to reason?

A doctrine or proposition may be contrary to the method of reasoning used by those in opposition to it, and not contrary to reason itself. A doctrine may, also, be above the comprehension of reason, and yet, in no measure, contrary to it. We are to make a distinction between a doctrine contrary to rea. son, and one above its comprehension. "We may conclude says one writer, a doctrine is contrary to reason when it contradicts some of the first principles which the mind of man cannot but assent to without any proof. Such are the following:

the whole is greater than a part-it thence follow that to say there

are three divine persons constituting one divine being is a contradiction in terms. To as sert, because our ideas of a distinct finite person are that he is a distinct being, and because we are not able to separate personality from being, when applied to creatures, that therefore every distinct divine person is a distinct divine being, would be false reasoning. And so, because we are not able to abstract separate personality from separate being, when applied to creatures, to assert, that therefore the proposition, "there are three divine persons possessed of perception and volition constituting one divine being pos

it is impossible a thing should be and not be at the same time-two are more than one." If a doctrine contradict such plain, selfevident propositions it is contrary to reason. But this cannot be said of the doctrine of the Trinity. The most we can say of that is, that it is above the comprehension of a finite mind. Should we say that three persons are one person, or that the one divine being is three divine beings, it would do violence to common sense, and contradict the first principles of reason.But the proposition is that three persons constitute one divine being, which is not contrary to reason, however mysterious and incomprehensible to a finite un-sessed of perception and voliderstanding.

2. Is the proposition a contradiction in terms?

tion," is a contradiction in terms, would be false reasoning; it would be drawing inferences To say that the one divine be- without any premises--it would ing, possessed of perception and be to assert, that since we do volition, is three divine beings, not fully understand and compossessed of perception and vo-prehend a proposition it cannot lition, would be a contradiction be true-and this method of reain terms. Or should we say soning would exclude from huthat one divine person is three man belief many of the truths divine persons it would be self of revelation: Yea, it would excontradiction. But tho' it is clude from the minds of many, conceded that we cannot ab- a belief of some propositions stract personality from being, which are capable of demonstrait doth not thence follow that tion. every distinct divine person is a If we consider the subject distinct being; nor that as many fairly, and in the exercise of distinct divine persons as there Christian candor, the proposiare, so many distinct divine be- tion we are examining will not ings there are. Nor does it fol- appear either a violation of realow because we cannot conceive son or a contradiction in terms. of distinct personality without, What tho' it contain a mystery; at the same time, conceiving of yet that, it is conceived, is no obdistinct being, when applied to jection against it. Many things creatures, that therefore they which we cannot comprehend, cannot be conceived of separate- or fully understand, we are ly, or that they cannot be sep-bound to believe. Who can acarated in the divine mind, and count for the divine existence, in the divine being. Nor does from eternity, underived and

of the Bible, and pronounce it inconsistent and contradictory, while we admit others equally mysterious and incomprehensible? This will be degrading to our own understanding, as well as reproachful to the infinite God. While we are not to explain or investigate the doctrine of the Trinity, for there is nothing in the nature of creatures by which it can be illustrated, we are to admit it as true on the credit of divine revelation-cspecially so, since it is neither a violation of reason, nor a contra

uncaused? Who can, on rational, philosophical principles, see how all things were made of nothing? These are as real mysteries, and as contrary to reason, as the doctrine of the Trinity. Who can account for the resurrection of the body, and the change of those who shall be found alive at judgment? Of the latter, Paul saith, "Behold, I shew you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye."Is not this a mystery-as really so as the doctrine of the Trini-diction in terms. If we estabty? Can we any more comprehend the one than the other? Is it to be accounted for on principles of reason and philosophy? And shall we reject this, or any other doctrine, because above reason; and say it cannot be true because we are unable to comprehend it? We cannot "find out the Almighty unto perfection." God is greater than man. He sees thro' and perfectly understands those things which, to the human mind, are enveloped in thick darkness; and by his unlimited power he is able to accomplish all his purposes. God can as easily change, in a moment, a natural to a spiritual body, as he can will to do it-and he knows perfectly well, how all things were made of nothing, and understands his own eternal existence underived and uncaused, tho' in view of these the human mind is lost and bewildered.So, by his infinite understanding, God is able to see through the doctrine of the Trinity, and know it is true, though to us it be an incomprehensible mystery.

Shall we deny one doctrine

lish it as a maxim, to admit no doctrine but what we can explain, on principles of reason and human philosophy, we may deny the doctrine of the Trinity. And on this principle we shall deny many other leading truths of scripture. On this principle, indeed, we shall discard and deny many things, which we know exist, in the natural world.Yea, this principle lays the basis of infidelity, and, if pursued, leads a short and easy way to a denial of the whole scheme of Christianity.

It may be suitable before these remarks are closed, to notice some of the dangerous consequences of denying the doctrine of the Trinity; or admitting the force of any objec tions against it.

1. If we deny the doctrine of the Trinity in unity it is a denial of the divinity of Christ. If there be not three divine persons existing in one God, the divinity of Christ must be given up-it cannot be supported on any other ground. If we allow that distinct personality constitutes distinct being, when applied to God, then of course, Jesus